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太平洋岛国研究

Research on Pacific Island Countries

（第四辑）

陈德正 主 编 // 于镭 执行主编 //



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卷首语

21 世纪以来，中国同太平洋岛国的关系发展迅速。继 2014 年双方建立战略合作伙伴关系之后，中国与太平洋岛国领导人又达成了共建“一带一路”和“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”南线的共识，奠定了中国同岛国关系扬帆再启航的坚实基础。中国同岛国关系的健康持续发展，既得益于中国坚持平等相待、互利共赢、守望相助的合作原则和同舟共济的“人类命运共同体”精神，也同太平洋岛国政府和民众渴望独立自主、发展经济的强烈内生动力紧密相关。“一带一路”和“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”南线的建设，推动了太平洋地区“人类命运共同体”的构建，揭开了太平洋岛国同域内外国家关系的新的历史篇章。

《太平洋岛国研究》第四辑主要关注“一带一路”视域下太平洋岛国同中国的关系，太平洋岛屿地区和岛国的政治、经济、文化和历史。本辑的研究课题引起了国内外学者的广泛关注和浓厚的兴趣。我们高兴地看到海内外学者纷纷致函本刊，惠予赐稿，为太平洋岛屿地区和太平洋岛国研究的不断发展做出了重要的贡献。

在本辑中，十余位中外学者分别从不同的学科领域、多维的研究视角对太平洋岛屿地区和太平洋岛国的地缘政治、经济、外交、文化和历史进行了深刻的理论分析和学理探讨，为将太平洋岛屿地区和太平洋岛国的研究不断推向深入做出了有益的探索。

本辑编者
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“一带一路”与 太平洋岛国

The Belt and Road Initiative and the Geopolitics of the South Pacific

David Morris *

Abstract: The Belt and Road Initiative has become associated with a geopolitical “China threat” discourse in the South Pacific. Are China and Australia, the dominant regional player in the South Pacific, driven by geopolitical imperatives to compete for power or do their different geopolitical needs provide opportunity for cooperation that is mutually beneficial and manages risks in the region? Supposed Chinese “threats” as well as risks to China are examined, including fears of a military base in Vanuatu, Chinese debt-funded projects in Tonga and closer economic cooperation with Papua New Guinea. A geopolitical analysis concludes that it is feasible for Australia to meet its geopolitical imperatives if its regional security leadership can be maintained. A geopolitical analysis of China in the South Pacific concludes that China is unlikely to seek regional security leadership if it can ensure access to trade routes and markets. If Australia could move beyond geopolitical rhetoric, it should therefore be possible for Australia to partner with China to support sustainable development, mitigate risks and ensure broader stability of the

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South Pacific region.

Keywords: Geopolitics; China; Pacific Islands; Australia; Belt and Road Initiative

China's new program for inter-regional economic connectivity, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), will develop new trade routes and production chains linking developing world economies with the giant Chinese market. In recent years, "China threat" discourse is becoming dominant in the English-speaking narratives about the BRI and that has been particularly prevalent in the South Pacific. At the same time, most Pacific island countries have signed up to participate in the BRI. The rise of China will certainly be disruptive to existing power relativities, strengthening China's geopolitical position as the hub for diversified land and maritime trade routes including the South Pacific. The question explored in this paper is whether China and Australia, the dominant regional players, are driven by geopolitical imperatives to compete for power in a high-risk game, or they do their geopolitical constraints which means they can find a formula for cooperation that is mutually beneficial and can manage risks in the region.

The BRI promises to develop a wider range of trade connections across land and sea, further internationalizing the Chinese currency and Chinese corporations, as well as further globalizing the Chinese economy. Through investing in local infrastructure and connectivity along the new trade corridors, the BRI offers to integrate developing economies further into global supply chains. As Chinese industry upgrades to higher value production, it can be expected that many developing world countries on the Belt and Road will take their place as suppliers of lower value products. The initiative may reduce China's dependence on traditional trading partners and therefore over time signal a shift in Chinese outward investment away from traditional destinations such as

the United States (U. S.) and Australia towards developing BRI partners, which are enjoying the fastest growth in Chinese investment.^① If successful, the BRI may therefore reshape global trade.

Depending on ideological predisposition, the audacity of this initiative from a rising power represents on the one hand a huge contribution to the public good that could be contrasted with the colonialism and plunder of former rising powers or, on the other hand, a geopolitical play to trap the developing world into debt relationships and domination by Chinese state and business interests. As China's relative power grows and given the nature of the Chinese Party State, inevitably those nations whose relative power is declining will perceive the disruption as a geopolitical threat.

The primacy of geopolitics was evident at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting in Port Moresby in November 2018. U. S. Vice President Pence confronted China with rejection of a so-called “constraining belt” and “one-way road”, claiming the terms of Chinese assistance were “opaque”, “unsustainable and poor quality”, “threatening the sovereignty of small nations”. At the same time, Pence announced the U. S. would partner with Australia in upgrading a military base on the Papua New Guinea island of Manus, at Lombrum, a port that China had reportedly offered to help upgrade.^② Australia also announced that it would establish a U. S. \$ 1.5 billion infrastructure financing facility for the Pacific Islands, including Papua New Guinea, in cooperation with Japan and other countries, as a clear counter-balance to Chinese infrastructure finance. The stage was set for Great Power competition in the South Pacific. Must it be so?

① MOFCOM Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation Comments on China's Outward Investment and Cooperation in 2018, January 17, 2019, <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201901/20190102829745.shtml>.

② Murphy, K., “America to Partner with Australia to Develop Naval Base on Manus Island”, *The Guardian*, November 18, 2018. Medcalf, R., “2018 APEC Summit Possible Turning Point for China's Powerplay in the Pacific”, *Australian Financial Review*, November 18, 2018.

After decades of constructive engagement with China, the mood in the West has soured. Following the shock of deep economic recession and its lasting impacts since 2008, with the subsequent rise of populist leadership, the U. S. has flipped to strategic competition with China. That was first manifested in the 2017 *U. S. National Security Strategy* and 2018 *Defense Strategy*. Its second manifestation was in the Trump Administration's "trade war" tariffs which observers believe is part of a U. S. strategy to de-link its economy from dependence on China and to prevent Chinese dominance of new communications and artificial intelligence technology, which are likely to be the critical platforms for the "fourth industrial revolution". This shift to strategic competition is unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon, as U. S. relative power diminishes over time from the unique unipolar after the end of the Cold War, and as China's relative power increases.

The changed geopolitical climate has had an impact in the leading power of the South Pacific region, Australia. Despite being one of the most economically integrated advanced economies with China, Australian discourse changed in recent years under a minority conservative government to a "China panic" over foreign political donations (allowed under Australian law) and supposed "foreign influence" operations. Australia began to push back against Chinese finance and investment in its region. A far right member of the government lashed out at Chinese "roads going nowhere"^① in an attempt to paint Chinese aid as overbearing and misallocated in order to gain political influence. The move backfired on the Australian Government, as it was followed by a series of blunders in which Australian ministers appeared condescending or dismissive of the Pacific, with the comments widely interpreted as attacking the decision makers of the Pacific who had solicited

① Graue, C., and Dziedzic, S., "Federal Minister Concetta Fierravanti-Wells Accuses China of Funding 'Roads that go nowhere' in Pacific", *ABC Pacific Beat*, January 10, 2018.

Chinese support for key infrastructure. Nevertheless, the BRI has been increasingly discussed in negative terms in the region, consistent with global English language discourse.

The geopolitical narrative that has developed in the West in recent years describes the BRI as a grand strategy for maritime and land route domination by China, using subsidized finance and disproportionate scale to develop infrastructure and relationships across vast swathes of the world to impose its will, including for future potential projection of military power. The narrative goes that China is trapping developing nations in debt that will be impossible to repay, laying the groundwork for Chinese economic and political domination and potential seizure of strategic assets.^① This narrative has developed at the same time as China has been militarizing islands in the South China Sea, tightening its grip on internal security and sharpening its rhetoric on unification with Taiwan. It is therefore understandable that geopolitical analysts may conflate a range of Chinese behaviours, combined with the Chinese Party State, with the BRI to construct a “China threat” to the global order. But before drawing any conclusions about the Chinese Government’s long term aims, it is important to investigate both the geopolitical imperatives as well as the limits on China’s current and potential “hard power” reach.

China is a rising power, but it is a constrained power. Unlike the British Empire or the U. S. before it, China does not and cannot enjoy dominance of the sea and is surrounded by strategic rivals. To grow and prosper, China must trade with the world, both to import resources and other goods for its huge domestic market as well as to export goods to the world. To do so, it must have access to maritime trade routes. Yet the global

① Hart, M., and Johnson, B., “Mapping China’s Global Governance Ambitions”, February 28, 2019, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466768/mapping-chinas-global-governance-ambitions/>.

and regional hegemon, the U. S. , with hundreds of bases around the world including across the Pacific, has the capacity to interdict China's trade. China therefore has a geopolitical imperative to expand its options, by developing new sea trade routes, as well as new land routes that will bring the added benefit of strengthening links to resource-rich Central Asia by developing and potentially stabilizing China's troubled Western regions. The scale of the Chinese economy allows it to simultaneously develop new trade routes in all directions, including to Southeast Asia, South Asia and beyond to the South Pacific.

The rise of China will certainly disrupt existing power relativities, strengthening China's geopolitical position. Based on the historical experience of previous rising powers, it is therefore understandable that observers expect with the development of new trade routes, will come demands to keep them secure by building bases and other platforms for the Chinese military to defend its economic interests and to protect its people overseas. Ever since the U. S. adopted the posture of strategic competition with China, stories have appeared in media across the world that China is planning future military bases along the Belt and Road.

Will The Belt and Road projects be followed by military bases? China emphatically says no. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly claimed China does not seek to be another hegemonic power. To date, China has only one overseas base, in Djibouti, which sits alongside a U. S. base and functions as a logistical and supply facility for Chinese peacekeeping forces (China is now the leading contributor of forces to United Nations peacekeeping operations) . A useful case study of the Western narrative is the "China panic" about Luganville Wharf in Vanuatu.

In 2018, chatter in tiny Vanuatu, an impoverished nation in the South Pacific, led Australian intelligence to leak to the media that China was considering establishing a base there. The claim was swiftly denied by the

Vanuatu Government.^① Chinese concessional finance had supported Shanghai Construction Company to build a new wharf at Luganville, which both the Government and local business welcomed as important infrastructure that could host simultaneous visiting cruise ships and container ships, supporting economic development on the resource-rich island of Espiritu Santo. The project was delivered on time and on budget but soon after the Australian media began to discuss it as a geopolitical threat. In the absence of access to confidential intelligence reports which may not become available for decades, the claim that China was planning a military base in non-aligned Vanuatu appear wholly unbelievable and might best be understood as more related to domestic Australian politics, consistent with media stories in previous decades that generated “Libya panic” and “Russia panic” about feared military bases in the South Pacific.^②

Western commentators Lee construct a geopolitical “debt trap” narrative, in which the debt burden of countries such as Vanuatu and Tonga (discussed below) makes them client states of China, and that will over time amass political leverage through its firms’ control of international supply lines.^③ This appears too simplistic, however, given the complexity of each BRI project and the multiple actors involved. Zhang notes the importance of agency on the part of governments that engage with China.^④ Not enough attention is being paid in the dominant narrative to the agency being exercised by the governments of independent nation states, with all the emphasis on the asymmetrical power of China’s bilateral relationships.

From a Chinese (and a developing nation) perspective, it could be

① Wroe, D., “Vanuatu PM Defends China Deals but Vows to Oppose any New Foreign Military Base”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 13, 2018.

② Gynge, A., *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942*, La Trobe University Press, Melbourne, 2017.

③ Lee, J., “China’s Trojan Ports”, *The American Interest*, 14 (4), November 2018.

④ Zhang, H., “Beyond ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Dissemination of PRC State Capitalism”, *China Brief*, 19 (1), The Jamestown Foundation, January 5, 2019.

posited that the BRI may be a stabilizing geopolitical force, aiding development and greater economic cooperation between the nations along its trade routes. On the other hand, China's power may be exaggerated and China itself may find itself and its interests caught in the middle of conflicts and disputes along new maritime trade routes which raise serious risks for BRI investments. Pacific island countries contain rivalries and internal divisions and China and local Chinese business communities could conceivably become the targets of alienated populations in the future, as has happened in the past. The geopolitical stakes, both risks and opportunities, are therefore particularly high for China as well as for the region.

Further, what if the debtor countries default? Some of the countries included in the BRI now have high levels of indebtedness to Chinese institutions. Others do not. China itself is exhibiting high levels of debt after a decade of expansionary policies. This is a new risk environment in which developing countries may be ill-prepared if a new global financial shock occurs in the short to medium term. These are risks that are less to do with the BRI itself than macro-economic policies in an uncertain international economic environment, but is relevant to the geopolitical analysis in cases in which countries have a high debt dependency on China.

It might reasonably be assumed that debtor countries seeking to renegotiate debt terms with Chinese financial institutions risk negotiating from a position of weakness. Yet an examination of the experience to date is that a number of debtor countries have been able to achieve rescheduling of debt or even conversion of debt to grant aid. Tonga, which became highly indebted after taking out two concessional infrastructure loans, convinced China to defer repayments for a further five years beyond its initial five-year grace period.^①In most cases, China

① Dornan, M. and Brant, P., "Chinese Assistance in the Pacific: Agency, Effectiveness and the Role of Pacific Island Governments", *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 1 (2), June 2014.

has tended to offer a grace period of five to seven years before repayment periods of fifteen to twenty years begin, typically at two to three per cent interest. Pacific island countries evidently welcome Chinese finance, in particular its generally lighter conditionality than finance from the traditional international financial institutions and traditional donors. Vanuatu Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu echoed a common refrain amongst developing nations when he referred to China's "less stringent processes for getting large infrastructure projects implemented".^①

Beyond debt, there are other areas of risk for China that BRI projects will be poorly planned or implemented and that this will be interpreted through the geopolitical lens. The Belt and Road includes many high-risk operating environments which are characterized by poor local governance, inadequate security, inconsistent rule of law, lack of policy and project coordination capacity, inadequate infrastructure and labour skills, amongst other risks, all of which are challenges for successful project implementation and outcomes. Regardless of the BRI, there are environments in which corruption and clientelism, opaque and conflicting state and stakeholder interests, political instability and even threat of conflict and law and order problems may exist. Investing in states without strong institutions and good governance is both a risk and a calculated opportunity, given Chinese confidence in their own model of development.

Like other major powers, China has a global network of embassies actively gathering information to better understand the economic operating environment in each country. Following collection of such information, government to government agreements are negotiated to determine the BRI projects for which the host government is seeking finance. In theory, these are

① Regenvanu, R., "Keynote Address to 'The China Alternative' Symposium", *Vanuatu Daily Post*, March 2, 2019.

aligned with the national development plans of the host countries and local governments might be expected to collaborate with Chinese partners to reduce country risks.

In practice, major country risks are difficult to mitigate. Adaptation to local conditions is more likely, with all of its attendant risks of corruption, poor project implementation and outcomes. These will vary however by country. Dornan and Brant demonstrate, through a comparison of Pacific Island countries, the difference in project outcomes as a result of the diversity in governance.^① In Tonga, two Exim Bank loans were negotiated directly by government ministers and experts, and government agency advice was either ignored or not sought. A substantial component of Tonga's first loan, provided to fund rebuilding the capital's downtown district following riots in 2006, was diverted to build a wharf and a palace extension for the king. The relevant government agency was unable to enforce its preferred Australian construction standards on a road project funded by the second loan. By contrast, in Samoa, no such concerns about quality or outcomes from Chinese-financed projects have been noted, which Dornan and Brant ascribe to a well-functioning system of transparent processes for decision making including sector plans, development partner meetings and Samoan Government coordination committees chaired by the Prime Minister and involving key agencies including the Ministry of Finance, as well as representatives of the private sector and civil society.

Corruption risks also vary across different operating environments. While the Chinese Government has embarked in recent years on a highly visible anti-corruption drive, it is difficult to demonstrate whether corruption risks are being successfully managed in BRI projects. The high cost of many projects would appear to indicate that corruption remains widespread. Anecdotal

① Dornan, M. & Brant, P., "Chinese Assistance in the Pacific: Agency, Effectiveness and the Role of Pacific Island Governments", *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 1 (2), June 2014.

discussion suggests that where projects are renegotiated after changes of ministers or of governments, that corruption is being recycled and the Chinese companies are being extorted repeatedly in some instances, although it is impossible to find such evidence on the public record.

Further, poor environmental governance by nations hosting BRI projects poses an increasing risk, as international civil society organisations publicise environmental problems and blame the firms involved (which are sometimes a softer target than host governments, which are less likely to respond). The Bank of China has faced widespread international protests over its funding of the Batang Toru Dam in Indonesia, which it is claimed will eliminate habitat for the endangered orang utan.^① It is quite possible that active civil society organisations in the South Pacific will also target Chinese firms if environmental problems arise from BRI projects.

The most strategically important Pacific island country is the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, which is rich in resources including maritime resources. There are deep and abiding links to its southern neighbour, Australia, which was given the mandate by the League of Nations after World War One to act as colonial power and to bring Papua New Guinea to independence. The two countries have strong economic and strategic ties. Australia played a leading role in Papua New Guinea's early resources projects, is the leading contributor of aid and no doubt will continue to be an important partner to Papua New Guinea.

Once a strategically vital buffer between South East Asia and Australia and the site of key World War Two battles, Papua New Guinea was neglected in geopolitical discourse in recent decades, while the world's attention (including Australia's) was focused in the Middle East and other conflict

① Chan, M., "China's Institutions and Banks Need Help from the World's Civil Society to Ensure the Belt and Road Initiative Remains Green", *South China Morning Post*, March 10, 2019.

zones. In 2018, however, Papua New Guinea returned to international prominence as the host of APEC for the first time, providing a platform for a developing geopolitical contest between the China and the U. S. , with Australia also swept along in the new narrative of strategic competition.

In the meantime, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific are continuing to build closer economic relationships with China. Over the last decade, China has overtaken the U. S. to become the second biggest aid donor in the Pacific, after Australia. Its businesses are active across the region on aid-funded projects and seeking out business opportunities.

This new wave of Chinese activity builds on earlier waves of Chinese presence in the Pacific. Chinese communities have built links to the region over centuries. First, relatively small numbers travelled out from South China and settled across Oceania, developing trading and retail businesses. In the last decade or so, as the Chinese Government adopted its “go global” economic strategy, large state-owned enterprises invested in major resource industries in Papua New Guinea and trade has increased with a number of Pacific island countries, particularly in resources, fish products and timber. At the same time, the Chinese Government has extended concessional loans to the developing countries of the region and has supported the construction of vital infrastructure, and education and capacity building support. The third wave is just beginning, as emerging private sector businesses from China look for more diversified opportunities across the region and as China’s outbound tourism grows.

It is difficult to ascertain how Papua New Guinea interprets the recent geopolitical turn. In the midst of the heightened geopolitical atmosphere, Papua New Guinea appears to have no grand strategy. With a weak state infrastructure, Papua New Guinea governments tend to engage with external powers on a transactional basis. Indeed, domestic politics as well is highly transactional, combining an Australian-designed system of democracy with local cultural

characteristics that often require each chief or “big man” to purchase support regularly from his constituency or to face rapid replacement. Despite the appearance of a deliberative parliamentary system, decisions tend to reflect negotiated transactional benefits for a shifting majority of lawmakers.

In foreign policy making, a small elite group of political and bureaucratic leaders exercise leadership, with no established processes of broader consultation, based on transactional benefits to the leadership group.^① It is in this context that Papua New Guinea’s relationship with China has been developed. In 2014, China and Papua New Guinea established a strategic partnership. Two years later, the two countries signed several cooperation documents including a framework agreement on development cooperation on production capacity. During Prime Minister O’Neill’s visit to Beijing in 2018, the relationship was upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Papua New Guinea signed up to the BRI and agreement was reached to begin work on joint feasibility study for a Free Trade Agreement.

It appears none of this until recently has been viewed through a geopolitical lens in Papua New Guinea. Prime Minister O’Neill was quoted as insisting “we are not very interested in geopolitics, we are very interested in doing business with everyone” in the lead up to APEC.^② Yet at the same time Papua New Guinea was negotiating with Australia for the first foreign military base on its territory since independence. While Papua New Guinea leaders might dissemble, the Manus military base announcement demonstrates that Papua New Guinea is undeniably within Australia’s sphere of influence and understandably so. In this situation, the apparent competition between Australia and China for influence in Papua New Guinea becomes an important

① Kaiku, P., “Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Relations in the Era of Sino-American Rivalry”, *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 19, 2018.

② Whiting, N., “PNG Offers to Play Peacemaker between Australia and China at APEC”, *ABC News*, November 15, 2018.

part of the context of understanding the geopolitics of the region.

Indeed, a closer investigation of the geopolitical imperatives of Australia and China is necessary to understand whether it is or is not inevitable that the two nations must engage in a great contest in the South Pacific, with Papua New Guinea (and the smaller island countries) caught in between.

Australia's first geopolitical imperative, as the continent at the end of the South East Asian archipelago, is to maintain a stable balance in East Asia, on which it depends for its security and prosperity. Yet Australia as a middle power cannot alone ensure the security of the broader region. It therefore must work with partners to sustain regional stability and free trade and its traditional partner has been the U. S. The rise of China, while enormously benefiting Australia economically, is naturally disrupting the strategic balance. Therefore Australia will need reassurance from China that its rise will strengthen regional stability and free trade.

Australia's second geopolitical imperative is to sustain its alliance with the U. S. and encourage active U. S. engagement in preserving the strategic balance, regionally and globally, underpinning free trade and the global rules-based order. Here, Australia is anxious. Not only has the U. S. flipped from four decades of constructive engagement with China to strategic competition, but it has also turned populist and, under President Trump, begun to act in a manner that is dismissive of free trade and the global rules-based order from which Australia has benefited so strongly. Australia will not abandon the alliance that has underpinned its security for the entire post-war era. Australia will, however, need to focus on its national interests first and foremost, in particular in its immediate region.

Australia's third geopolitical imperative (third only because it becomes of critical importance if either of the first two fail) is to secure the Australian continent and its approaches, through high population growth, defence self-reliance and maintaining stability in the South Pacific. Australia maintains

defence superiority in its immediate region, is growing in population and has the wealth to build greater self-reliance to defend itself. But it has neglected the South Pacific for two decades, a region with weak governance, aid-dependent economies and facing an existential challenge from climate change. Geopolitical commentary about China's presence in the South Pacific is adding to Australian anxiety.

There is nothing preventing Australia, with its abundant assets and good governance, from developing a grand strategy to meet its geopolitical imperatives. Australia has a strong track record of middle power leadership, building coalitions to shape its regional environment and to encourage major powers into cooperation, for example, APEC. Australia is highly likely to be at the table as an active participant if the East Asian region develops a future grand bargain, or concert of powers, to ensure stability and prosperity. Australia's alliance with the U. S. also brings it broader influence and strategic depth, as long as the U. S. remains focused on sustaining the balance in Asia. And Australia can certainly show more leadership in the South Pacific.

Yet Australia has suffered from a high turnover of leaders and a lack of strategic focus and policy continuity for a decade. Its current government, which surprised almost all observers to be narrowly re-elected in 2019, has fallen back onto old habits of whipping up geopolitical panic for political purposes.

It is therefore important to separate the real issues from the day to day politics. Firstly, Australia will want to ensure that its military remains the predominant force in the South Pacific region and that any critical infrastructure is secure from foreign control. This is reasonable and, despite the media hyperbole, does not have to be interpreted as a contest with China. Both sides of politics in Australia have signaled a desire for increased leadership in the region and China could contribute to regional stability by signaling its acceptance of Australia's leadership in the South Pacific.

Secondly, it is in Australia's interests, as much as those of the Pacific

island countries, to encourage sustainable development across the South Pacific region. China can be a partner here, as it has been for Australia in its massive economic expansion over recent decades. This is where Australia could change its language from the combative tone of recent months to signal its acceptance of China's legitimate role as economic partner in the region.

It is necessary to also examine China's strategic imperatives to understand whether China is intent on strategic control of the waters around the Australian continent and therefore heading to confrontation in the South Pacific.

China's first geopolitical imperative is to ensure the stability and security of its nation, a vast and complex country which retains deep economic and other imbalances. That is why China's focus is much more domestic than global, unlike the traditional great powers of recent centuries that sought foreign territories to control.

China's second geopolitical imperative is to ensure access to land and maritime trade routes, as China continues to develop its economy and to build its trade and investment links to diverse partners across the world. This includes maintaining economic cooperation with the great global markets of Europe, North America and Asia, as well as developing new integration with developing economies along The Belt and Road, including the South Pacific.

China's third geopolitical imperative (most critical if the first two fail) is to find a new global balance including in Asia. At present, China's interests are well served by the global rules-based order, which has allowed it to rise and to prosper from open world markets. China is investing in larger and more modern military forces but is surrounded by strategic competitors, which constrains China from becoming a regional or global hegemon as previous great powers sought to be. China is likely to seek greater global and regional influence, including deeper and broader economic links, but appears unlikely to be the military threat to distant nations that geopolitical commentators fear.

So, the question is whether both Australia and China need to be wary of

each other in the South Pacific, or they might be able to cooperate. Australia does have an overarching security imperative in the South Pacific, while China's primary interest is economic.

Might Australia-China cooperation in the Pacific contribute to broader regional stability and economic development that meets the geopolitical imperatives of both countries? It seems to be at least possible, and the current narrative of strategic competition appears to be too simplistic. There is nothing inevitable about a contest between Australia and China in the region if both countries focus on their national interests and, not forgetting, of course, the interests of the sovereign governments of the Pacific.

Indeed, none of the small island nations wish to be treated like pawns in a bigger game; all will seek at least transactional benefits from the new attention from Australia as well as China, and all will want to keep the Pacific a region of peace.

The South Pacific should have significant growth potential. Papua New Guinea is resource-rich, other island nations have vast fishery resources and could be developed for high-earning tourism if there were direct air links and adequate local infrastructure.

Australia's new regional infrastructure focus could be complementary to China's BRI in helping to realize this potential in the South Pacific. Firms from both Australia and China bring skills and experience to address the development needs of the region. There are political risks, to be sure, and Australia-China cooperation could help mitigate these risks, by ensuring projects are developed within sustainable debt repayment plans and according to the highest standards of governance and transparency to avoid corruption and other risks. What is fundamental to getting new infrastructure right will be listening to the needs of the local communities and aligning new investment with the economic development that the Pacific islands themselves want. Both Australia and China have sometimes not listened closely enough; new

cooperation models built in consultation with the region should help. And Australia-China cooperation in the South Pacific could provide a good model for how two very different nations can work together and indeed provide a model for reduction of political risk on the Belt and Road in general.

The Pacific islands are amongst the poorest, least developed nations on earth. They are distant from markets, sparsely populated and lacking the capacity to find solutions to their challenges such as climate change, chronic disease and aid dependency. At least the recent geopolitical flurry has put their region in the spotlight. Perhaps the strategic importance of the South Pacific can help, finally, to bring sustainable development and opportunities to its people.

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“一带一路”视域下中国同太平洋岛国互利合作关系探析

于 镭*

摘要：21 世纪以来，中国同太平洋岛国的关系发展迅速。继 2014 年双方建立战略合作伙伴关系之后，中国与太平洋岛国领导人又达成了共建“一带一路”的共识，奠定了中国同岛国关系扬帆再启航的坚实基础。中国同岛国关系的健康持续发展，既得益于中国坚持平等相处、互利合作、心心相印、守望相助的相处原则及同舟共济的“人类命运共同体”精神，也同太平洋岛国政府和民众渴望独立自主和发展自身经济的强烈内生动力及与域内外西方大国进行施压与反施压博弈的外生动力紧密相关。共建“一带一路”推动了太平洋地区“人类命运共同体”的构建，揭开了中国同太平洋岛国关系的新的历史篇章。

关键词：太平洋岛国 “一带一路” 合作共赢 人类命运共同体

2018 年 11 月，习近平主席对巴布亚新几内亚进行国事访问，并同

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与中国建交的太平洋岛国领导人集体会晤,^① 共商加快共建“一带一路”合作。这是继 2014 年中国与太平洋岛国构建“相互尊重、共同发展”战略伙伴关系以来, 双方关系发展史上的又一里程碑事件, 标志着中国与太平洋岛国关系的扬帆再启航。

一 太平洋岛屿地区: 重要的地缘地位

太平洋岛屿地区位于太平洋西南部, 是连接亚洲与南北美洲的交通要冲, 战略地位十分重要, 一向被全球体系的主导者美国视作自己的“内湖”。^② 南太平洋的地区强国澳大利亚则视太平洋岛屿地区为其“前院”。^③ 长期以来, 美、澳两国不仅对太平洋岛屿国家进行政治、经济、文化和意识形态上的控制, 而且还在该地区不断扩建联合军事基地。美国和澳大利亚之所以对太平洋岛屿国家如此重视, 主要有以下三方面原因。

一是太平洋岛屿地区丰富的自然资源是西方大国高度重视该地区的首要因素。虽然太平洋岛屿地区的 14 个独立岛国的面积仅为 50 多万平方公里, 但其拥有的海洋专属经济区面积却高达 3000 多万平方公里。^④ 辽阔的海疆蕴藏了丰富的动植物资源和无尽的石油、天然气等矿物资源。据澳大利亚有关机构报道, 太平洋岛屿地区近来又探明了储量极为丰富并极具战略价值的稀有金属和非金属资源。^⑤ 这些宝贵的资源既可

① 太平洋岛国是指位于南太平洋地区的岛屿国家。2018 年 11 月 15 日, 习近平主席对巴布亚新几内亚进行国事访问, 并同与我国建交的斐济、萨摩亚、巴布亚新几内亚、瓦努阿图、密克罗尼西亚联邦、库克群岛、汤加和纽埃 8 个太平洋岛国领导人举行集体会谈。本文如无特别说明, 所指中国与太平洋岛国关系即中国与上述 8 个建交太平洋岛国的关系。

② Thomas Lee, George Yu and Kenneth Klinkner, *American Studies in China*, New York: University Press of America, 1993, p. 143.

③ Yu Lei, “China-Australia Strategic Partnership in the Context of China’s Grand Peripheral Diplomacy”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, pp. 740–760.

④ Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Pacific Islands Factsheets*, <https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/Pages/the-pacific.aspx>.

⑤ Michael Peterson and Akuila Tawake 2017, Deep Sea Minerals in the Pacific, *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*, September, http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2017-05/ib_2017_9_pettersontawake_0.pdf.

用于航空、航天等高科技领域，又可用于尖端军事领域。显然，掌握了这些资源不仅可为己方获得丰厚的经济和军事利益，更可制约潜在竞争对手的发展。

二是太平洋岛屿地区具有重要的军事和战略价值，是超级大国和地区强国一直竭力加以掌控的军事战略区。太平洋岛屿地区位于太平洋中部地带，扼守亚洲与南北美洲的海上交通要道，地理位置十分重要。此外，该地区洋面辽阔、水深流急、岛屿密布，战略舰艇布防于此既易于隐蔽，又便于进攻，对太平洋地区大国而言具有重要的军事价值。美国和澳大利亚部分媒体曾指出，二战期间日本将帕劳殖民地建为军事基地后，东向威胁关岛，西向威慑菲律宾，并一举切断了美国本土与亚洲的联系，致使太平洋战争伊始，美军菲律宾基地在日军前后夹击下瞬间崩溃，数万美军不战而降。因此，以美国为首的西方国家一直竭力掌控太平洋群岛地区的安全体系，决不容许太平洋岛国与任何非西方国家建立军事和安全合作。

三是太平洋岛屿地区 14 个独立岛国“用一个声音说话”，日益成为国际社会的重要政治力量，是西方国家设法控制的“票库”。20 世纪 70 年代前，太平洋岛国均为美国、澳大利亚、新西兰、日本等帝国主义列强的殖民地。独立后，岛国在经济和外援上一直依赖前殖民宗主国，因而在国际社会上并不能真正为自身的利益发声。冷战结束后，岛国政府及民众在政治上的独立自主意识空前高涨，在联合国等国际组织中“用一个声音说话”，努力成为一支独立的政治力量。为此，各岛国奉行“不要将所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里”的策略，^① 努力与包括中国、印度和东盟在内的世界新兴经济体发展全方位的合作关系。^② 西方前殖民宗主国并不甘心在该地区力量和影响力的下降，竭力试图在政治、经济和意识形态上恢复对太平洋岛国的控制，并使其成为在联合国和其他国际组织中可以利用的政治工具。

① Peter Abigail, *Australia and the South Pacific: Rising to the Challenge*, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008, p. 91.

② Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, *Pacific Opportunities*, Manila: Asian Development Bank Asian Development Bank Institute, 2015, p. 8.

二 区域力量转换下太平洋岛国的新选择

自2006年中国同太平洋岛国合作论坛成立以来，中国与太平洋岛国的关系得到了长足的发展。双方于2014年建立了战略合作伙伴关系，2018年达成了携手共建“一带一路”的共识，从而将双方关系提升至前所未有的高度。中国同太平洋岛国关系的深入发展与日益强化引起了域内外某些传统大国，特别是太平洋岛国前殖民宗主国的不满和猜忌。这些国家囿于冷战和霸权主义思维，罔顾事实地在国际社会和太平洋岛屿地区渲染中国“新殖民主义论”“新霸权主义论”“资源掠夺论”“债务危机论”等谬论，企图遏阻中国与太平洋岛国关系的发展。^①与此同时，前殖民宗主国竞相宣布设立岛国基础设施专项基金，并大幅度增加“无偿援助”，以抗衡并“消除”中国在该地区的影响。^②然而在新形势下，前殖民宗主国企图在政治和经济上加大对岛国控制的“图谋”已很难变为现实，其主要原因如下。

首先，岛国政府和民众的民族独立与自决意识空前高涨，因此附加了政治条件的“援助”，即使“无偿”，也不为岛国政府和民众所欢迎。据澳大利亚洛伊研究所相关资料，澳、美、新西兰等西方“传统捐助国”向太平洋岛国提供的大部分资金直接服务于其政治目的，用于输出西方的意识形态和价值观，这是岛国政府和民众并不愿意接受的“政治献金”。洛伊研究所部分学者曾对“传统捐助国”对太平洋岛国的“捐助”进行了长期跟踪研究，发现“传统捐助国”的“捐助”除一小部分是“人道主义援助”外，其余绝大多数是旨在推进当地“民主”“人权”“法治”“良政”的政治性项目，并且其效果“远非‘捐助国’政府宣传的那样完美”，毕竟输

① Graeme Smith, “Is there a Problem with PRC Aid to the Pacific?”, *China Matters*, April, 2018, p. 2.

② Jane Norman, “Scott Morrison Reveals Multi-billion-dollar Infrastructure Development Bank for Pacific”, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-08/scott-morrison-announces-pacific-infrastructure-bank/10475452>.

出意识形态和价值观是极其费时费力的事。^①

其次,太平洋岛国寻求经济援助和对外经贸合作的对象已不是“仅此一家,别无分店”的西方垄断时代了,包括中国在内的亚洲以及世界其他地区的新兴经济体已经成为岛国地区发展越来越重要的合作伙伴。尽管相较于西方“传统捐助国”,中国在过去十年中对太平洋岛国的“援助”额度并不高,但是中国的发展资金主要用于岛国经济和社会发展急需的基建项目,^②建成后具有相当的经济效益,以及难以量化的社会效益,因而受到当地政府和民众的欢迎。洛伊研究所一些研究人员发现,中国提供的援助多为低息贷款或“友好性利率”贷款,主要用于当地涉及国计民生的大型基础设施建设项目,^③并对这些基础设施项目设置了严格的质量和管理标准,因此更严格地讲,中国的援助属于发展性基金。这些学者还发现中国的基础设施援助并非中国强加于岛国,而是岛国“积极主动地向中国争取的结果”,其过程类似商业性借贷谈判。

再次,太平洋岛国的前殖民宗主国均已进入国力相对下降期,其国力已不可能也不容许它们对岛国进行长期的、与新兴经济体对抗式的“无偿援助”竞赛。美国虽是世界第一大经济体,但每年要花费高达6000多亿美元的军费“刚需”以维持全球军事霸权,美国国内的基础设施也到了需要大举投入以维护升级的境地。美国民众常常抱怨相较于太平洋西岸,美国部分地区的基础设施已沦落到“第三世界”的水准,^④但美国政府的回应往往是预算紧张。即使是美国政府决心大规模推进的印太地区基础设施建设,也只准备出资1.13亿美元。澳大利亚现政府则制订了雄心勃勃

① Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Overview of Australia’s Pacific Regional Aid Program”, <https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/Pages/development-assistance-in-the-pacific.aspx>.

② Matthew Dornan and Jonathan Pryke, “Foreign Aid to the Pacific: Trends and Developments in the Twenty-First Century”, *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2017, pp. 386–404.

③ Philippa Brant, “Chinese Aid in the South Pacific: Linked to Resources?” *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2013, pp. 158–177.

④ Mattea Kramer and Jo Comerford, “How America Became a Third World Country”, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/21/sequester-cuts-make-america-third-world-country>.

的军事计划以期维持其南太平洋地区强国地位，不仅将军费开支提升至国内生产总值的2%，而且计划未来数年筹措4000多亿澳元（约合3000亿美元）用于从美欧等军事强国购买先进的战机和潜艇，更打算进一步通过大量资金来升级和新建“强大”的军事工业。庞大的军事开支导致澳大利亚“北部大开发”计划和国家经济“创新转型”计划基本停留在纸面上。部分有识之士指出，与其将宝贵的资金拿来与新兴国家进行冷战式竞争，不如将各自国家早已陈旧的基础设施进行升级改造，以便更好地造福本国民众，促进本国的经济发展。^①

最后，太平洋岛国在独立前后经历了殖民主义、帝国主义掠夺和与中国平等互利相处的两个时期，岛国政府和民众已具备了高度的辨别力和鉴定力。全球范围的经验表明，世界上没有任何一个国家因为与中国建立了紧密的经贸合作而被重新“殖民”，或被剥削压榨，也没有任何一个身陷“债务危机”或“破产”。20世纪90年代末，西方国家就曾大肆“妖魔化”中国与一些发展中国家，特别是与非洲国家之间日益紧密的经贸合作关系。但事实上，中非不仅实现了共同发展，更推动了发展中国家整体崛起。同样，太平洋岛国地区的经济发展在近年实现了高达7%的年均经济增长率，这是殖民时代根本难以想象和企及的。^② 中国始终支持太平洋岛国发展经济、改善民生、提高自主可持续发展能力，为促进太平洋岛国的经济社会发展提供了真诚的帮助。岛国政府和民众在发展中越来越认识到谁是真正的朋友，谁才能真正帮助自己的国家走上稳定与发展之路。因此，任何“妖魔化”中国或中国同太平洋岛国互利合作关系的言论与行为，都难以在太平洋岛屿地区产生诬指者所希望的结果。^③

① Greg Jennett, "Defence White Paper: Australia Joins Asia's Arms Race with Spending on Weaponry and Military Forces to Reach \$195b", Australian Broadcasting Company, February 25, 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-25/defence-white-paper-released-increased-spending/7198632>.

② Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Pacific Islands Factsheets*, <https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/Pages/the-pacific.aspx>.

③ Peter Brown, Australian Influence in the South Pacific, *ADF Journal*, Issue 189, 2012, pp. 66-78.

三 太平洋岛国积极同中国发展双边关系的内生与外生因素

近年来,中国同太平洋岛国的关系发展迅速。在国际政治领域,双方在气候变化、地区政治、经济秩序等许多重大国际问题上立场相近、相互支持。在经济领域,据中国海关部门统计,2017年中国和太平洋岛屿地区双边贸易额增至82亿美元,比2012年几乎翻了一番。在文化、医疗等领域,双方的合作也在不断加深,两国人文交流日益扩大。中国-太平洋岛国关系在过去的十余年之所以发展如此迅速,从太平洋岛国角度分析,既有其渴望独立自主和发展自身经济的强烈内生动力,也有其与域内外西方大国进行施压与反施压博弈的外生动力。

首先,太平洋岛国渴望独立自主、平等合作的政治主张,与中国倡导的和平共处五项原则相互契合,是双方互利合作迅猛发展的最重要内生动因。太平洋岛国有着漫长的被帝国主义列强殖民和奴役的历史,因此对国家的独立自主和国际社会的平等相待充满渴望。中国在政治上主张国家不分大小,都是国际社会的平等成员,经济上坚持互利、共赢,不附加任何政治条件,因而赢得了太平洋岛国政府和民众的尊重和友谊,也收获了丰硕的成果。笔者在太平洋岛国做学术田野调研时,发现当地政界、学界、工商界,乃至普通民众争相称赞中国对岛国的平等相待和从无丝毫“霸凌”的言行。相较而言,西方政客、学者总以居高临下的态度大谈“普世价值”和“良政”对太平洋岛国政治、经济和社会发展的“贡献”,往往容易引起岛国政府和人民的极大抵触情绪。

其次,太平洋岛国对提高就业率、改善民生有迫切需求,中国以不附加任何政治条件的形式提供了力所能及的援助,促进了岛国经济和社会发展,是两地合作迅猛发展的重要动因。澳大利亚洛伊研究所有关研究报告称,澳大利亚、新西兰和美国在过去的十年间向太平洋岛国提供了90多亿美元的“捐助”,其中澳大利亚占了1/3,是太平洋岛国的第

一大“捐助”国。^① 但该报告指出，西方的“捐助”多为政治性的“无偿援助”，而中国的“捐助”主要用于帮助岛国地区发展经济和进行基础设施建设。如中国援建了许多通往偏远乡村的初级公路和农业种植技术培训站等，这些“援助”项目对促进当地的经济发展和便利民众的生活发挥了重要作用。由此看来，中国为岛国提供的“接地气”的“民心”援助工程，不仅拉近了中国与太平洋岛国人民的距离，而且助推了双方互利合作关系的发展。

再次，西方国家企图控制和利用太平洋岛国，并牺牲包括岛国在内的广大发展中国家利益的自私自利的行为是太平洋岛国积极发展对华关系的最重要的外生动因。中国在国际社会践行正确的义利观，支持广大发展中国家维护自身合法权益的言行与西方国家形成了鲜明的对比，赢得了太平洋岛国的信任和尊重。太平洋岛国最关心的议题莫过于全球变暖和海平面上升，对某些大国为一己私利而拒不执行节能减排的国际公约义务表示强烈不满，对中国在国际气候大会上为全球各岛国的生存和利益“大声疾呼”、坚定履行节能减排的国际义务表示感谢钦佩。在田野调查中，岛国一些地方领导人和酋长纷纷恳请中国提供能够保护沿海红树林的技术和专家，因为中国是岛国应对气候变化最“值得信赖的朋友”。

四 “一带一路”引领中国－太平洋 岛国关系扬帆再启航

太平洋岛国赢得独立后，一直渴望获得国际社会的尊重，并走上繁荣富强的发展之路。但现实却是无论是在国际政治领域，还是在世界经济体系中，太平洋岛国均被极度边缘化。中国政府提出的“一带一路”倡议和构建“人类命运共同体”的理念之所以受到岛国政府和民众的

^① Lowy Institute, *Chinese Aid in the Pacific Interactive Map*, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2016, <https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/>.

欢迎,就在于中国倡导以平等相处、互利合作理念与岛国人民携手共建中国-太平洋岛国利益共同体和命运共同体。太平洋岛国政府和民众深刻感受到了中国的真诚,也看到了脱贫致富和国家发展的希望。中国的“一带一路”倡议,特别是“21世纪海上丝绸之路”南线建设,不仅有助于太平洋岛国加强自身的基础设施建设,实现“内联内通”,而且有助于岛国与世界各地,特别是大洋洲之外的亚洲、欧洲和拉丁美洲实现“外联外通”,对岛国的政治稳定和经济的发展均会产生重大而深远的影响。

太平洋岛国“内联内通”,不仅会促进岛国的社会和经济的发展,便利民众的生活,而且能够增强各个岛国的民族团结和国家凝聚力。太平洋岛国都是岛屿国家,“岛多国散”是其共同特点,各岛之间交通不便,联系不密,难以形成统一的商品和就业大市场。一些岛国加入中国提出的“一带一路”倡议后,国内基础设施状况得到了极大的改善,不仅便利了当地民众的出行与就业,而且促进了外来投资与国内贸易的发展,岛国人民的生活质量和生活水平得到了较大改善和提高。交通的便利更是促进了各岛屿之间的民众交往,增进了岛国民众的国家认同感和民族凝聚力。

太平洋岛国“外联外通”,不仅能够使岛国不再游离于世界经济体系之外,而且将极大促进岛国与世界各地的经贸交流,带动岛国经济以前所未有的速度持续发展。太平洋岛国与外部世界更为便利的互联互通引来了世界各地,特别是亚洲新兴国家更为优惠的、不附加任何政治条件的投资。渔业加工园、农产品加工出口园、旅游工业园等史无前例地出现在太平洋岛国,促进了当地的经济发展和人民生活水平的提高。“外联外通”也让岛国的产品,特别是宝贵的自然资源实现了更大价值,不再因交通不畅而被迫贱卖给前殖民宗主国。“一带一路”建设正成为太平洋岛国走出世代生活的大洋洲,进而更好地参与经济全球化进程的重要渠道。

太平洋岛国“内外联通”,升华并拓展了岛国政府和民众的发展观及实现国家发展的道路和模式。太平洋岛国在挣脱殖民主义的枷锁后,

对发展本国经济、改善民生予以高度重视。但是，由于既有发展观和发展模式的桎梏，太平洋岛国鲜有实现国家富强、人民富裕的成功案例。世纪之交，新兴国家特别是亚洲国家的群体性崛起，给太平洋岛国政府和民众的发展观与发展模式带来了强烈冲击，“向北望”成为岛国政府和有识之士的共识。与外部世界，特别是与亚洲各国的互联互通极大地促进了岛国政府和各阶层民众与亚洲国家和人民的交流与往来。“借鉴亚洲发展经验和发展模式”成为许多太平洋岛国社会经济发展规划中越来越重要的考量。^①

结 语

21 世纪以来，中国同太平洋岛国的经贸合作出现了前所未有的大发展，“平等相处、互利合作、心心相印、守望相助”是双方关系健康快速发展的最坚实基础和最强大动力，是冷战和霸权主义思维作祟下的“遏制”和“妖魔化”策略根本无法阻挡的。太平洋岛国政府和民众热爱自己的国家，坚持捍卫自己的国家主权和国家利益，有智慧、有能力管理和发展好自己的国家，因此，在太平洋岛屿地区根本不存在所谓中国“新殖民主义说”、“资源掠夺说”或“新霸权主义说”。正是在合作共赢的基础上，太平洋岛国政府和民众如此精心呵护和推动中国—太平洋岛国关系的深化，中国同太平洋岛国的关系才会不断发展，进而处于历史最好时期。正如习近平主席所言：“浩瀚的太平洋是中国同岛国关系发展的纽带。”^② 共建“一带一路”助力推动太平洋地区“人类命运共同体”的构建，为中国同太平洋岛国关系揭开了新的历史篇章。

① Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, *Pacific Opportunities*, Manila: Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, 2015, p. 8.

② 习近平：《让中国同太平洋岛国关系扬帆再启航》，《人民日报》（海外版）2018 年 11 月 15 日，第 1 版。

An Analysis on the Win-Win Cooperation between China and PICs in the Context of the BRI

Yu Lei

Abstract: China's relations with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have witnessed a rapid growth since the new century. The leaderships of China and PICs have reached consensus on the advancement of B & R followed their strategic partnership created in 2014 and laid solid groundwork for the advancement of China-PICs relations. The healthy and sustained development of China-PICs ties are based upon China's foreign principles and the spirits of the "community of shared future". As well, they are driven by the aspiration of the PICs's governments and peoples to seek a foreign policy of independence and economic growth as well as a counterbalance of western pressure. The BRI serve as a boost to the development of the "community of shared future" and a prelude to the new development of China-PICs relations.

Keywords: China-PICs Relations; B & R; Cooperation and Win-Win; Community of Shared Future

从“走出去”到“一带一路”： 中国与太平洋岛国四十年^{*}

赵少峰^{**}

摘要：自1975年与斐济建立外交关系以来，中国已经与10个太平洋岛国建立了正式外交关系。从改革开放实施的“走出去”到当前推进的“一带一路”倡议，40年来中国与太平洋岛国的合作持续稳步推进，建立了相互尊重、全面发展的全面战略伙伴关系。中国同太平洋岛国的合作具有很强的互补性，有利于双方经济的发展与合作，特别是中国向太平洋岛国提供的官方发展援助，为太平洋岛国的经济社会发展注入了新动力，为太平洋岛国发展提供了新选择。太平洋岛国的产品和资源进入中国市场，满足了中国社会发展的需求。在看到中国同太平洋岛国关系开启新时代的同时，也不应忽略已经或者正在出现的来自域内外大国和地区带来的挑战，以及我们自身与太平洋岛国合作中存在的问题。

关键词：太平洋岛国 改革开放 “走出去” “一带一路” 倡议

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太平洋岛国和中国同属于太平洋地区，是亚太大家庭的一员。在20世纪相当长的一段时间内，双方相互往来很少且互不了解。随着全球化和亚太一体化的发展，太平洋岛国在经济与外交上与中国的联系已经越发紧密。习近平主席分别在2014年11月和2018年11月同建交的太平洋岛国领导人举行会晤，中国与太平洋岛国的关系步入新时代。本文主要回顾40年来中国与太平洋岛国的交往，同时分析中国与太平洋岛国交往过程中面临的挑战。

一 40年来中国同太平洋岛国交往持续稳步推进

邓小平的对外开放思想孕育了“走出去”战略。改革开放之初，邓小平同志指出：“经验证明，关起门来搞建设是不能成功的，中国的发展离不开世界。”^①党的十一届三中全会上明确提出：“在自力更生基础上，积极发展同世界各国平等互利的经济合作。”^②在这一重要方针指引下，我国企业开始勇敢地迈向世界。但是，这个过程异常艰难。

20世纪80年代以前，中国一直以“战争与革命”作为时代主题，中国的对外战略长期以进行革命斗争和建立国际统一战线为指导思想。1985年6月，邓小平在中央军委扩大会议上指出，“根据对世界大势的这些分析，以及对我们周围环境的分析，我们改变了原来认为战争的危險很迫近的看法”，改变了过去我们所奉行的“一条线”战略，“我们也相信中国在国际事务里面是有足够分量的”。^③1987年，党的十三大报告明确提出“和平与发展是时代主题”。伴随对时代主题认识的变化，中国外交的主要目标从“支持世界革命”变成“为国内建

① 邓小平：《我们的宏伟目标和根本政策》，《邓小平文选》（第三卷），北京：人民出版社，1993年，第78页。

② 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》，中国共产党新闻网，<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html>，最后访问日期：2019年2月17日。

③ 邓小平：《在军委扩大会议上的讲话》，《邓小平文选》第三卷，北京：人民出版社，1993年，第127、128页。

设营造一个良好的国际环境”。中国不断改善和发展同各大国的关系，并在和平共处五项原则的基础上同世界上一切国家建立和发展外交关系。中国的“走出去”战略是多层面的，“走出去”包括走向太平洋国家。

中国与太平洋岛国的往来可以追溯到一千年以前，那时中国的商船到达过南太平洋地区的岛屿进行贸易。作为现代意义上的中国与太平洋岛国的外交开端，应当从 1975 年开始。中国率先与斐济建交，并陆续与其他太平洋岛国建立了外交关系。中国与太平洋岛国的外交关系可见表 1。

表 1 中国与太平洋岛国外交关系一览

国家	外交关系	备注
斐济	1975 年 11 月 5 日建交	
萨摩亚	1975 年 11 月 6 日建交	
巴布亚新几内亚	1976 年 10 月 12 日建交	
瓦努阿图	1982 年 3 月 26 日建交	
密克罗尼西亚联邦	1989 年 9 月 11 日建交	
库克群岛	1997 年 7 月 25 日建交	
汤加	1998 年 11 月 2 日建交	
纽埃	2007 年 12 月 12 日建交	
所罗门群岛	2019 年 9 月 21 日建交	
基里巴斯	2019 年 9 月 27 日建交	
图瓦卢	未建交	1979 年与台湾当局建立“邦交”关系
马绍尔群岛	未建交	1990 年 11 月 16 日至 1998 年 11 月 20 日与中国建交;1998 年 11 月 20 日与台湾当局建立“邦交”关系
帕劳	未建交	1999 年与台湾当局建立“邦交”关系
瑙鲁	未建交	1980 年与台湾当局建立“邦交”关系;2002 年 7 月 21 日至 2005 年 5 月 14 日与中国建立外交关系;2005 年 5 月 14 日与台湾当局“复交”

资料来源：笔者根据相关资料整理。

中国共产党、中国政府历来重视与太平洋岛国政党、政府、议会之间的交往和交流。

胡耀邦在中国与太平洋岛国关系史上书写了重要一页。1985年4月12~24日，胡耀邦应邀前往澳大利亚、新西兰、萨摩亚、斐济和巴布亚新几内亚五国访问。其中，萨摩亚、斐济和巴布亚新几内亚三国是中国领导人第一次到访。胡耀邦在访问萨摩亚期间提出：“南太平洋是南太平洋各国的南太平洋。我们完全支持南太平洋各国关于加强区域合作的主张。我们一贯认为，国家不分大小，不分强弱，不分贫富，应当一律平等。”^① 胡耀邦在同萨摩亚总理托菲劳·埃蒂会谈时提出了中国同西萨摩亚发展关系的两项原则：第一，中国希望同西萨摩亚发展关系，而这种关系是以不削弱西萨摩亚同南太平洋其他国家之间业已存在的友好关系为前提的；第二，中国向西萨摩亚提供援助的目的在于帮助受援国发展自己的民族经济，用中国的话说，就是加强受援国自力更生的能力。^② 此时，美国和苏联都在南太平洋地区有战略利益，一些西方国家对中国进入南太平洋地区，特别是与这些“小而且不重要”的国家进行联系，具有戒备之心。在回答西方记者提问时，胡耀邦宣布了中国同南太平洋各国发展关系时所遵循的三项原则，即充分尊重南太平洋各国根据本国人民的利益制定的内政外交政策；充分尊重南太平洋各国之间已经存在的密切关系，希望这种关系根据他们的意图继续发展；充分尊重南太平洋各国根据自己的利益同其他大国签订的协定。中国与太平洋岛国的交往原则获得了太平洋岛国领导人的认可，充分表明了中国无意在这一地区竞争，并表明了中国希望在和平共处五项原则的基础上同南太平洋各国以及世界上一切其他国家发展关系的愿望。^③ 在这次访问时，中国向斐济提供了80万美元赠款，向萨

① 《中国支持南太平洋各国关于加强区域合作的主张 胡耀邦总书记在马列托亚国家元首举行的国宴上的讲话》，《人民日报》1985年4月22日，第4版。

② 《胡耀邦在西萨摩亚举行告别招待会 并同西萨摩亚总理举行会谈》，《人民日报》1985年4月23日，第6版。

③ 《胡耀邦和斐济代总理举行记者招待会 胡耀邦宣布中国同南太平洋国家关系三原则》，《人民日报》1985年4月24日，第6版。

摩亚提供了 50 万美元赠款。胡启立在谈到这次访问取得的成果时说，访问增强了我国同这些国家的领导人和广大人民之间的相互信任，使他们了解到中国真心实意地谋求和平、谋求友好、谋求在和平共处五项原则的基础上同这些国家建立长期的合作关系。双方就扩大经济合作和友好往来进行了认真的讨论，达成了一些协议，并就开辟新的合作领域的可能性进行了探讨，为今后扩大经济合作打下了一个良好的基础。概括起来，可以说这次访问在我国和南太平洋各国关系史上写下了重要的一页，把我国同南太平洋各国的友好合作关系推进到了一个新水平。^①

中国－太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛是中国与太平洋岛国在经贸领域最高级别的对话机制，是中国与太平洋岛国密切经济联系、促进共同发展的重要平台。该机制在 2005 年 10 月由时任中国外交部副部长杨洁篪在莫尔兹比港举行的第 17 届太平洋岛国论坛会后的对话会上正式倡议建立。2006 年 4 月，首届论坛在斐济成功召开。时任国务院总理温家宝指出：“深化中国与太平洋岛国间的友谊、扩大互利合作，是双方人民的共同愿望，符合各自的根本和长远利益，也有利于实现地区的和平与繁荣。”^② 论坛期间，温家宝宣布了中国与岛国开展投资、农渔业、旅游、基础设施建设合作、应对气候变化以及扶持岛国发展经济的 6 项举措。目前这 6 项举措均已落实。^③ 2013 年 11 月 8 日，中国政府与太平洋岛国 8 个建交国政府在广州举办第二届中国－太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛。论坛召开期间，同时举行“2013 中国国际绿色创新技术产品展”。时任国务院副总理汪洋在会上做出了 7 项承诺：中国支持岛国重大项目建设、扩大对华出口、开发人力资源、开拓中国旅游市场、发

① 《胡启立谈胡耀邦访问南太平洋五国的成果 在我国和南太平洋各国关系史上写下重要一页》，《人民日报》1985 年 4 月 25 日，第 2 版。

② 《温家宝在中国－太平洋岛国经合论坛上讲话》，中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站，2006 年 4 月 5 日，http://www.gov.cn/lhdh/2006-04/05/content_246559.htm，最后访问日期：2019 年 1 月 30 日。

③ 《什么是中国－太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛？》，中国网，2014 年 7 月 28 日。http://www.china.com.cn/guoqing/2014-07/28/content_33078943.htm，最后访问日期：2019 年 2 月 7 日。

展医疗卫生事业、发展农业生产、保护环境和防灾减灾。^①

在 21 世纪的第一个十年结束以后，国际形势也发生了深刻变化。2014 年 11 月 15 ~ 23 日，国家主席习近平赴澳大利亚出席二十国集团领导人第九次峰会，对澳大利亚、新西兰、斐济进行国事访问并同太平洋岛国领导人会晤。这是习近平主席首次对大洋洲地区国家进行国事访问，对中国深化同澳大利亚、新西兰和太平洋岛国的友好合作具有重大意义。中国与 8 个建交太平洋岛国建立了相互尊重、共同发展的战略伙伴关系。习近平提出了提升中国和太平洋岛国关系的五点建议，承诺“中国对发展同太平洋岛国关系的重视只会加强、不会削弱，投入只会增加、不会减少”。^② 2018 年 11 月 16 日，习近平主席出席 APEC 会议之际，再次同建交太平洋岛国领导人举行会晤，将双方关系提升为相互尊重、共同发展的全面战略伙伴关系，并提出了深化中国和太平洋岛国关系的四点建议。^③ 双方达成了一系列合作共识，包括举办第三届中国 - 太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛、中国 - 太平洋岛国旅游年系列活动，同时签署了“一带一路”合作协议，深化了各领域合作。

太平洋岛国看到了中国在国际事务中提供的中国智慧和方案，以及在它们极为关心的气候变化等环境领域采取的措施和具体行动，愿意同中国加强交流与合作。

二 中国为太平洋岛国发展注入新动力

亚太地区是全球经济发展速度最快、潜力最大的地区。太平洋岛

① 《汪洋在第二届中国 - 太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛暨 2013 中国国际绿色创新技术产品展开幕式上的演讲》，中华人民共和国外交部网站，2013 年 11 月 9 日，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/t1097478.shtml，最后访问日期：2019 年 2 月 12 日。

② 《习近平同太平洋岛国领导人举行集体会晤并发表主旨讲话》，《人民日报》2014 年 11 月 23 日，第 1 版。

③ 《习近平同建交太平洋岛国领导人举行集体会晤并发表主旨讲话》，《人民日报》2018 年 11 月 17 日，第 1 版。

国独立的时间主要集中在 20 世纪 70 年代，要比新中国建立的时间还要更晚一些。独立以后，它们想更快地振兴经济、改善民生，更好地适应全球化的变化，跟上世界发展的潮流。同时，太平洋岛国自主发展意识不断提升，国际影响持续扩大。中国同太平洋岛国经济互补性强，合作潜力巨大。截至 2013 年，中国已累计向太平洋岛国提供了 94 亿元人民币的各类援助，促进了太平洋岛国的经济社会发展。中国 - 太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛改善了太平洋岛国发展的外部环境，提升了基础设施建设水平，推动了中太关系健康发展。

第一，为太平洋岛国包容、灵活、持续的发展框架提供了中国智慧和方案。亚太地区成为世界经济发展的新动源，特别是作为世界第二大经济体的中国，可持续发展政策引起了全球关注。而太平洋岛国由于受到历史、地理和资源的限制，多数国家经济发展较慢。近年来，斐济、库克群岛的 GDP 增速保持在 3.5% 左右，瓦努阿图、帕劳、所罗门群岛、图瓦卢的 GDP 增速在 3% 左右，而汤加和瑙鲁是负增长，其中瑙鲁为 -4%。所有太平洋岛国都在寻觅突破过去的依赖，以经济互利和可持续发展为基础建立新型关系。它们欢迎经济上实现跨越式发展的中国对太平洋岛国进行投资，带来就业机会，促进农业、渔业发展，加强基础设施建设。

第二，提供了太平洋岛国经济社会发展所需要的资金、技术，为太平洋岛国发展提供了新选择。太平洋岛国经济成分单一，自身独立性比较脆弱。中国从经济着手，通过优惠贷款、基础设施建设以及其他经贸方式，加大了这些国家与中国的往来。2006 年，中国承诺在此后 3 年内提供 30 亿元人民币优惠贷款。2013 年，汪洋副总理表示中国国家开发银行将设立 10 亿美元专项贷款，用于支持太平洋岛国基础设施建设。中国政府持续为太平洋岛国提供培训政府官员和各类技术人员的名额。据中国海关统计，2005 年，中国与太平洋岛国双边贸易额为 8.38 亿美元，其中中国对岛国出口 4.24 亿美元，从岛国进口 4.14 亿美元；2017 年，中国和太平洋岛国地区双边贸易额达到 82.0 亿美元。在 12 年的时间内，双边贸易额增长了近 9 倍。其中，中国对岛国地区出口 47.2 亿美元，同比下

降 13.8%；从太平洋岛国地区进口 34.8 亿美元，同比增长 34.9%。据中国商务部统计，2017 年，中国在太平洋岛国地区对外承包工程新签合同额 27.1 亿美元，完成营业额 9.7 亿美元。2017 年，中国对太平洋岛国地区直接投资 1.6 亿美元，涉及农渔业、旅游、基础设施建设等领域。^①

第三，通过项目援助，为当地培训人力资源。人力资源是经济发展和社会稳定的重要因素。南太平洋域内外大国对太平洋岛国进行投资需要适宜的环境、可预期的收益、精简的政策和稳定的社会局面。中国通过教育援助、农业援助、医疗援助以及提供留学生、培训名额等方式，以先进的技术和管理理念，引导岛国知识阶层接受新知识，以迎接全球化的需要。教育和培训是太平洋岛国知识阶层迎接机遇和挑战的最好方式，一方面可以促进本土人才把握机遇，另一方面可以提升合作的针对性，比如，太平洋岛国重点加强与日本、中国广东的合作等。

第四，带动了太平洋岛国产业的优化升级。太平洋岛国除巴布亚新几内亚、斐济等国家面积较大、矿产资源相对丰富外，多数国家国土面积不大，除渔业资源之外的其他资源相对匮乏，工业、农业发展缓慢，旅游业成为经济发展的支柱，但是囿于航空条件和基础设施的制约，旅游业发展遇到瓶颈。在“一带一路”建设框架下，中国提供的资金、技术、人力有效解决了这些限制，港口、交通等基础设施建设有了大幅度提升，渔业养殖和加工技术日益成熟，蔬菜种植水平不断提高，面积不断扩大。太平洋岛国以特色优势资源为依托，大力促进蓝色经济发展，在新科技的支持和推动下，不断发展具有一定附加值的产业，改善和优化了产业结构，加快了新能源、新材料、先进装备、制造业、特色生物资源开发等战略性新兴产业发展，有效带动了当地就业。巴布亚新几内亚总理奥尼尔表示，将积极参加共建“一带一路”，尽快启动同中国的自由贸易协定谈判。^②

① 国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴 2018》，国家统计局网站，www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexch.htm，最后访问日期：2019 年 8 月 31 日。

② 《习近平同巴布亚新几内亚总理奥尼尔会谈》，中华人民共和国中央人民政府网站，2018 年 11 月 16 日，http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-11/16/content_5341112.htm，最后访问日期：2019 年 2 月 2 日。

三 中国在太平洋岛国遇到的挑战

中国与太平洋岛国的合作已经步入快车道。中国对南太平洋地区的介入，特别是中国向太平洋岛国提供的援助，已经或者正在引起南太平洋域内外大国的关注。在中国提出“一带一路”倡议后，太平洋岛国成为“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”的重要组成部分。中国已经与斐济、巴布亚新几内亚签署了“一带一路”建设谅解备忘录，实现了发展战略对接。在中国同太平洋岛国合作的大好发展形势下，我们也不能忽略合作中遇到的各种挑战和影响。大体而言，挑战主要源自三个方面。

一是太平洋岛国地区主义和国家主义的影响。太平洋岛国之间在地理、历史、文化、政治和经济方面存在巨大差异。巴布亚新几内亚在陆地面积、人口和专属经济区方面都有绝对优势，而图瓦卢、瑙鲁、纽埃等国家资源少，发展陷入困境。尽管如此，共同的利益追求和战略目标将它们联系在一起，通过“抱团合作”实现共同利益。“太平洋方式”的提出满足了地区认同、地区联合的需要，并成为南太平洋地区特有的交往和决策方式。^① 这在世界气候变化大会、联合国等活动中都有具体体现。太平洋岛国的地区主义对南太平洋地区内源合作型秩序的建构发挥了重要作用，在一定程度上也影响了与大国的合作。随着太平洋岛国独立自强意识的提升，各岛国都非常重视本国的建设和发展，在涉及国家利益选择时，维护本国利益又成为首要选择。现在看来，在谁是太平洋岛国政治和文化中心、谁是地区领导者等问题上，分歧非常大。在合作中，权衡二者的关系非常重要。步入现代化国家之后，传统力量和因素在太平洋岛国政治决策中依然发挥着重要影响，在一定程度上制约和束缚着国家领导人的政治思维。

二是源自域内外大国的影响。太平洋岛国所处区域战略位置极

^① 徐秀军：《地区主义与地区秩序：以南太平洋地区为例》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2013 年，第 124 页。

其重要。它连接着太平洋和印度洋，是美洲至亚洲海上运输线上最安全的航线，而且占据着北半球至南半球的国际海运航线，是东西、南北交通的交会处。它还毗邻东南亚、美洲、澳大利亚，并且与南极大陆隔海相望。域内外大国如澳大利亚、新西兰、美国、日本、印度、俄罗斯、英国、法国，甚至包括拉丁美洲的古巴等国家，都认识到这一地区所具有的战略意义，不断介入这一地区的活动。这些国家都有兴趣确保太平洋两岸的商业自由和军事准入不受阻碍，削弱潜在敌对国家对本国产生威胁的可能性。尽管太平洋岛国在浩瀚的太平洋中只占据了小部分领土，但 14 个岛国拥有 2200 多万平方公里的海洋专属经济区，是发展中的“海洋大国”。这里海洋资源与矿产资源丰富，盛产铜、铝等金属矿产和稀土，海底蕴藏着丰富的天然气和石油资源。

澳大利亚是南太平洋地区大国，一直将太平洋岛国地区视为其“后院”，对中国的介入表现得“相当焦虑”。2018 年，莫里森政府推出了“太平洋升级”方案（Pacific Step-up），重新关注该地区。新西兰表示要当好太平洋地区的领导者，认为南太平洋已成为“被日益激烈争夺的战略要地”。而美国，尽管在过去的十年中减少了对该地区的投入，但美国对该地区并未放松，反而不断加强与印太地区的盟友和伙伴关系。美国与帕劳、密克罗尼西亚联邦、马绍尔群岛保持着自由联系国（FAS）关系，在该地区拥有军事基地。^① 日本则通过举办日本—太平洋岛国峰会加强与太平洋岛国的联系，抗衡中国在南太平洋地区的影响。太平洋岛国中的多个国家曾是英国的殖民地，独立后依然有 11 个国家是英联邦成员国。印度则通过海洋地缘优势，扩大价值理念的输出，如在太平洋岛国有众多印裔人口，其中，斐济的印裔人口达到了其总人口的 40% 左右。

按照西方主流的现实主义国际政治和国际关系关于权力体系

^① 参见蔡育真《澳洲对中美在南太平洋权力竞逐之回应》，台北：致知学术出版社，2015 年。

(Power System) 和权力架构 (Power Hierarchy) 的理论, 作为全球权力体系的缔造者和主导者, 超级大国的首要目标是维护全球体系的稳定, 阻止新兴超级大国对现行体系的挑战和颠覆, 以保持自身在全球权力体系中的既得政治、经济利益和至高无上的地位。守成地区强国出于维护自身在全球体系中的既得利益和地位的考量, 和超级大国在维护现存全球体系上存在着重大的利益契合。美国从战略竞争、地缘性、制海权三个层次不断发展与太平洋岛国的关系。美国先后提出“转向亚太” (Pivot to Asia)、“亚太再平衡” (Asia-Pacific Rebalance) 和“印太”战略, 强调美国必须重新调整其在全球的政治、经济, 特别是军事资源的分配, 以应对中国的快速发展,^① 以及由此可能产生的对美国在本地区, 乃至全球构建的霸权主义体系和秩序的挑战。美国为编织边缘地带上新的“十字战略”, 实现战略目标, 重掌制海权, 再度扩充海上力量, 印太战略成为实践“美国优先”“权力最大化”的主要工具。美国与印度、日本、澳大利亚等地区强国联合进行“军事演习”, 缘自超级大国、守成强国不愿见崛起大国形成地区霸权, 更不愿见在国际社会中有匹敌的竞争对手。^② 因而, 在一定的利益基础之上, 这些国家就会形成联盟, 一起抗衡中国在太平洋岛国的活动。

2017年, 所罗门群岛宣布由华为承担其至悉尼的海底高速光缆工程。项目全程4000公里, 总投资7000万美元, 由亚洲开发银行提供贷款。但随后, 澳大利亚就向所罗门群岛施加外交压力, 最后由澳大利亚的公司承担这一项目。汤加首相提出的“免除债务”, 被澳大利亚、美国、英国等国家称为“债务陷阱”, 抹黑中国对岛国的援助。有些国家

① 太平洋岛国论坛副秘书长克里斯蒂尔·普拉特直言不讳地说, 美国印太战略的提出“符合其确保海上通信线路的政策目标, 重点是海上安全和航行自由, 并且是对中国在印度和太平洋海洋日益增长的影响力和权力的制衡”。*DSG Cristelle Pratt's Opening Address at the 2019 Regional CSO Forum*, March 20, 2019, <https://www.forumsec.org/dsg-cristelle-pratts-opening-address-at-the-2019-regional-cso-forum/>, Accessed on 2 April 2019.

② 于镭、赵少峰:《澳美同盟与澳大利亚南海政策的蜕变》,《国际政治科学》2018年第2期。

的政府官员指出，中国的投资和援助不透明，经常带来环境退化、腐败和犯罪，并对包括渔业在内的自然资源造成更大压力。

三是源自中国台湾地区以及中国同岛国合作中问题的影响。从台湾当局在太平洋岛国的活动来看，台湾当局以南岛文化、南岛语族为借口，不断加强与太平洋岛国的“邦交”关系。李登辉、陈水扁时期奉行“金钱外交”的做法，拉拢太平洋岛国。马英九当政时期，与大陆达成了“外交休兵”的共识，但是也没有放弃加强同太平洋岛国的关系。2010年3月21~27日，马英九“出访”太平洋岛国马绍尔群岛、基里巴斯、图瓦卢、瑙鲁、所罗门群岛、帕劳。蔡英文当政后，否认“九二共识”，奉行“台独”政策。蔡英文于2017年10月28日至11月4日“参访”马绍尔群岛、所罗门群岛及图瓦卢，并认为这三国与台湾当局“邦交”关系最为稳固。2019年3月，蔡英文再次“参访”帕劳、瑙鲁、马绍尔群岛。中国从政府、企业、民间多方位着手，扩大了太平洋岛国对“一个中国”原则广泛的认同。台湾当局以各种渠道阻挠中国大陆与未建交岛国接触，不断地通过资金、技术、项目等措施争取“外交”空间。^①

从中国与太平洋岛国的合作而言，中国与太平洋岛国的合作从过去的政治支持、资金援助转向项目合作、技术支持、多种形式的资金帮扶，由重视基础设施支持逐渐转向渔业、农业、旅游业、采矿业等行业的合作。在合作过程中，也存在一些问题：一是在执行项目援助时，缺乏与当地的深入协商，追求工期，忽视了建筑的文化内涵和质量；二是在资金援助上，有些援助项目和领域，限于政府间达成的协议，而并不符合当地民众的需求，造成各种后续问题；三是在外执行和承担政府项目的公司，没有严格执行行业标准，受到诟病；四是部分企业和个人过于追求商业利益，忽视当地法律，严重影响中国的形象。^②

① 何登煌：《太平洋岛国风情与风云》，台北：台湾商务印书馆，2013年，第152、159页。

② 石莹丽：《中国对萨摩亚援助述论》，《苏州科技大学学报》（社会科学版）2018年第4期。

四 中国与太平洋岛国合作发展的新路径

改革开放 40 年来，国际局势发生了重大变化，中国外交经历了三个重要阶段，从“独立自主”“不结盟”到“韬光养晦，有所作为”，再到“和平发展”“互利共赢”。^① 中国与建交太平洋岛国的关系也在不断发生变化。2018 年 11 月 16 日，国家主席习近平再次同建交太平洋岛国领导人举行集体会晤，确立了相互尊重、共同发展的全面战略伙伴关系，开创了全方位合作新局面。习近平主席对新形势下中国和太平洋岛国关系的发展提出了四条建议。太平洋岛国领导人表示，将积极参加共建“一带一路”，加强同中国在贸易、投资、渔业、旅游、基础设施建设等领域的合作，助力自身经济社会的发展。面对中国 - 太平洋岛国发展的新局面和新机遇，中国要积极应对挑战，以新的路径开创新的局面。

第一，要在平等相处的基础上建立峰会对话机制与平台。政治互信是加强交往的基础和前提。中国领导人在与太平洋岛国领导人会晤时都强调，国家不分大小、强弱、贫富，都是国际社会的平等一员，都应相互尊重，平等相待。中国尊重太平洋岛国根据本国国情所选择的社会制度和发展道路，也尊重各岛国为维护国家主权与独立、为维护本地区的和平与稳定所做出的努力。中国的主张赢得了太平洋岛国领导人的认同和支持。随着“一带一路”的持续推进，中国与太平洋岛国之间的合作越来越多。2018 年 11 月 16 日，习近平主席表示中方愿和岛国于 2019 年下半年共同举办第三届中国 - 太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛。中国 - 太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛的持续举办，为中国与太平洋岛国领导人建立更高级别的对话提供了基础。

第二，向南太平洋地区域内外大国宣示中国“和平发展”的政策。美国主导的霸权体系与秩序对美国的西方盟国仍然具有重要价值，在全

^① 高飞：《改革开放 40 年中国外交的历程与启示》，《当代世界》2018 年第 5 期。

球权力体系和秩序面临深刻变革的时代大背景下，在深入理解和掌握全球权力体系理论的基础之上，运用“对价交易”理论的基本原理，尽力与全球体系与秩序主导国美国，以及其他现时全球体系与秩序的既得利益者开展关于我国在全球体系与秩序中新的地位与权力的博弈，并达成符合我国“硬、软”力量增长实际的阶段性“对价交易”，以利于世界和亚太、印太地区的和平、稳定与繁荣，以及我国基本良好的外部发展环境不至于发生根本性逆转。根据“对价交易”的“充分宣示”策略，我国应明确无误地向守成超级大国美国表明我国“和平发展”的战略目标、利益诉求、核心利益，以及我国的和平发展路径等，以最大限度地减少美国及其盟友对我国的战略误判。

第三，建立跨文化视域下的民主协商机制。民主协商机制是最大限度减少分歧、保障利益最大化的重要举措。“太平洋文化圈”拥有独有的特征，其在岛国政治经济社会发展中的影响不容忽视。中国与太平洋岛国在中长期培训、教育合作、使馆往来以及贸易与投资中有了全面合作。中国的太平洋岛国研究中心不仅促进了学术研究与合作，而且延展了其他可持续性发展机会。在现有合作基础上，需要建立一个跨文化的机制，梳理太平洋岛国优先发展事项，分析投资环境、区域文化，制定最佳投资方案，并且形成一套完整的问题解决机制，探索在合作中，如何与岛国政府官员、社区领袖以及相关技术部门开展磋商，以完善实施方案。比如，与太平洋岛国“蓝色经济”对接内容是什么；作为可持续发展重要内容的旅游行业，如何实现飞机直航问题；^① 等等。

第四，在太平洋岛国共建“一带一路”要做到“四个超越”。“一带一路”是构建人类命运共同体的具体实践。在 14 个太平洋岛国中，尽管多数国家对中国的“一带一路”倡议表现出了极大的热情，期望通过借助“一带一路”提供的机遇，改善国内基础设施建设落后的局面，带动国内就业，赶上全球化发展步伐，但是共建的任务任重道远。

① 欧阳杰、徐翀宇：《构建面向南太平洋岛国的“空中丝绸之路”发展战略的思考》，《中国民航报》2016 年 4 月 28 日，第 7 版。

在太平洋岛国共建“一带一路”要做到“四个超越”：超越意识形态、超越经济社会发展差距、超越文化差异、超越地缘政治。^①“超越”并不意味着“撇开”，而是在正视现实、承认差异性的基础上，站得更高、看得更远，追求互补、和而不同。在此基础之上，扩大与太平洋岛国的经济合作范围，壮大贸易投资网络，形成连接拉丁美洲、澳大利亚、新西兰的多边合作关系。

结 语

“一带一路”倡议聚焦于更广阔的经济一体化、政治合作、世界联通、贸易金融一体化和人文联系。太平洋岛国期望赶上全球化的浪潮，推动国内经济社会的全面发展，而与中国合作是太平洋岛国走向世界经济中心的题中之义。国际产能合作不仅能够促进中国产业在全球产业链中优化升级，而且能够带动太平洋岛国的科技、技术的提升，具有优势互补的契合点。“一带一路”倡议为这一地区带来了金融、经济和社会活力，与此同时，我们也不能忽略潜在的投资风险和存在的挑战。

From “Going Global” Strategy to the Belt and Road Initiative: Forty Years Friendship between China and Pacific Island Countries

Zhao Shaofeng

Abstract: Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Fiji in 1975, China has established formal diplomatic relations with eight Pacific island countries (PICs). From the “Going Global” strategy implemented in

① 赵少峰：《与太平洋岛国共建“一带一路”的四个超越》，《中国海洋报》2018年11月29日，第2版。

reform and opening up period to the Belt and Road Initiative, over the past 40 years, cooperation between China and PICs has continued to advance steadily, and a comprehensive strategic partnership of mutual respect and common development has been reached. Cooperation is highly complementary and beneficial to both countries and peoples. China's official development assistance to PICs has injected new impetus into the economic and social development of PICs and provided new development options for the PICs. The products and resources of PICs have entered the Chinese market to meet the needs of China's social development. While seeing the new era of China's relations with PICs, we should not lose sight of the challenges that have emerged or are emerging from major countries and regions inside and outside the south Pacific region, as well as the problems existing in our cooperation with PICs.

Keywords: Pacific Island Countries; Reform and Opening Up Period; “Going Global” Strategy; The Belt and Road Initiative

政治与经济

Research on
Pacific Island
Countries

《太平洋计划》如何走向终结

——以两份报告为中心的文本研究

陈晓晨*

摘要：在南太平洋地区主义发展史上，《太平洋计划》曾发挥了重要角色，其走向终结是重大事件，值得细究。本文对此进行了历史过程追踪，在一系列复杂事件中择取“温德尔报告”和“莫劳塔报告”，以这两份报告为中心进行文本研究，揭示了成员国（尤其是太平洋岛国）对太平洋岛国论坛的“所有权”、气候变化等太平洋岛国的切身利益关切以及太平洋岛国对地区一体化的谨慎态度是两份报告所反映的核心问题，促使《太平洋计划》走向终结，最终为《太平洋地区主义框架》所取代，构成了近年来南太平洋地区主义的重大变化。

关键词：南太平洋 太平洋计划 气候变化 “委托—代理”模型

2005年出台的《太平洋计划》（Pacific Plan，简称《计划》）在南太平洋地区主义或“太平洋地区主义”（South Pacific Regionalism, or

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Pacific Regionalism)^① 发展史上占据着重要地位。我国最早系统性研究南太平洋地区主义的学者徐秀军将其称为“以加强地区合作与地区一体化为目标的纲领性文件”。^② 不过,《太平洋计划》在出台9年后被《太平洋地区主义框架》(The Framework for Pacific Regionalism, FPR)所取代,打破了该计划确立的向地区一体化迈进的既定目标和线性趋势,是2009年前后以来南太平洋地区主义改革与新发展的的重要表征,也是南太平洋地区主义发展史上的重大事件。那么,《太平洋计划》如何以及为何走向终结?国际学界对此的已有研究大多为描述性,欠缺解释性研究与社会科学研究方法意识;^③ 国内学界的研究还基本是空白。^④

① 本文认为,广义的南太平洋地区包括目前太平洋共同体中的22个岛屿政治实体,重点包括目前太平洋岛国论坛中拥有主权的14个太平洋岛国(简称“岛国”),包括巴布亚新几内亚(简称巴新)、斐济、基里巴斯、库克群岛、马绍尔群岛、密克罗尼西亚联邦(简称密联邦)、瑙鲁、纽埃、帕劳、萨摩亚、所罗门群岛、汤加、图瓦卢和瓦努阿图。国内最早系统性研究并界定南太平洋地区的代表作之一,可参见徐秀军《地区主义与南太平洋地区秩序的构建》,博士学位论文,华中师范大学政治学研究院,2009年,第2页。国内学界对南太平洋地区和太平洋岛国的内涵与外延的不同界定,可参见汪诗明、王艳芬《如何界定太平洋岛屿国家》,《太平洋学报》2014年第11期,第1~8页。本文对地区主义采用如下定义:“主要由国家领导的建立和维持包含三个国家以上的正式的地区机制与组织的过程。”Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Introduction: Framework of the Handbook and Conceptual Clarifications”, in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 7. 近年来,“太平洋地区主义”得到越来越多的使用,但使用“南太平洋地区主义”的文献也不少。本文将二者视为同义词,指的都是“南太平洋地区机制与组织的过程”。

② 徐秀军:《地区主义与地区秩序:以南太平洋地区为例》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2013年,第110页。

③ 国际学界对《太平洋计划》的研究从其出台前后就已开始,包括:Michael Powles, ed., *Pacific Futures*, Canberra: Pandanus Books, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2006; Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and Ian Frazer, eds., *Redefining the Pacific?: Regionalism Past, Present and Future*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006; etc. 《太平洋计划》于2014年终止,对其终止过程的研究包括:Claire Slatter, “The New Framework for Pacific Regionalism: Old Kava in a New Tanoa?”, in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, eds., *The New Pacific Diplomacy*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015, pp. 49–63; Helen Leslie and Kirsty Wild, “Post-hegemonic Regionalism in Oceania: Examining the Development Potential of the New Framework for Pacific Regionalism”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2018, pp. 20–37; etc.

④ 遗憾的是,由于《地区主义与南太平洋地区秩序的构建》成文时间较早,无法研究2009年前后以来的新发展。鲁鹏等对《太平洋计划》进行了研究,但并未注意到该计划走向终结的事实。参见鲁鹏《南太平洋地区主义的“三环模式”研究》,硕士(转下页注)

《太平洋计划》出台以后，对其批评的声音一直不断，直到其终止，这期间发生了很多事件。本文择取在其中起到承上启下重要作用的两份文件——《太平洋岛国论坛秘书处审查》（又称“温德尔报告”，the “Winder Report”）和《太平洋计划审查（2013）》（又称“莫劳塔报告”，the “Morauta Report”），以文本分析对其进行过程追踪（process-tracing），^① 试图分析《太平洋计划》走向终结的过程如何发生、动因何在，动因又是如何在文本中得以体现、从而在历史过程中发挥作用。其中，“温德尔报告”从未正式公开，但其文本早已流传出来，为业内人士所采信，^② 但尚未有对此专门而细致的文本分析。因此，对这份材料的研究尤其具有价值，对考察南太平洋地区主义 2009 年前后以来的新发展意义重大。

一 背景

2005 年，太平洋岛国论坛（Pacific Islands Forum, PIF）莫尔兹比港峰会通过了《太平洋计划》。《计划》以加强地区一体化为目标导向，明确了以经济增长、可持续发展、良治和安全四个方面为支柱，并通过《楠迪决定》（Nadi Decisions）作为实现计划的时间表，通过《卡里波波路线图》（Kalibobo Roadmap）作为实现计划的路线图。《计划》将经济增长作为“四大支柱”之首，主张将贸易自由化尤其是《太平洋紧

（接上页注④）学位论文，华中师范大学政治学研究院，2014 年。梁甲瑞和曲升关注了《太平洋计划》及《太平洋计划审查（2013）》中有关海洋治理的部分内容。参见梁甲瑞、曲升《全球海洋治理视域下的南太平洋地区海洋治理》，《太平洋学报》2018 年第 4 期，第 48～64 页；曲升：《近年来太平洋岛屿区域海洋治理的新动向和优先事项》，载陈德正主编《太平洋岛国研究》（第二辑），北京：社会科学文献出版社，2018 年，第 47～68 页。

① 过程追踪是案例研究的一种方法，研究者考察自变量与因变量之间的因果关系是如何通过中间环节的更小步骤连接的。参见 Pascal Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices”, in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 232.

② Sandra Tarte, “Regionalism and Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands”, *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2014, p. 315.

密经济关系协定》作为举措中的重中之重,并开展石油产品大宗批量采购,推动落实太平洋航空安全办公室(PASO)、小岛国航运倡议等地区机制;将良治作为《计划》的重要内容,实施涉及国家主权的领导人问责制、加强审计和调查机关、法律和检查部门等重要机构的问责制;强化地区安全委员会(FRSC),实际上加大了岛国在安全合作方面向太平洋岛国论坛让渡主权。^①

《太平洋计划》为澳大利亚所主导,这一点几乎没有疑问;^②其出台显示了澳大利亚对太平洋岛国论坛及南太平洋地区主义的主导权,但也引发了太平洋岛国的不满。几乎从《计划》刚刚出炉时,对该计划的批评就已经开始在学界和非政府组织中蔓延开来。批评主要指向这个计划没有解决太平洋岛国人民的真正需求(批评新自由主义倾向),损害了太平洋岛国的主权(批评新干涉主义倾向)、有违太平洋岛国认可的程序、方式与观念(批评地区霸权主义倾向),^③从当时对《计划》的讨论看,太平洋岛国领导人已经注意到《计划》将不可避免地侵犯国家主权。^④这种不满随着时间的推移与日俱增,通过对《计划》和

① Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *The Pacific Plan: For Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*, Suva, Fiji: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, November, 2007.

② 南太平洋地区知名社会活动家爱丽丝·赫弗(Elise Huffer)对《太平洋计划》进行了文本研究,结论是《太平洋计划》的地区主义的愿景与目标更多的是依据以亚洲开发银行和英联邦秘书处构成主要研究团队的《迈向新太平洋地区主义》报告,而后者又与澳大利亚议会在2003年的《介入太平洋:澳大利亚与巴新和西南太平洋岛国的关系》报告中提出的地区一体化方案吻合。参见 Elise Huffer, "Regionalism and Cultural Identity: Putting the Pacific back into the Plan", in Stewart Firth, ed., *Globalisation and Governance in the Pacific Islands*, Canberra, Australia: ANUE Press, 2006, pp. 44 - 46。

③ 南太平洋地区主义研究的重要代表人物罗恩·克罗科姆(Ron Crocombe)、格雷格·弗莱(Greg Fry)和爱丽丝·赫弗(Elise Huffer)等都参与了这场批评,代表性言论与研究成果参见: Greg Fry, "'Pooled Regional Governance' in the Island Pacific: Lessons from History", in Satish Chand (ed.), *Pacific Islands Regional Integration and Governance*, pp. 89 - 104. Elise Huffer, "The Pacific Plan: A Political and Cultural Critique", in Jenny Bryant-Tokalau and Ian Frazer, eds., *Redefining the Pacific: Regionalism Past, Present and Future*, pp. 157 - 174. Ron Crocombe, "Regionalism Above and Below the Forum: The Geographical/Culture Regions, Asia-Pacific and Others", in Michael Powles, ed., *Pacific Futures*, pp. 195 - 203。

④ Duncan Wilson, "Leaders Assess Pacific Plan Progress", *Islands Business*, April, 2005, as cited in Jim Rolfe, "Beyond Cooperation: Towards an Oceanic Community", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2006, p. 94.

对太平洋岛国论坛秘书处（PIFS）的审查（review）过程，对《太平洋计划》的实施进程产生了影响。

2009年，《太平洋计划》做了启动以来的第一次审查。这次审查由第三方咨询机构完成，主要负责人为前基里巴斯外交官马库丽塔·巴罗（Makurita Baaro），因此这份《太平洋岛国论坛审查（2009）》也被称为“巴罗报告”。“巴罗报告”的主要成果之一是将“可持续发展”的内涵予以变更、外延予以扩大，纳入了应对气候变化、提高生活水平与增加福利的内容，这样南太平洋语境下的“可持续发展”彻底脱离了一度强调财政紧缩、结构调整的新自由主义范式，与联合国语境下的“可持续发展”实现了同步。^①

不过，岛国及非政府组织对《太平洋计划》的不满仍然与日俱增。在这种情况下，对太平洋岛国论坛秘书处的审查开启了《太平洋计划》走向终结的进程。

二 “温德尔报告”

2011年底，太平洋岛国论坛对秘书处进行了一次审查，也是由第三方咨询机构完成的，审查小组的主要负责人为前新西兰奥克兰市议员彼得·温德尔（Peter Winder），因此这份《太平洋岛国论坛秘书处审查》也被称为“温德尔报告”。在报告撰写的过程中，审查小组对论坛成员国进行了广泛调研，因此这份审查报告反映了不少成员国，尤其是岛国对论坛秘书处以及对论坛和《太平洋计划》本身的关切。这份从未正式公开的报告对《太平洋计划》和论坛秘书处的工作都表达了批

① 20世纪90年代，“可持续发展”一度主要指的是财政和经济结构上具有可持续性，是一个与当时在全球盛行的新自由主义经济政策，与财政紧缩、结构调整和经济自由化高度相关的概念。时任澳大利亚外交部部长戈登·比尔尼（Gordon Bilney）1994年的言论具有代表性。参见 Gordon Bilney, “Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific: Challenges and Change”, an address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association in Sydney, 15 June 1994, Australian Development Studies Network, Briefing Paper No. 34, July 1994。

评乃至否定态度。

“温德尔报告”开篇就提出了全报告聚焦的内容——成员国—管理层关系问题——更为直接地说，就是秘书处“专权”的问题。报告尖锐地提出，成员国和秘书处的沟通水平低下，需要双方都采取行动来解决这个问题。“审查小组强烈地相信，成员国的行为和方式将决定秘书处的成败。为了改进秘书处的工作成绩，成员国需要对秘书处施加更大力度的‘所有权’。”报告为此建议秘书处的所有会议都要有成员国的代表参加，而且成员国代表要有延续性，并加强内部沟通。^①

审查报告尤其强调领导人对秘书处的领导作用，认为核心政府官员的缺席限制了《太平洋计划》的价值。报告建议领导人要成为《计划》的监护人，建议秘书处的所有项目都要成为即将开始的《太平洋计划审查（2013）》的一部分。^②审查报告明确认为在地区组织内的发言权与资金贡献大小相关，建议成员国（实际上主要指的是岛国，尤其是小岛国）在有限的经费中挤出一部分，以加强它们此时对秘书处缺失的权力。^③

审查报告关注了议程设定问题，认为这是论坛的核心问题，而议程设定的“所有权”应该归成员国、领导人。报告建议领导人和部长要对论坛的议程设定有更强的战略导向；建议对秘书处的管理要有更强的纪律性，以确保决策完全让成员国知晓。报告还特别建议确保成员国在设置优先度的会议上的参与权，包括《太平洋计划》行动委员会（PPAC）和论坛官员委员会（FOC）。为了加强成员国对议程设定的掌控力，报告建议设立论坛部长会议（后演变为论坛外长会议），在每次会议之前召开《太平洋计划》行动委员会并向部长们汇报，再由部长们向领导人汇报。报告特别提出，《太平洋计划》要反映国家层面的发

① Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, p. 4.

② Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, pp. 6, 8.

③ Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, p. 39.

展目标。^①

审查报告尤其关注贸易自由化问题，建议论坛领导人重新调整秘书处在贸易发展领域的授权，平衡成员国在贸易促进与新贸易协议之间的优先度——显然，这是回应岛国普遍对澳新加速推进《太平洋紧密经济关系协定》升级版（PACER+）的不满，建议要照顾岛国在促进贸易上的关切，而非急切推进 PACER+。报告注意到，一些论坛成员国对秘书处在贸易领域的工作更倾向于持批评态度；一些成员国认为应扩大首席贸易顾问办公室（OCTA）的权力，使其职权超越 PACER+ 的范围。另有一些国家普遍提出，它们全面参与贸易自由化谈判的能力极端有限，对贸易自由化的相关度（即必要性）以及优先度（即紧要性）都有很大存疑，也就是说，它们不明白在贸易自由化对岛国既没什么好处、又不急迫的情况下，为何要以秘书处的力量推动岛国参与贸易谈判，尤其是 PACER+。^②

审查报告确认了论坛应回应太平洋岛国在气候变化问题上的强烈而急迫的关切。审查报告认为，在国际气候变化谈判和气候适应资金问题上让这个地区的声音被听到非常重要，认为外长们应发挥更大作用，对地区组织有更大“所有权”并更好地协调地区与成员国的对外发声。^③

在气候变化问题上，太平洋岛国论坛、太平洋共同体（Pacific Community）和南太平洋地区环境规划署（SPREP）存在事权竞争问题，与 20 世纪 70 年代时南太平洋委员会（South Pacific Commission）和南太平洋论坛（South Pacific Forum）争夺环境问题事权相似，这引发了审查小组的关注。审查小组确认了事权竞争现象的存在，但敏锐地发现，这反映了一个真正问题：地区组织在成员国做出政治决断和地区安排之前就试图设计并执行技术性工作计划，而环境问题天然需要地区主

① Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, pp. 9 – 11.

② Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, pp. 7 – 8.

③ Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, p. 27.

义的方式。因此，审查报告提出的对策是领导人要加强对事权的授权，以及对秘书处的所有项目进行审查。审查报告对气候变化问题上的事权进行了分配，将气候资金的使用和项目归入南太平洋地区环境规划署，认为太平洋岛国论坛秘书处如果不执行项目的话，会更容易发挥政策和谈判促进作用^①——实际上，这形同建议剥夺太平洋岛国论坛秘书处在气候项目上的权力。^②

“温德尔报告”首次明确提出了《太平洋计划》本身的去留问题——在此之前，《太平洋计划》并没有提出何时做出重大改动乃至终止。“温德尔报告”明确建议，要建立“第二代《太平洋计划》”，以取代“第一代”即“目前版本”，更好地与国家发展目标和地区行动相结合，更有效地驱动地区架构以反映成员国的需求，反映成员国的发展目标。^③

不过，审查报告也直言建立“第二代计划”的困难，就是他们在审查中发现秘书处的态度比较复杂，“不是所有人都保持开放性”，尤其是秘书处高层对任何改革怀有“强烈的抵触（态度）”。因此，改革需要“持续的外部支持”。^④

“温德尔报告”对太平洋岛国论坛秘书处直言不讳的批评，引发了圈内的强烈反响。有人认为，正因为如此，秘书处才一直未将该报告正式公开。^⑤ 看过这份报告的学者迅速将报告定义为对秘书处的批评，

① Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, pp. 37 – 38.

② 关于气候变化议题在南太平洋主要地区组织之间的事权分配及动态，参见 Marc Williams and Duncan McDuie-Ra, *Combating Climate Change in the Pacific: The Role of Regional Organizations*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 13 – 38。

③ Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, p. 43.

④ Peter Winder, Tessie Eria Lambourne and Kolone Vaai, *Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat-Draft Report*, Leaked Document, May, 2012, p. 59.

⑤ Tess Newton Cain, “Rebuild or Reform: Regional and Subregional Architecture in the Pacific Island Region”, *Le Journal de la Société des Océanistes* [En ligne], Vol. 140, No. 6, 2015, p. 53.

解读为“几乎是认为秘书处在回应成员国需求上失败了”，并认为首要问题就是确认成员国对秘书处的“所有权”，呼吁秘书处不要“遮丑”，应正式公开这份报告。^① 还有人更为直接地将“温德尔报告”概括解读为秘书处存在下列问题：

- 受到澳大利亚、新西兰和欧盟的强大影响
- 没有对太平洋岛国领导人做出响应
- 在贸易等地区问题上缺乏（领导人）授权和地区共识
- 管理薄弱
- 在关键问题上没有能力作为
- 运行结构老化
- 员工薪资不足^②

“温德尔报告”在《太平洋计划》走向终结的过程中起了承上启下的作用，它将岛国的利益和不满概括呈现出来，塑造了议程。正因为“温德尔报告”，对《太平洋计划》的审查被推迟，以安排更多的调研走访，“自下而上”地倾听太平洋岛国的声音，反映太平洋岛国的诉求。

三 对《太平洋计划》的审查过程

1. 调研过程

对《太平洋计划》的全面审查工作从2012年底开始，一直持续到

① Matthew Dorman, “Swept under the Pandanus Mat: the Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Needs to be Taken Seriously”, in DevPolicy Blog, September 20, 2012, <http://www.devpolicy.org/swept-under-the-pandanus-mat-the-review-of-the-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat-needs-to-be-taken-seriously-20120920/>.

② “Emanuel”, “Draft Report-2012 Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat”, August 25, 2012, <https://masalai.wordpress.com/2012/08/25/draft-report-review-of-the-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat/>.

2013年10月完成并向论坛领导人汇报。这次的审查小组由巴布亚新几内亚前总理梅克雷·莫劳塔（Mekere Morauta）牵头，在政治级别上是该地区最高级别的。在研究途径上，与《计划》“自上而下”的制定方式不同，审查以“自下而上”的方式进行研究，广泛地进行调研、咨询，强调过程参与和透明。“考虑到非政府组织、学者和其他利益攸关方对《太平洋计划》的严厉批评，这种（‘自下而上’的方式）意图非常明确：给非国家行为体一个为修改《太平洋计划》做出贡献的机会。”^①

事实上，论坛成员国在给审查小组进行授权时，就已经提出要考虑如何更有效地反映小岛国的优先利益。^②因此，如同很多审查报告一样，这是一次一开始就带有改革目的的政治活动，不能完全将其视为客观的、单纯的研究活动。授权本身就体现了论坛成员国尤其是岛国的利益。当然，后来的结果超出了授权——授权是对《太平洋计划》进行修正，但审查的结果是必须终结《太平洋计划》。

在8个月左右的时间里，审查小组对所有相关方开放意见提交，任何人都可以在网上提交自己或所在组织对《太平洋计划》的意见书（submission），以供审查小组参考。审查小组还在所有论坛成员国及纽约、日内瓦等地进行了实地调研，听取了各方面对《计划》的看法，咨询了超过700个调研对象，收到了65个由本人或机构提交的有效的意见书，并就一些具体问题进行了委托研究。审查小组还组织了《太平洋计划》行动委员会参加的地区层面的咨询研讨会。2013年8~10月，行动委员会进行了工作论文审议，评估了小组草拟的初稿，并在不断修改基础上形成了终稿。^③

从调研对象类型数据上看，虽然官员（含议员、外交官）是调研对象最集中的类别，但民间团体也占了1/4左右（185人），较为可观。

① Claire Slatter, “The New Framework for Pacific Regionalism: Old Kava in a New Tanoa?”, in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, eds., *The New Pacific Diplomacy*, p. 55.

② Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. ix.

③ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, pp. 95 – 100.

此外，私营部门的调研对象占了7%（52人），与来自地区组织的人员（49人）相仿（见表1、图1）。

表1 《太平洋计划审查（2013）》实地调研过程及调研对象

单位：人

调研日期	调研国家、地区或机构	调研对象类型及人数							总计
		领导人/部长	官员(含议员、外交官)	地区组织	民间团体	私营部门	学界	域外发展伙伴	
1. 23 ~ 25	萨摩亚	1	21	2	4	8		5	41
1. 28 ~ 29	汤加	1	7	—	18	2	2	3	33
1. 31 ~ 2. 5	图瓦卢	4	27	—	10	—	—	—	41
2. 6 ~ 9 2. 19 ~ 20 7. 25 ~ 27	新西兰	3	25	1	20	—	10	—	59
2. 10 ~ 14 7. 25 ~ 27	澳大利亚	2	37	—	14	—	27	4	84
2. 14 ~ 19	瓦努阿图	2	11	5	21	—	4	3	46
2. 20 ~ 24 *	库克群岛	7	20	—	1	2	—	—	30
2. 25 ~ 28	法属波利尼西亚	4	14	—	6	1	3	—	28
4. 6 ~ 12	纽埃	4	6	—	9	5	—	—	24
4. 16 ~ 20	所罗门群岛	3	2	4	3	1	—	3	16
4. 20 ~ 25	巴布亚新几内亚	4	16 **	—	36	11	5	—	72
4. 25 ~ 5. 1	新喀里多尼亚(法)	1	5	9	2	5	4	—	26
5. 2 ~ 5. 6	瑙鲁	9	25	—	10	—	—	—	44
5. 3 ~ 5. 7	马绍尔群岛	15	10	1	3	4	—	—	33
5. 6 ~ 5. 9	基里巴斯	4	2	—	1	3	—	5	15
5. 7 ~ 9	密克罗尼西亚联邦	2	25	2	2	—	—	1	32
5. 9 ~ 12	帕劳	3	16	—	9	6	—	—	34
5. 14 ~ 17	斐济	1	2	25	16	4	—	3	51
6. 11	欧盟	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5
7. 15 ~ 16	联合国	—	9	—	—	—	—	3	12
1. 23 ~ 7. 27	合计	70	280	49	185	52	55	35	726

注：* 原文为2月10~14日。经笔者核对，实应为2月20~24日。

** 有些与会官员未列名。

资料来源：Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, pp. 117–133。




图1 《太平洋计划审查（2013）》调研对象类型/所属部门

资料来源：Mekere Morauta et al. , *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, pp. 117 - 133。

从调研对象所在国家数据上看，虽然澳大利亚、新西兰分别位列第一、第三位，但总体上国家分布较为平衡，既照顾到了小岛国和人口较少的国家，又考虑到了人口规模（如巴布亚新几内亚调研对象人数位列第二，超过新西兰），岛国调研对象远远超过澳新和域外发展伙伴（见图2）。不过，值得注意的是，澳新官员和学者较为集中，其中澳新官员超过被调研官员总数的1/5，澳新学者更是超过被调研学者的2/3。这从一个侧面显示，澳新在政策制定和思想传播方面还是有着无可比拟的“软实力”（soft power）优势。不过，岛国领导人参与调研较多，16个岛国和政治实体〔新喀里多尼亚（法）和法属波利尼西亚当时尚未成为论坛正式成员，但也受邀参加了调研〕中有11个国家的现任国家元首或实权政府首脑参加了调研，显示出岛国对调研的重视。

通过部门广泛、国别平衡的实地调研，岛国得以借助数量优势施加影响力，岛国的利益诉求也得以充分表达。这对审查的走向的影响，在




图2 《太平洋计划审查(2013)》在大洋洲调研期间调研对象所在国家/地区

资料来源: Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, pp. 117-133。

《太平洋计划审查(2013)》中得以体现。

2. 意见书

非政府组织和学者通过网上提交意见书的方式积极参与调研。在网上提交的意见书中,有37份来自非政府组织,其中19份来自本地区非政府组织,18份来自域外国际非政府组织。另有17份个人(包括学者、社会活动家和普通公民等)提交的意见书,4份私营部门意见书。网上提交意见书成为岛国和非政府组织影响审查的另一个主要渠道。^①

在19份本地区非政府组织的意见书中,有三份影响力较大,最后都以较大篇幅出现在《太平洋计划审查(2013)》的文本中。其中,一份来自太平洋岛国非政府组织协会(PIANGO),这是一家涵盖21个太

^① Claire Slatter, "The New Framework for Pacific Regionalism: Old Kava in a New Tanoa?", in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, eds., *The New Pacific Diplomacy*, p. 53.

太平洋岛国和岛屿的地区性非政府组织框架协调机构。该意见书呼吁“重新思考发展、重新塑造我们希望的太平洋地区”，反对《太平洋计划》持续强调单纯的经济增长和地区一体化，认为这无助于改善人类发展的可持续性条件，要求关注气候变化、可持续渔业、教育医疗等对岛国人民非常重要的可持续发展议题。具有基督教会资助背景的太平洋全球化网络（PANG）提交的意见书呼吁“《太平洋计划》对新自由主义经济学的强调必须被反思”，提出“新自由主义经济学对太平洋人民和他们生计的负面影响正在日益显现”，地区主义应当符合本地区的传统和文化的方式。还有一份意见书来自代表13家地区非政府组织的太平洋地区非政府组织联盟（PRNGO），该意见书关注非国家行为体参与地区主义的机制问题，认为非政府组织、私营部门等应当成为正式的、机制化的发展伙伴。^①

有一份来自个人的意见书非常重要。2013年，长期在英国外交部和联合国等机构从事国际发展工作的安东尼·贝蒂（Anthony Beattie）在去世前向太平洋岛国论坛提交了意见书，利用“委托-代理”模型（principal-agent model）阐述了“管理团队俘获”（management capture）问题，成为改革太平洋岛国论坛的论据，直接对岛国主导的南太平洋地区主义的新发展产生了影响。

贝蒂的意见书以管理学与国际发展学跨学科结合视角的“委托-代理”模型解释了“管理团队俘获”——管理团队独立追求自己的目标，而非成员国的目标——的现象。这个理论是在关于国际公共产品（international public goods）的讨论中发展起来的。在国际发展合作中，由于无法像公司那样计算商业收益，一个国际组织的成员国或援助国难以对管理团队进行绩效测量，因此，国际组织的执行团队有逐渐脱离理事会/董事会的控制而自行主导运作的倾向。^② 贝蒂将这个模型应用于地区组织，指出地区组织的成员国对地区组织的权力因上述逻辑

① *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Public Submissions*, <http://pacificplanreview.org/submissions/>.

② Owen Barder, “Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid”, *Working Paper 185*, Center for Global Development, Washington D. C., October 2009, p. 9.

在后者负责提供公共产品的过程中被削弱。^①

意见书除从宏观上分析了国际组织中“管理团队俘获”的理论问题外，还特别针对南太平洋地区提出了一些观点。其中包括：

——《太平洋计划》对像贝蒂这样的“局外人”来说缺乏关于其治理问题的公开资料。也就是说，《太平洋计划》的透明度和可视性不高。

——《太平洋计划》的执行过程中，“管理层”（论坛秘书处）较为强大，但“董事会”（成员国领导人）领导力不足。各国政治周期不同，因此领导人参与地区事务的时间参差不齐，且各国领导人对地区事务的关注度不一，使得“弱董事会、强管理层”的现象在《太平洋计划》的执行中强化。

——《太平洋计划》行动委员会人数太多，但投入程度又有限，还在原则上存在监督《太平洋计划》的合法性问题，因而无法承担领导力。^②

不过，贝蒂在其意见书中最为引人注目的还是直接点出了澳新和岛国的关系存在问题。在当时的南太平洋地区，由于澳新尤其是澳大利亚占据绝对的主导地位，“委托—代理”关系与“援助国—受援国”关系高度相关。也就是说，澳大利亚通过秘书处对南太平洋论坛的“俘获”实现对南太平洋地区主义的主导权。

在贝蒂看来，双边合作、非核心项目和特定项目资金支持成了南太平洋地区主义的重要趋势，使得捐助国可以对议程实施强大影响，至于如何影响到太平洋岛国论坛秘书处，还有待《太平洋计划审查（2013）》

① Anthony Beattie, “The Governance of Priorities, Financing and Performance in the Delivery of Public Goods by International and Regional Membership Organisations”, *Prepared for Independent Review of the Pacific Plan*, Suva, 2013, p. 7.

② Anthony Beattie, “The Governance of Priorities, Financing and Performance in the Delivery of Public Goods by International and Regional Membership Organisations”, *Prepared for Independent Review of the Pacific Plan*, Suva, 2013, pp. 1 – 5.

的研究。而且，“那个最大的论坛成员国，同时也是论坛秘书处最大的捐助国”从上一个十年起“绑架了论坛”。^① 贝蒂如此直接地批评澳大利亚可以说捅破了南太平洋地区习惯的那种运用字里行间的微妙措辞掩盖真实含义的“窗户纸”，引发了本地区学者的讨论和对他观点的支持。^②

上述来自几大非政府组织以及贝蒂等学者的意见在审查调研过程中发挥了很大作用，不仅直接体现在《太平洋计划审查（2013）》的相关段落中，还体现在他们引发了更多讨论，使得对《太平洋计划》“努力的审查”和对太平洋岛国论坛治理机制的改革获得了广泛支持。

四 “莫劳塔报告”

2013年8月，在广泛调研与吸收网上意见书的基础上，《太平洋计划审查（2013）》报告初稿完成，进入修改阶段，供《太平洋计划》行动委员会开会讨论，并邀请利益相关方和具有代表性的非政府组织参加。初稿中仍然有一些支持此前的地区主义架构、肯定《太平洋计划》、倾向地区一体化的内容，引起了来自非政府组织的一些反对声音。10月，莫劳塔向太平洋岛国论坛第44届领导人马朱罗峰会汇报修改后的报告主旨。在经过了来自成员国的意见反馈和继续修改后，报告最终版出炉，分三大部分、21个附录，共225页。在最终版中，受非政府组织批评的内容被大量删除。^③ 12月，审查报告最终版正式对外发布，又称“莫劳塔报告”。^④

① Anthony Beattie, “The Governance of Priorities, Financing and Performance in the Delivery of Public Goods by International and Regional Membership Organisations”, *Prepared for Independent Review of the Pacific Plan*, Suva, 2013, pp. 10–12.

② Vijay Naidu, “Commentary on Professor Anthony Beattie’s Governance Think Piece for the Pacific Plan Review 2013”, May 14, 2013, <https://www.cid.org.nz/assets/CID-Resources/Other/CommentaryonGovernanceThinkPieceVijayNaidu-1.pdf>.

③ Claire Slatter, “The New Framework for Pacific Regionalism: Old Kava in a New Tanoa?”, in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, eds., *The New Pacific Diplomacy*, pp. 58–59.

④ Resina Katafono, ed., *A Sustainable Future for Small States: Pacific 2050*, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2017, p. 103.

1. 《计划》赶不上变化

“莫劳塔报告”开篇就点明了核心结论：“发展地区主义不是修改优先事项，而是要对整个计划的过程、机制和治理进行彻底改革。”^①实际上，这意味着彻底推翻《太平洋计划》，尤其是莫劳塔在向岛国论坛领导人汇报时明确说，《太平洋计划》“到了考虑存续与否的时候了”，并呼吁要设立一个新的地区主义框架。^②

“《计划》赶不上变化”是报告为这种彻底改革提出的背景。报告确认，“大量的、复杂的地缘政治利益……是做出改变的背景”。^③尤其是域外大国对本地区新的地缘政治利益出现，背景是本地区广阔的海洋和资源的全球重要性显著。^④

岛国的利益在“莫劳塔报告”中被予以特别强调。审查小组认为，在当前复杂的全球形势下，本地区国家，尤其是小岛国面临一系列新需求、新挑战，其中包括全球金融经济危机带来的余波与全球化给岛国的冲击，“千年发展计划”（MDG）未能实现，气候变化等一系列挑战加剧等。^⑤不过，这些新挑战并未被充分地、合适地讨论，公民的声音在地区治理中缺失。^⑥而这份审查报告要特别考虑如何才能更有效地反映小岛国的优先利益。^⑦

2. 调整成员国—管理层关系

与“温德尔报告”一样，“莫劳塔报告”也重点关注了成员国和管理层的关系。审查小组断定，“我们发现论坛所需要的政治对话是缺失的；相反，我们发现大量由（地区组织）官员驱动的过程……地区组织追求自设议程成了优先事项设定的动力”。^⑧审查小组认为，《太平洋

① Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. xx.

② Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 135.

③ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 136.

④ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 11.

⑤ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, pp. 12–13.

⑥ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 16.

⑦ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, pp. 3, 89.

⑧ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 18.

计划》被官僚与地区组织的利益主导，结果是《太平洋计划》内容过多、经常出现方向错误。^① 地区组织官员对具体政策措施影响很大，而这与领导人制定的政策之间产生脱节。^② 《太平洋计划》行动委员会本来应充当为领导人监督《太平洋计划》落实执行的角色，但这个委员会人员太多却不够投入，并不能真正起到管理作用。^③ 由此种种，使得《太平洋计划》的治理结构出现问题，委托—代理关系混乱——在这里直接引用了贝蒂意见书中关于“委托—代理”模型的理论。^④ 为此，报告建议加强成员国的“董事会”职能，改革《太平洋计划》行动委员会，由官员、民间团体、私营部门和援助者的代表共同组成，让一小群能够有效投入的人代表领导人的集体意愿，负责指导地区主义发展。^⑤

成员国—管理层关系的背后是捐助国—受援国关系。“莫劳塔报告”认为，太平洋岛国论坛秘书处和其他本地区组织一样，其国际集体行动的资金很大一部分来自援助，这决定了援助者有更大的发言权，尤其是通过专项资金来设定议程。^⑥

3. 地区一体化应由各国决定

地区一体化应由各国决定，反对在条件不成熟、成员国不认同的情况下推动让渡主权的地区一体化是“莫劳塔报告”传递出来的另一个核心信息。报告开头即试图对地区主义进行定义，将地区合作列为地区主义外延的第一位，认为地区合作是南太平洋地区主义自 20 世纪 60 年代以来的首要模式。^⑦ 报告称，南太平洋地区的国家“可能没有意愿”迈向经济一体化；有的国家也可能有意愿，但一体化到底

① Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 31.

② Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 35.

③ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. 34.

④ Anthony Beattie, “The Governance of Priorities, Financing and Performance in the Delivery of Public Goods by International and Regional Membership Organisations”, p. 7.

⑤ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, pp. 61–62.

⑥ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, pp. 30, 37–39.

⑦ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013; Report to the Leaders*, p. x.

走多远，应当交由太平洋地区人民和领导人来决定。^① 报告还称，将超主权机构作为南太平洋地区发展的路径让许多岛国公民和政治家感到受挫。^② 报告对此建议，新的地区主义框架应当具有应对这个地区多样性的灵活性，承认面对现代化时的脆弱性和反弹。^③ 报告虽然也提出了一个地区一体化的路径，但重点强调“这个路径并不存在共识”，强调必须有足够的灵活性应对一体化的不同速度和方式，而且最终应由各国决定。^④

4. 地区主义是框架而非计划

报告明确提出《太平洋计划》要改名为“框架”，指出这不仅名称的改变，而且是性质的变化，强调地区主义要由各成员国“所有”，认为新的框架只应包含一个战略性愿景、价值和战略方向，由领导人和其他过程决定优先事项，不能包含具体项目。^⑤ 报告还建议，新的地区主义框架要以更由政治驱动为原则，改变议事规则和优先事项设定程序，让这个过程更加透明、包容、简明、独立。^⑥ 这是和《太平洋计划》那种“自上而下”的、因而也有利于澳新和论坛秘书处本身设定议程的程序完全不同，与以“太平洋方式”（Pacific Way）为代表的南太平洋本地区的习惯议事方式在文化上更为相近。

“莫劳塔报告”是从2005年以来对《太平洋计划》批评的一次总结，反映了从“温德尔报告”开始的对整个计划做出反思的成果，明确反映了新的全球背景下太平洋岛国的利益与需求，表达了对“自上而下”推动地区一体化的否定倾向，再次突出了成员国—管理层关系和援助者—受援国关系问题，认为应当由成员国决定地区主义的方向和优先事项。报告还提出了36条具体建议，基本构成了2014年《太平洋

① Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. 49.

② Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. 14.

③ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. 46.

④ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. 49.

⑤ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, p. 56.

⑥ Mekere Morauta et al., *Pacific Plan Review 2013: Report to the Leaders*, pp. 46, 59 – 60.

地区主义框架》的核心内容。由此，《太平洋计划》行将结束，《太平洋地区主义框架》呼之欲出。

结 论

“温德尔报告”和“莫劳塔报告”集中反映了三个核心问题，也是《太平洋计划》为太平洋岛国所诟病的三个方面。第一，“委托—代理”关系中的太平洋岛国论坛成员国与秘书处之间的关系问题。如前所述，表面上是成员国—秘书处关系，实际上反映的是澳新一岛国关系，以及“谁对秘书处拥有‘所有权’”^①的问题。因此，两份报告对秘书处“俘获”论坛的解构，就是对澳大利亚对南太平洋地区主义主导权的解构。第二，两份报告反映了太平洋岛国在气候变化、贸易、渔业等具体领域的利益诉求与关切，也表达了太平洋岛国对《太平洋计划》的不满。这些利益诉求通过两份报告以及“温德尔报告”对“莫劳塔报告”的影响显现出来。第三，两份报告共同反映了太平洋岛国对澳大利亚主推的、以 PACER + 为代表的地区一体化的保留态度，强调地区主义是一个框架而非计划，是否以及如何进行地区一体化应由各国决定，而非“自上而下”地推动。三个方面的因素在两份报告的文本中得以充分体现，共同促使《太平洋计划》走向终结。

2009 年前后以来，南太平洋地区主义经历了新发展，其中包括对太平洋岛国论坛的改革与《太平洋计划》的终结。“温德尔报告”和“莫劳塔报告”是这个历史过程中的重要环节。通过这两份报告，太平洋岛国的利益与不满得以表达，并转化为政策输出，为《太平洋地区主义框架》的制定奠定了基础，最终构成了整个南太平洋地区主义新发展的一环。

^① “Emanuel”, “Draft Report-2012 Review of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat”, August 25, 2012, <https://masalai.wordpress.com/2012/08/25/draft-report-review-of-the-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat/>.

How Did the Pacific Plan Come to the End

——*Text Analysis of Two Reports*

Chen Xiaochen

Abstract: In the history of South Pacific Regionalism, the Pacific Plan has played an important role, with its ending a significant dynamics, which deserves detailed studies. This paper is a historical process-tracing research, picking up the “Winder Report” and the “Morauta Report” in a series of complex events, focusing on the two reports for text studies. It reveals that the member states, particularly the Pacific Island Countries (PICs)’ “ownership” on the Pacific Islands Forum, the PICs’ vital concerns such as climate change, and the PICs’ prudence toward regional integration is reflected by the two reports as the core issues, prompting the Pacific Plan come to an end, eventually replaced by the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, which constitutes a major change of the South Pacific Regionalism in recent years.

Keywords: South Pacific; Regionalism; Pacific Plan; Climate Change; Principal-Agent Model

檀香木、海参、契约华工与早期中斐关系^{*}

吕桂霞^{**}

摘要：在早期中斐关系中，檀香木和海参扮演了极其重要的角色。古代中国对檀香木和海参的大量需求，使得中斐两国因欧洲殖民者而产生间接联系，而西方殖民者为了发展种植园经济在南太地区引进的契约华工，成为中斐关系的缘起，客观上为后来中斐关系发展奠定了基础。

关键词：中斐关系 檀香木 海参 契约华工

关于中斐关系的缘起，目前较为普遍的看法是可以追溯至 1855 年。2017 年 1 月 28 日斐济华人协会（Chinese Association of Fiji）在首都苏瓦举办隆重庆典，为象征中斐友谊的纪念凉亭——“中国亭”揭幕，以此纪念首批华人旅居斐济 160 周年。同时，潘翎也认为，首批中国人奔赴斐济应在 1855 ~ 1857 年。^① 其实，早在明末清初，中斐关系已经欧洲人与中国的贸易而被动开启，其中最为重要的媒介就是斐济盛产的檀

^{*} 本文为教育部国别和区域研究指向性课题“‘一带一路’倡议在太平洋岛国地区的实施路径研究”（R18WB0401）、山东省社科规划新型智库研究专项“‘一带一路’倡议下山东与太平洋岛国地区的对接研究”（17CZKJ02）的阶段性研究成果。

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^① 潘翎编著的《世界华人百科全书》中也提到了 1855 年第一个华商抵斐。

香木、海参和中国的契约华工。这一时期，中斐两国之间虽然还没有建立官方关系，但因檀香木和海参贸易，两者之间已产生了某种联系，契约华工的赴斐，则使这种联系愈益表面化和实质化。

一 檀香木、斐济与中国

檀香木，主产于印度东部、泰国、印尼、马来西亚、东南亚、澳大利亚、斐济等湿热地区，中国的南方也有小量生长。檀香树属半寄生植物，栽种困难，幼苗期还必须寄生在凤凰树、红豆树、相思树等植物上才能成活。檀香树的生长极其缓慢，通常要数十年才能成材，因而檀香的产量极受限制。但因木材奇香，功用多样，甚至可药用，譬如紫檀具“降辟恶气，宣胸理气”的功效，白檀“止心腹之痛最良，辟鬼杀虫开胃口，每逢噎膈是神方”，^①因而人们对它的需求很大。供求的巨大落差，使得檀香木从古至今一直都是既珍稀又昂贵的木材。

中国人对檀香木推崇有加。“沉（香）檀（香）龙（涎香）麝（香）”是中国自古以来非常名贵的四种香料，可以说檀香木属于香料中的极品。^②中国用檀历史悠久，《诗经·小雅·鹤鸣》名句“爰有树檀，其下维箝”千古流传。同时因其珍贵，檀香（木）也多用作中外国家间互酬的国礼贡物。宋朝时，越南、印尼和马来半岛都曾把檀香木用作进贡的礼物。檀木也成为巨富之家争强夸富的炫料，1556年冬天访问过广州的葡萄牙多明我会士克路士（Gaspar da Cruz）称曾看见“很漂亮的床”，用象牙和檀木等制成，价格奇昂。^③

1. 欧洲人对斐济檀香木的开采与贸易

中国人对檀香木的喜爱和巨大需求，给檀香木的输入提供了广阔的贸易市场。“东方航线的发现者”葡萄牙人最早开始这项生意，将帝汶

① 胡仿西录：《分类本草诗》，《中医杂志》第14期，1925年。

② 林滨编著《檀香》，福建：福建美术出版社，2015年，第13页。

③ 郭卫东：《檀香木：清代中期以前国际贸易的重要货品》，《清史研究》2015年第1期，第40~41页。

岛的檀香木经望加锡运到澳门，以赚取巨额利润。1590年，席尔瓦主教（D. Francisco Pedro da Silva）记述：“檀香木在中国很受重视，虽然其一般价格是每担20帕塔卡（Pataca），而在有些年份，当由帝汶开来澳门的船只不足时，其澳门售价将达到150帕塔卡。”^①当然，采运檀木的路程也满布艰辛与危险，甚至有时要付出生命的代价。1804年纽约商船“联合号”到英国殖民地斐济去找檀香木时，船长及船员多人被杀。^②对此，美国人唐纳德·B. 弗里曼认为，“太平洋的檀香木开采是掠夺太平洋资源的许多形式中最粗暴和残忍的一种”。对于檀香木贸易研究著述颇丰的历史学家多萝西·夏因伯格也认为，就通过船员和土著居民之间的谋杀和冲突所导致的人命丧失而言，檀香木生意比捕鲸或皮毛猎取更为粗暴，100多位船员和数倍于此的岛民在有关檀香木的纠纷和争斗中被杀。^③

继葡萄牙人之后，荷兰人、英国人和美国人也加入了这一贸易的行列。在寻找檀香木的过程中，他们到达了菲律宾、印度尼西亚和斐济等太平洋岛国，从而把中斐这两个遥远的国家联系在一起。

英国参与檀香木贸易源于其对中国市场的开发。茶叶作为中国传统的国际贸易商品，很早就已进入了欧洲，包括英国。1637年4月，英国东印度公司驾驶四艘帆船来到广州，第一次运去中国茶叶，开创了英国贩运中国茶叶的先河。从此，英国东印度公司就源源不断地将中国茶叶运往西欧和北美等地。由于数量较少，当时中国产茶叶主要是作为贵族宴会上的珍贵饮品，每磅6~10英镑。1662年，英王查理二世与葡萄牙国王约翰四世的女儿凯瑟琳·布拉甘萨（Catherine Braganza）公主结婚后，酷爱饮茶的凯瑟琳公主将饮茶的习惯带到了英国王室。饮茶迅速在英国王室和贵族间流传开来，并发展成为一种时尚，从而促使饮茶之风很快席卷整个英国。到18世纪后期，茶逐渐取代咖啡成为英国人

① 转引自张廷茂《明清时期澳门海上贸易史》，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004年，第113页。

② 李定一：《中美早期外交史》，北京：北京大学出版社，1997年，第18页。

③ [美]唐纳德·B. 弗里曼：《太平洋史》，王成至译，上海：东方出版中心，2015年，第174页。

的主要日常饮品。

由于需求旺盛，英国从中国大量进口茶叶，而中国从英国进口的货物则很少，两国出现巨额贸易逆差，英国急需找到新的、有利可图的商品输入中国。就在这个阶段，英国人在太平洋的一些岛屿上找到了檀香木，而当时由于制作屏风、扇子、家具及佛教用品和药用等需求，中国正形成一个庞大的檀香木需求市场。于是，英国和其他欧洲商人开始从斐济、马克萨斯群岛等地收集檀香木，出口到中国广东。^①

美国人之所以参与檀香木贸易，主要是为了寻找运往中国的商品。因为在那个时代，美国能用来对华进行交换的物品非常有限，主要是产于本国西北海岸的人参和皮毛。由于这些物品都属于不可再生资源，久而久之便出现了枯竭，加之 1810 年前后毛皮价格大跌，美国此前趁着欧洲陷入拿破仑战争的混乱而垄断的毛皮贸易开始走向衰落。美国人为了与中国继续交易，就必须寻找新的商品，最终他们把目光瞄准了檀香木。在 18、19 世纪之交，人们意外发现了斐济诸岛上有高质量的檀香木树丛。

1800 年，美国的纵帆船“阿尔戈号”（Argo）在从诺福克岛到中国的途中不幸沉没，其中一位幸存者被正在斐济群岛的小岛姆巴（Mbua）下锚修理的船只“普拉默号”（El Plumier）救出。这位幸存者就是斐济檀香木贸易的开山鼻祖——奥利弗·斯莱特，他声称在姆巴有大量的檀香木树丛。1804 年，在斯莱特的引导下，美国船“标准号”（Criterion）到达姆巴，以便采购一船檀香木销往中国市场。来自新南威尔士殖民者以及美国的其他船只很快就发现了在斐济群岛的其他岛屿上有丰富的檀香木，尤其是在瓦鲁阿岛上。

关于美国与斐济檀香木，另外一种说法是，1800 年前后，一艘美国商船在斐济触礁沉没，船上所载的 3.4 万元西班牙银币也随之沉下海

① 王华：《夏威夷近代社会转型研究：1778～1854》，北京：人民出版社，2016 年，第 117 页。

底。船上人员上岸逃生时,与当地一位酋长建立了友谊,并在发生海难的附近村落住了下来。他们在寻回失落银币的过程中,无意中发现当地盛产檀香木,其中的一位船员就用毛瑟枪和弹药与土著进行交换,换取了一整船的檀香木,并于1808年搭乘一艘路过的商船把檀香木运到了澳大利亚,然后转运到中国高价出售,引起了轰动。^①

此时,在美国船“珍妮号”上,大副威廉·洛克比(William Lockerby)因为与船长威廉·杜尔就一些船员在汤加塔布群岛用装有霰弹的旋转机枪屠杀无辜的岛民而发生争吵,导致他被放逐在姆巴岛上一年的有余。令杜尔船长没想到的是,放逐并没有要了洛克比的命,反而使他成为姆巴酋长的得力助手,后来又成为该酋长和在该岛停留的檀香木商人都不可或缺的人物——一位受到信任的中间人,谈判当地劳工“拉”檀香木和为一些国家的船只(但主要是美国的纵帆船)提供檀香木货物和食物供给所支付的价格(用铁、鲸鱼牙和小饰物)。^②

此后,斐济的檀香木被美国人源源不断地运到中国。根据英国东印度公司1806年1月22日的档案记载,“最近从南海到达的一艘美国船,运来斐济群岛(Fiji Islands)出产的檀香木约2000至3000担之间,据说该处发现有同样木材的森林很多”,运入的檀木质量好,块头大,成本与广州市价间溢价一倍多。^③1806年,在“联合号”发财的刺激下,专事采运檀木的“希望号”出航,船抵斐济后,与当地酋长订立了采集合同,土人把檀香木从山上运下堆在海边装船,美商以各色小饰品交换。当“希望号”离开时,酋长答应在18个月内再收集好第二船货,合同甚至规定,在同一时期内不得把檀香木卖给别船,等于是美商获得了买断权。1808年6月15日,“唐昆号”在“希望号”船长的指挥下自纽约出航,获得特别优待而免受当时在美国实行的封港令

① 孙嘉瑞:《华人为什么来斐济》,斐华网, http://www.fijichinese.com/history/chns_history_index.htm, 最后访问日期:2019年2月10日。

② [美]唐纳德·B.弗里曼:《太平洋史》,王成至译,上海:东方出版中心,2015年,第175~176页。

③ [美]马士:《东印度公司对华贸易编年史》第三卷,区宗华译,广州:中山大学出版社,1991年,第4页。

限制，它发觉前此所订合同为“土人丝毫不苟地遵守着”。1810年5月，“兴隆号”从撒冷驶往斐济群岛，“这是从该港口出发的许许多多类似航行中的第一次”。^①1811年，美国从斐济运来檀木4130担，英国从该地运来3521担。1812年，美国人的寻香足迹扩及太平洋上的多岛，运来檀木7350担。^②

美国人在斐济掠夺檀香木的同时，也加强了与夏威夷之间的檀香木交易。1811年，3艘美国商船在夏威夷群岛收集到一船檀香木，并于次年将这批檀香木卖到中国广东，获取了巨额利润。随后，他们返回夏威夷，把为夏威夷国王卡美哈一世代售的檀香木收入交给国王。在巨额利润的诱惑下，卡美哈一世与美国人签署了一份合约，给予了他们10年的檀香木专属经营权。1821年夏威夷的檀香木贸易达到顶峰，据说这一年出口到中国市场的檀香木总量超过了30000担。然而，无序的砍伐使得夏威夷群岛的檀香木资源逐渐耗尽。

由此，可以看出，斐济檀香木作为该地特产，原本只是当地极具特色的物种之一，但因西方殖民者寻找输入中国商品的需要，加之当地酋长的贪婪，最终几乎被砍伐殆尽。不过，欧洲殖民者将斐济檀香木输入中国，也开启了中斐联系的大门，使得斐济和中国日趋接近。

2. 中国人开始涉足斐济

檀香木不仅仅让斐济与中国发生了联系，更为重要的是，因为檀香木而使得中国人开始离开家乡，跨越遥远的南太平洋，来到菲律宾、巴布亚新几内亚和斐济等太平洋岛国。

中国人去斐济，最早的途径就是搭乘欧洲寻找檀香木的船只。因为自明朝初开始，统治者即开始实施“海禁”政策。明太祖朱元璋为防止内地海商出海勾结倭寇为患，遂于洪武四年（1371）诏令“濒海民不得私出海”；^③洪

① [美] 赖德烈：《早期中美关系史（1784～1844）》，陈郁译，北京：商务印书馆，1963年，第41页。

② [美] 马士：《东印度公司对华贸易编年史》第三卷，区宗华译，广州：中山大学出版社，1991年，第153～154页。

③ 《明太祖实录》卷70，中国社会科学网，2013年9月29日，http://www.cssn.cn/sjxz/xsjdk/zgid/jsbml/mtzsl/201311/t20131120_843625.shtml，最后访问日期：2019年1月19日。

武七年(1374),“罢明州、泉州、广州市舶司”;洪武廿七年(1394),又严令“敢有私下诸番互市者,必置之以重法”。^①嘉靖年间,禁海更甚。嘉靖二年(1523),罢浙、闽、粤三地市舶司;嘉靖四年(1525),规定“查海船但双桅者,即捕之”;嘉靖十二年(1533),复令“一切违禁大船,尽数毁之”,凡“沿海军民,私与贼市,其邻舍不举者连坐”;嘉靖廿六年(1547),浙江巡抚朱纨上任后,“下令禁海,凡双桅余皇,一切毁之,违者斩”。^②这样,从禁止海民出海,到罢除沿海各市舶司,再到禁造双桅航海大船甚至全部焚毁,加之连坐法的实施,使得当时的中国民众根本没有正当出洋的机会。故而,最初出洋者,包括最早去斐济的人,都是为生活所迫、无以为生的人,包括后来“天地会”的一些反清复明义士,为逃避追捕,上船出洋逃生。他们一般是被寻找檀香木的欧洲人船长雇用,充当水手、木工或厨子,也有可能因熟悉檀香木而充当买手,跟随欧洲人的商船前往斐济,在找到檀香木之后再随船返回中国。

关于抵达斐济的时间,目前尚没有统一的说法。在斐济华人中普遍流传的说法是在19世纪50年代,然而遗憾的是首先来到斐济的华人姓名谁和人数、登陆的岛屿,为什么留在斐济等则没有记录。这种说法的根据可能源于时任中国驻墨尔本副领事范志聪 Van Chi Tsang 在1946年写给斐济殖民政府秘书 J. F. Nicoll 的信。同时,斐济华侨孙嘉瑞也认为,第一位来到斐济的华人应是“康利”的创始人梅屏耀(又名百龄),时间大约是1855年。他于清咸丰二年(1852)到澳大利亚悉尼谋生,咸丰五年(1855)从维多利亚驾驶帆船来斐济的列武卡定居,并在列武卡开了第一家华人公司——康利公司。^③这一说法似乎得到了官方的肯定,2015年9月5日,斐济华侨华人举行了盛大仪式,庆祝华人来斐160周年,斐济总理姆拜尼马拉马作为主宾盛赞华人为斐济经

① 《明太祖实录》卷231,中国社会科学网,2013年4月28日, http://www.cssn.cn/sjxz/xsjdk/zgid/jsbml/mtzsl/201311/t20131120_843474.shtml,最后访问日期:2019年1月19日。

② 席龙飞:《中国古代造船史》,武汉:武汉大学出版社,2015年,第380页。

③ 孙嘉瑞:《斐济华人史话》,《中山侨刊》第66期,中山市外事侨务局网站,2005年12月1日, <http://www.zsnews.cn/zt/zsqwj/2006/01/26/650895.shtml>,最后访问日期:2019年2月10日。

济社会发展所做出的贡献，认为中华文化为斐济发展带来了活力。^①2015年9月8日，中国国务院侨办主任裘援平出席了华人抵斐160周年纪念凉亭揭幕仪式，并发表了致辞。^②

另一种说法时间更早。1829年，Peter Dillon在有关1813年的“黑石事件”中提到，他和其他几个人都遭到了斐济人的伏击，并提到有两名华人Luis和Saoo乘坐Eliza号船从1808年即在Bau定居下来。华人前往斐济的正式书面证据是1870年一个名叫Wong Sam的木工和政府兼职翻译的归化入籍申请。^③

二 海参、契约华工与中斐关系

海参，属海参纲，广泛分布于世界各海洋中，它与人参、燕窝、鱼翅齐名，是世界八大珍品之一。海参不仅是珍贵的食品，也是名贵的药材。据《本草纲目拾遗》记载：海参，味甘咸，补肾，益精髓，摄小便，壮阳疗痿，其性温补，足敌人参，故名海参。现代专家则认为，海参是高蛋白食物，有助于人体生长发育，能够延缓衰老，增强免疫力，对高血压、心血管疾病、肝炎、糖尿病、再障性贫血、癌症患者及年老体弱者，都堪称食疗佳品。

海参在中国广受欢迎，中国人很早就开始食用海参，但正式的文献记载出现在三国时期。据三国时期吴国沈莹的《临海水土异物志》记载：“土肉如小儿臂大，长五寸，中有腹，无口目，有三十足，炙食。”其中，“土肉”就是指海参，“炙食”，炙从字义上讲为烤，也就是烤着吃。这是中国人食用海参最早的文字记录。据唐代传奇剧记载，秦始皇东寻长生不老药时，当地渔民在威海成山头敬献刺海参，称此物能长

① 《斐济总理盛赞华人贡献》，新华网，2015年9月6日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/06/c_128199489.htm，最后访问日期：2019年2月10日。

② 《裘援平出席华人抵斐160周年纪念凉亭揭幕仪式》，中新网，2015年10月8日，<http://chinese.people.com.cn/n/2015/1009/c42309-27674368.html>，最后访问日期：2019年2月10日。

③ *Chinese in Fiji: 1855-2015*, Suva, Fiji, Chinese Association of Fiji, 2016.

寿,始皇大悦,此后海参逐渐成为历朝历代进奉皇宫的贡品。元朝时,贾铭著《饮食须知》,认为海参“味甘咸,性寒滑。患泄泻痢下者勿食”。明朝时,人们开始用海参烹制丰富多样的食物。清代直至民国,海参成为名门贵族高级宴席的美味佳肴。

与檀香木一样,中国人对海参的喜爱及旺盛需求,催发了欧洲人及后来的美国人对海参的寻找。根据斐济华人孙嘉瑞的回忆,欧洲人包括美国人最初对斐济的兴趣主要集中于檀香木方面,但是由于他们的掠夺性采伐,斐济的檀香木资源逐渐被砍伐殆尽。与此同时,檀香木争夺战还引发了当地部落间的枪支收购热潮和部落的地盘争夺战。由檀香木引起的部落战争持续了差不多5年时间,一直到1813年檀香木被砍伐光才告一段落。

10年后,欧美商人卷土重来,展开了第二轮的争夺战——海参争夺战,又引发了更残酷的部落战争。当时,商人用一支价值2~3元的毛瑟枪就可以从斐济土著人手中换取600~800加仑的海参,然后运到中国高价出售。^①同样,部分中国人随着欧美运输海参的船只来到斐济。与檀香木贸易不同的是,个别精明的中国人已经从檀香木和海参的交易中看到了巨大的市场,他们开始留在斐济,经营海参贸易,把海参、椰干、珍珠贝和木材贩卖到中国去。后来,越来越多的华人来到斐济,经营日用百货,从事商业贸易,成为推动斐济经济社会发展的一支重要力量。据载,1808年一名吕姓或雷姓中国人,系船上厨子,因海难流落斐济,1813年参与部落战争,被当地土著居民杀死吃掉。^②也有人认为,早在1805年华人即开始涉足斐济。^③

18世纪末期,少数澳洲华人矿工,因金坑干涸取道斐济回国而留下来。他们最初是在北部大岛的马都巴度(Matuvatu)以收海参、珍珠贝、龟壳为生,后来迁移至首都莱武卡(Levuka),^④最著名的是台山

① 孙嘉瑞:《华人为什么来斐济》,斐华网, http://www.fijichinese.com/history/chns_history_index.htm, 最后访问日期:2019年2月10日。

② 司徒泽波、陈本健:《斐济国、所罗门群岛、西萨摩亚群岛华侨概况》,台北:正中书局,2000年,第14页。

③ 王光华:《斐济华人》,《华裔世界》2004年第2期,第6页。

④ 也常常被译为“列武卡”。

人梅康利的康利公司和开平人方文清的方三公司。

华人进入斐济的另一途径，就是当契约劳工，即广东人讲的“卖猪仔”。据记载，从 1865 年大溪地最早出现“猪仔工”，到 1941 年大约有两万名契约华工在南太平洋工作。1898 ~ 1903 年，德国人开始在新几内亚和萨摩亚引进契约华工开垦椰园；瑙鲁和巴纳巴发现磷酸盐矿之后，英国磷酸盐公司在 1906 年开始引进契约华工。

斐济虽然并不是近代史上华人劳工输出的主要目的地，但也有契约华工的存在，而且是最早接受华人移民的海外地区之一。19 世纪 70 年代后期，斐济开始经由厦门和汕头招募华工，至 1913 年已经招募了 4000 余人；1934 年华人规模为 1436 人，部分华人已在当地从事商业。^①

另外，20 世纪初至 20 年代，斐济的华人香蕉园主曾聘雇一批华人契约劳工，后因殖民地政府禁止再雇用华人契约劳工，香蕉园也因受澳大利亚禁止香蕉入口和病虫害影响而逐步减少，但当地原住民至今仍称香蕉为“China”，斐济国徽上也绘有香蕉图案，可见华人种植香蕉一事在斐济历史上的重要地位。^②

三 早期中斐关系的特点

纵览早期的中斐关系，可以看出，由于距离遥远，再加上两国自身特殊的情势，早期中斐之间的关系较为简单与隐晦，大致呈现如下几个方面的特点。

1. 早期中斐关系因被动而发生

自公元前 221 年秦始皇统一中国，中国一直以强大、独立的姿态屹立于世界东方，与外国的交往也多以周边、邻国为主，与孤悬于太平洋之中的斐济没有任何交集活动。明朝初期，为防沿海军阀余党与倭寇滋扰，朱

① 费晟：《南太平洋岛国华人社会的发展：历史与现实的认知》，《太平洋学报》2014 年第 11 期，第 57 页。

② 孙嘉瑞：《斐济华人史话》，中国侨网，2006 年 1 月 30 日，<http://www.chinaqw.com/news/2006/0130/68/14987.shtml>，最后访问日期：2019 年 2 月 10 日。

元璋又开始实行“海禁”政策，禁止中国人赴海外经商，也限制外国商人到中国进行贸易（朝贡除外），从而更加断绝了中国与斐济来往的可能性。

然而，中西贸易尤其是中国与欧洲国家之间巨大的贸易逆差，却让欧洲人把斐济硬生生地拉入了与中国的贸易圈之中。因此，早期中斐关系是因被动而发生的，无论是斐济，还是中国，都没有主动发展与对方的关系。这是早期中斐关系极其重要的一个特点。

2. 间接贸易关系是中斐关系最重要的内容

由于早期中斐两国并未建立外交关系，也没有任何官方往来，因此中斐两国之间实际上仅仅存在着因檀香木和海参而产生的间接贸易关系。

中斐间接贸易关系与西方殖民者密切相关。通常情况下，西方殖民者如葡萄牙人、英国人或美国人等会从本国或殖民地出发，满载毛瑟枪、弹药或西方常见的货物来到斐济，或者用毛瑟枪、弹药等与斐济人进行交换，或者通过与当地酋长的特殊关系取得檀香木的垄断经营，或者采用直接掠夺等手段，在斐济获取他们所需要的檀香木或海参。然后，把满载檀香木、海参的船只开往中国，换取他们所需要的丝绸、茶叶等物品。因此，间接贸易成为早期中斐关系最重要的内容。

3. 檀香木和海参在早期中斐关系中扮演着重要角色

由于檀香木和海参是中国人十分喜爱的商品，且本国产量有限，而斐济却盛产檀香木和海参，因此在早期中斐关系中它们扮演着非常重要的角色。斐济的其他物品如龟壳、珍珠贝等虽然也通过欧美人的船只来到中国，但并不显眼，或者说仅仅是点缀。

On Sandalwood, Sea Cucumber, Chinese Indentured Labor and Early China-Fiji Relations

Lyu Guixia

Abstract: Sandalwood and sea cucumber played an extremely important

role in the early China-Fiji relationship. It is because of the huge demand for sandalwood and sea cucumber in ancient China that China had a connection with Fiji and European colonists. In order to develop the plantation economy, Western colonists introduced Chinese indentured Labor in the South Pacific region which not only made China-Fiji relations more rich and diverse, it also laid the foundation for the later Sino-Fiji friendly relations.

Keywords: China-Fiji Relationship; Sandalwood; Sea Cucumber; Chinese Indentured Labor

／ 文化

Research on
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锻造与升华：基里巴斯传统舞蹈及其意义

徐美莉*

摘要：从历史到今天，舞蹈是基里巴斯文化的最重要表达方式。传统舞蹈是基里巴斯传统审美的集中体现，基里巴斯舞蹈家竭力追求舞蹈的形体美、动态美、音乐美与服装美。舞蹈家自幼学习复杂的舞步，精益求精地进行舞蹈编创，甚至以魔法求助于神灵的力量以获得舞蹈所能展现的一切美感。传统舞蹈是基里巴斯民族精神的集中体现，是历史的记忆，也是岛屿生活的再现，是人与神交流的媒介，也是人与人交流的方式。传统舞蹈蕴含着基里巴斯人民的浪漫与顽强，体现了基里巴斯的社会凝聚力和文化独特性。

关键词：基里巴斯 传统舞蹈 形态美

舞蹈是大洋洲文化中一个璀璨夺目的部分。大洋洲传统舞蹈具有绚烂之美，并蕴含丰富的历史文化意义。在历史上，基里巴斯舞蹈曾被认为是太平洋舞蹈中最美的，并且因较少受到西方宗教的禁锢，基里巴斯传统舞蹈的慑人魅力保存至今。19 世纪晚期，英国著名作家

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罗伯特·路易斯·史蒂文森（Robert Louis Stevenson）及其夫人描述过吉尔伯特群岛北部的布塔里塔里岛的舞蹈。20 世纪前半叶，英国人类学家阿瑟·弗朗西斯·格瑞姆布尔（Arthur Francis Grimble）以及 P. B. 拉克斯顿（P. B. Laxton），对风靡整个吉尔伯特群岛的 Ruoia^① 舞及其他舞蹈有重要的民族志的研究，为后世留下了宝贵的研究资料。近三四十年以来，记录和深入研究同时展开。美国布朗大学玛丽·伊丽莎白·劳森（Mary Elizabeth Lawson）的博士学位论文《基里巴斯表演中的传统、变化和意义》，就是关于基里巴斯舞蹈的第一篇综合研究。巴纳巴学者罗倍亚·肯·希格拉（Raobeia Ken Sigrah）记录了巴纳巴岛古老的矛舞和短棍舞。另一位巴纳巴学者卡捷琳娜·玛蒂娜·特利瓦（Katerina Martina Teaiwa）对基里巴斯舞蹈尤其是巴纳巴舞蹈的研究成绩斐然，她尤其关注舞蹈所体现的民族文化的独特性。在中国学术界，对基里巴斯舞蹈的研究刚刚起步。与大洋洲其他国家和地区一样，舞蹈是基里巴斯人民的生活方式，从历史到今天，基里巴斯人民以舞蹈迎客、送别、庆祝、抒情，舞蹈是陌生人进入基里巴斯后容易关注到的文化景观，是了解基里巴斯历史文化的一个路径。

一 基里巴斯传统舞蹈的种类

基里巴斯由吉尔伯特、菲尼克斯、莱恩三大群岛以及巴纳巴岛共 33 个珊瑚岛组成，东西漫长延展，南北跨越赤道。在数千年的历史时期里，基里巴斯各岛屿孤独地处于太平洋中心，但基里巴斯文化已发展到相当高的水平。基里巴斯人民在传统的陆地农业、海洋渔业、手工制造业、天文学与航海等领域，都发展出令人叹为观止的独特技术和工艺，舞蹈以及与之关系密切的诗歌与音乐的发展水平，同样远远超出文明世界的想象。

① 吉尔伯特语的舞蹈名称。以下吉尔伯特语舞蹈名称，对意义不明者，暂不做音译。

基里巴斯传统舞蹈具有浓烈而独特的形态美。据 P. B. 拉克斯顿的研究，Ruoiā 舞是吉尔伯特群岛最古老的舞蹈之一，在流传过程中产生了多个版本，其中最流行的是 Ruoiā te bino，P. B. 拉克斯顿认为这是 Ruoiā 舞中最经典的一种。Ruoiā te bino 是坐舞，领舞坐在前方中间，在领舞的两侧稍微靠前的位置，坐着两个副领舞，之后是舞蹈队的主体成员。在这三人附近的表演者，可参与舞蹈表演，而后方远处的表演者则只参与歌唱。舞蹈动作限于头部和双手，时而有躯干转动，动作最大程度精确地与歌词和音乐相应。舞蹈并无乐器伴奏，由拍手标志节奏。^① Ruoiā te bino 舞的主题，由歌词、音乐与舞姿共同展现出来。1888 ~ 1889 年，罗伯特·路易斯·史蒂文森徜徉于太平洋，在吉尔伯特群岛的布塔里塔里岛和阿贝马马岛住过 4 个月，被布塔里塔里岛的 Ruoiā te bino 舞深深打动，他写道：“我不断地想到故乡的大歌剧；……演员……挥舞举起的手，眼睛转动望向天空——或者看向观众……这是完美的戏剧，虽然短小。在南海（太平洋）我所看到的舞蹈中，布塔里塔里岛的舞蹈无疑是第一的，它直达内心；它紧张，震撼，征服；它是一切艺术的精髓，充满尚未经发掘的又即将显示的意蕴。”^② 大歌剧是一种严肃歌剧，在 19 世纪前半叶产生于法国，与当时的喜歌剧相对，迅即传遍欧洲。大歌剧通常为四幕或五幕的大型歌剧，内容多取材于英雄或爱国事迹，由独唱、重唱、合唱、芭蕾舞、乐队组成，具有场面宏大华丽、音乐辉煌的舞台效果，由此可以想象 Ruoiā te bino 舞的璀璨美丽。对于 Ruoiā te bino 舞表演结束之际产生的效果，史蒂文森描述称：“难以设想他们在锤炼这些终曲时加入了什么样的火与魔；所有的都达到一致，声音，手，眼睛，叶片和振动的指环；合唱队摇曳在眼前，歌声跳动在耳边；脸庞因热情和投入而活跃。”^③

其他 Ruoiā 舞都是站舞。其中 Ruoiā te kamei 最流行，另外还有

① P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “ ‘Ruoiā’ , A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, p. 58.

② Robert Louis Stevedson, *In the South Sea*, 转引自 P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “ ‘Ruoiā’ , A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, p. 60.

③ 转引自：P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “ ‘Ruoiā’ , A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, p. 64.

Ruoia te wanibanga 与 Ruoia te wantarawa 两种,这三种为站舞,舞者踮起脚,小步轻快地前行,这种舞步有专门名称:kabuti。在每一个短节的末尾,舞者加快速度,制造出紧张的气氛;如果舞蹈主题是爱情,舞者则以异常的富于魅力的漂浮动作结尾。这三种站舞在结尾之际都达到紧张高潮的状态。

此外,还有 Ruoia te tie 和 Ruoia te kakibanako 两种站舞,是求爱舞蹈。三列群舞演员构成两条通道,一边拍手一边吟唱,作为主人公的男孩、女孩以 kabuti 舞步,踮脚、小步轻快地穿过通道,到达表演团队面前的表演场地时,这一对爱人相互靠近,但不允许有任何的身体接触,却又似乎双臂和身体缠绕。每一节都很简洁,都是在一个庄严如雕塑般的姿态下结束表演。

除了 Ruoia 舞,还有几种据波利尼西亚舞改编的舞蹈。第一种是拥有一整个系列的 Tirere 舞,包括两组或两列舞者击棍的舞蹈。第二种是据埃利斯群岛(吉尔伯特群岛的邻居)的 Fatele 舞改编的 Batere 舞,也是大众化的一组舞蹈,这是一种站舞,表演者多少人都可以。表演者有节奏地击打一个结实的箱子,虽然歌词、音调简单,但十分动人。第三种是模仿自萨摩亚的 baka Tamoā 舞,在 20 世纪前半叶曾经很流行。男女演员两两相对,由吉他伴奏,歌词是常用的原始波利尼西亚语。P. B. 拉克斯顿应该是欣赏过 baka Tamoā 舞,他认为这个舞蹈是极有魅力的,尽管其规模有限。其他还有布塔里塔里岛和马金岛的 Ietōa 舞。20 世纪前半叶出现的阿罗赖岛的 Taubati 舞也很突出,Taubati 舞融合了上述源自波利尼西亚的 Batere 舞,以及仿自萨摩亚的 baka Tamoā 舞的特征,因此同时具备这两种舞蹈的美感。^①

与汤加、斐济等太平洋国家相比,在历史上,基里巴斯舞蹈没有受到太多西方宗教的禁锢,因而保存了传统的形态。基里巴斯舞蹈中,女性有摆臀动作,诸如 Ruoia te buki,包含大幅度的摆臀动作,如此动作

① 参见 P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “‘Ruoia’, A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953。

增加了舞蹈的动感，从而增强了舞蹈的活力。

在巴纳巴岛，最古老的矛舞（Te karanga）具有另一种美。矛舞是巴纳巴岛最古老的特·安卡（te Aka）家族的舞蹈，是战舞，在动作和歌唱方面具有特色。长矛是矛舞的必要元素，用海边红木制成，以军舰鸟羽毛装饰，羽毛用椰纤维绳扎在矛上。在表演中，舞者吟诵历史，好像他们在真的从事战争，舞者呐喊，挥舞长矛，并跺脚。1909年，殖民地官员亚瑟·马哈菲（Arthur Mahaffy）在巴纳巴岛欣赏过矛舞，认为矛舞奇异而美丽，在别处从未见过。他描述道：舞者分成两排，面对面。每个舞者装备一个6英尺长的木棒，装饰着羽毛和彩带。领舞者吟唱长段的宣叙调，舞蹈行列编织出复杂队形，进进出出，就在旋转的矛与矛相撞之前完成所有花样。舞蹈结束时，那两排舞者非常准确地出入两排间的空地，每一个舞者经过与他相邻的舞者时，都举棒过头顶，与第二个人的棒和谐地相击，效果出奇的好。^① 亚瑟·马哈菲承认，矛舞具有使观者激动羡慕的魅力。据罗倍亚·肯·希格拉所了解，与原始的矛舞相比，后来的矛舞依然孔武有力，但增加了流动感，如鸟儿在空中飞翔，这是受16世纪晚期移居到巴纳巴岛的奥瑞亚瑞亚家族舞蹈影响的结果。

巴纳巴岛的短棍舞（Te Karanga Are E Uarereke），是奥瑞亚瑞亚家族与土著特·安卡家族关于土地争端的艺术表现，与矛舞一样具有攻击性，舞蹈由男性表演，通常有数对舞者。舞蹈模仿两个男人为土地疆界而对战，舞者双手各持短棍，目标是攻击到对方，对方同样手持短棍，要在精心设计的舞姿中抵挡住对手的撞击。^②

从以上舞蹈中可领略基里巴斯传统舞蹈的形体美、动态美、音乐美与装饰美。舞姿繁复、动感而优雅；拍手或击打箱子的节奏，加之完美的歌声与旋律，伴奏紧张、高亢，摄人心魄；从额头、颈项、胸部、手

① Raobeia Ken Sigrah, Stacy M. King, *Te Rü Ni Banaba-The Backbone of Banaba*, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 2001, p. 86.

② Raobeia Ken Sigrah, Stacy M. King, *Te Rü Ni Banaba-The Backbone of Banaba*, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 2001, p. 114.

臂、手指到脚踝的环饰，既花团锦簇又素雅；环饰的鲜花以及舞者身涂的椰油使空气弥漫馨香，因而使舞蹈具有独特的气味之美。

二 毅力与魔力的锻造

在基里巴斯历史上，无论是舞蹈创作者还是舞者，都没有来自社会的经济支持，他们由于舞蹈技能而获得的社会声誉也不会影响到其他事务，但是，无论是在吉尔伯特群岛还是巴纳巴岛，岛民为舞蹈付出了巨大努力，在舞蹈（包括舞蹈歌曲）创作、练习、表演等环节，舞蹈家全力以赴，调动全部的经验 and 心智，除此之外，他们还要诉诸魔法和神力，调动人、神的最大力量，以创造最佳作品，正如被 Ruoia te bino 舞深深感动的史蒂文森所说：“难以设想他们在锤炼这些终曲时加入了什么样的火与魔。”

一个舞蹈作品的创作过程，以及接下来的舞者的练习过程充满艰辛。据阿瑟·弗朗西斯·格瑞姆布尔的了解，吉尔伯特诗人创作的诗歌，经作者本人或其他作曲家谱曲之后，往往由作者本人或者委托一个创作组，据歌编舞，由村落的舞者实现其最终的展示。村落的舞蹈大师们不计名利，尽心竭力地设计出复杂的躯干、头部、眼睛、手臂、手指的动作，以表达艺术家的主旨。编舞完成后，村落的舞者集合，有时人数超过二百位，舞者首先逐段地学习这首新歌，待他们熟悉歌曲后，舞蹈编创者向他们讲解一系列舞蹈动作，然后舞者反复练习，直到设计者满意。这期间，会有没完没了地重复，舞者无数遍地练习，编创者无数遍地讲解，直到众人对咏唱达到熟悉的程度。就这样，声音和舞姿渐渐准确，舞蹈最终变成一部拥有上千个姿态的光辉的作品，呈现躯体、眼睛与美妙而协调地摆动双臂的和谐壮美，以及完美的声音、旋律与完美的姿态的和谐壮美。^①

① 参见 Arthur Francis Grimble, *Return to the Islands*, New York: William Morrow & Company, 1957, pp. 204 - 206。

舞蹈编创严格遵循经典。在漫长的舞蹈史上，基里巴斯人积累起一笔宝贵的经验财富，其中包括许多标准舞姿，这些标准舞姿不仅众所周知，而且各有名字，成为经典。编创者可以从中选择，以进行创作。他可以有所变化，但是需要接受长者的审查和鉴定。以 Ruoia 舞为例，Ruoia 舞有严格的规范，其中歌词、曲调以及舞蹈动作由编创者规定后，表演者须仔细遵从。

舞蹈教育是自幼儿就开始的。以 Ruoia 舞为例，Ruoia 舞往往是由某一家族创作的，自然地，创作者是熟练的舞者。这些家族的孩子，学步之时即开始学习舞蹈。婴儿满一周岁刚蹒跚走路时，即在母亲的扶持下，开始学习复杂的舞蹈，至七八岁时，他已能十分熟练地表演舞蹈。^① 音乐教育同样，在巴纳巴岛，孩子自小即学习和声主音。

为追求完美，舞者将严肃认真地借助魔法（magic）的力量。以 Ruoia 舞为例，与之相应的魔法称为“Karuoia”，若是重要场合的 Ruoia 舞表演，舞者会请一位精通这一魔法的朋友，为其实施一个复杂的魔法程序，使其借此获得神力，在表演中表现优异。不过，从下文可知，需要魔法相助的，是初次参加重要舞蹈表演的新手。从 P. B. 拉克斯顿所记录的魔法仪式看，通过魔法祈求的神力来自天空与大地之神、祖先神以及享有盛名的舞蹈家之神。以下简要介绍魔法仪式，从中观察基里巴斯历史上的舞者所追求的舞蹈之美。

魔法仪式的第一环节是祈求太阳。舞者的魔法师朋友在黎明时分（凌晨4点左右）醒来，去摘一个嫩椰子，称为“te moimoto”。他要小心，不能让它坠落，他用牙齿咬紧椰子的须，然后下树。这个嫩椰子以备在后面的程序中饮用，以此获取太阳的神力。古代基里巴斯人崇拜太阳，这枚椰子是最高的且朝向太阳的，因而可以获得更多的太阳的力量。

第二个环节是祈求地之神灵以及祖先神。魔法师准备三个小而干透

① P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “‘Ruoia’, A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, p. 57.

的椰壳，称为“binobino”，这种椰子是过早地从树上掉落的。他需要将其清理干净，在椰壳顶部留下一个小孔。之后，他在地上挖一个坑，达到地下淡水层，之后，他在其中挖出三个浅水坑，如手一般的大小，让它们注满水。他依次将三个 binobino 壳分别放进三个浅水坑，让它们注满水，与此同时吟唱：

盛满，盛满/我的来自地下的召唤的椰壳/我的来自上空的召唤的椰壳/我将用我的魔法跟随他（舞者）/因为我的魔法足够/而且我的魔法足够有力/渴望好的和第一的，精益求精，精益求精。

当三个椰壳都注满水，魔法师蹲着，他用右手依次拿起装满水的 binobino 壳，面对即将举行舞蹈表演的村落集会房的方向，用食指盖住椰壳的开口，将椰壳从头部下滑到膝部，同时微微放松手指让水一点点洒下来，当这一动作结束时，binobino 壳里已经半空。在这一过程里，他吟唱道：

准备，准备，准备，准备/我准备头脑，我准备双手/我用心准备，我准备皮肤/我用心准备，我准备双脚/我准备他（舞者）/因为我给了他祝福并随时准备帮助他/准备，准备/Nei Manruonako, Nei Manruonako/去除我在 Ruoia 里的错误，去除我在 Ruoia 里的失误/去除我的错误，去除我在 Ruoia 里的傲慢/把它们去除，你能去除它们。

然后，他重新拿起第一个，将之从膝部举到头部，举高而止，在这一过程里，其中的水洒下，同时他吟唱如下咒语：

Nei Manruonako, Nei Manruonako/让它增进我的 Ruoia 舞的技巧/让它增进我 Ruoia 舞的技巧和精确/让它增进我 Ruoia 舞的技巧和表现/让它增进我 Ruoia 舞的技巧和声誉/让它增进我 Ruoia 舞的

技巧和同辈中的美誉/让它提升，让它提升/我的头脑纯净，我的双手纯净/我的头脑纯净，我的皮肤纯净/我的头脑纯净，我的双脚纯净/我的头脑纯净，我的姿态纯净/我的身体在集会房里舞蹈/唤醒力量，上升/你将被决定，第一，第二，第三，第四，第五，第六，第七，第八，第九，第十/最高级的/最高级的，噢，最高级的，最高级的。

在魔法师吟唱的过程里，三个椰壳的水依次全部洒出。在基里巴斯，淡水是神圣的。基里巴斯诸岛屿没有地上淡水，只有地下淡水层，基里巴斯人民高度珍视淡水。在这两个反方向运动过程中，魔法师以纯净神圣的地下淡水反复洗涤自己，这象征着对舞者的身体和心灵的洗涤，同时呼唤祖先神 Nei Manruonako，祈求她的帮助。

第三个环节是对于高度的祈求。魔法师回到自己家，将这三个 binobino 壳和先前从树上摘下的嫩椰子 te moimoto 高悬在房顶，希望他为之祈祷的舞者表现最佳，超过同伴。

第四个环节是“Ruoia 之饮”。舞者将自己洗干净，在身上涂抹芳香的椰油，然后前往魔法师朋友的房子。魔法师将那个嫩椰子用贝壳刀小心打开，不剥壳，用一根长约七英寸的被称为“kangeri”的棍子在里面搅动三次，每一次搅动时都默诵：

哦，Bwere，Wiaki 和 Tongo-tongo/你们都来到这里吧/哦，Bwere，Wiaki 和 Tongo-tongo/不仅给他灵感/不仅给他 Ruoia 舞的快乐/不仅给他 Ruoia 舞的精确/不仅给他灵感/不仅给他 Ruoia 舞的美妙/Bwere，Wiaki 和 Tongo-tongo/来吧。

舞者喝下嫩椰的汁，这称为“Ruoia 之饮”。从语境看，Bwere、Wiaki 和 Tongo-tongo 是三位享有盛名的已经被神化的舞蹈家，嫩椰子即魔法开始时从椰树摘下的最高的且朝向太阳的那个，经过了悬挂房顶时的祝福，再渗入三位舞蹈家的神力，舞者喝下饱含太阳以及优秀舞蹈家

神力的琼浆后，随即拥有所有神力。

第五个环节是向天地四方的祈求。“Ruoiā 之饮”之后，魔法师拿着 kangeri 棍，中指放在棍子上面，其他手指放在下面，手臂前伸，指向即将参加舞蹈表演的舞者，以恰当的姿势吟唱：

我找出了头虱/全世界会寻找芳香的魅力/我们召唤他的魅力和
Ruoiā 舞的精湛技巧/从哪里？从东方/我们召唤他的魅力和 Ruoiā
舞的精湛技巧/从哪里？从西方/从哪里？从南方/从哪里？从北方/
我们召唤他的魅力和 Ruoiā 舞的精湛技巧/我们从上方和下方/冲出去，
你将吃到什么/你将喝下我的魔咒/抓住它，我的魔法之棍/抓住。

于是，在上一个环节用于搅动嫩椰子的棍子成为魔法之棍，向舞者传递天地四方的神力。

第六个环节是祝福舞者拥有完美的仪态。舞者穿戴舞蹈服饰，头、颈、双臂、手腕、手指都戴上环饰，他的魔法师朋友吟诵：

让完美降临/姿态完美，双手完美/姿态完美，皮肤晶亮/姿态
完美，双脚完美/双唇唯有美丽/在同辈中无人能比。

在此祝福后，舞者前往集会房。

第七个环节为最后的祈求与祝福。当所有舞者在集会房集合，魔法师在集会房外面，但是在舞蹈团的视线之内，吟诵如下：

他的舞姿优雅，容貌优雅/赐予他才华，让他汲取力量/我
为他转换他们的魔咒/我转换，我抓住，我取走/我施法于他们
以允许他投入 Ruoiā 舞/我转换，我抓住，我取走/他们的美丽将
成为他的/我转换，我抓住，我取走/他们的荣誉将成为他的/我
转换，我抓住，我取走/他们金色皮肤将成为他的/我转换，我
抓住，我取走/他们的精湛技能将成为他的/我转换，我抓住，

我取走/他们的声誉将成为他的/来吧，你们到他脑中吧/穿过集会房/带着力量醒来，起来/你们决定他，第一，第二，第三……第十/最高级的，噢，最高级的，最高级的。^①

至此，魔法仪式结束。通过这一系列仪式，魔法师召唤太阳等自然神灵、祖先神以及舞蹈神灵，将他们的力量传输给他为之祈祷的舞者，使舞者的心灵和头脑为舞蹈而纯净，身体——眼睛、双唇、双手、双脚、皮肤等各个部位唯有美丽，从而拥有最完美的舞姿，超过他的所有同伴。

在巴纳巴岛，矛舞表演之前四天，舞者需要集中到远离村落的一处台地，之后的三天里，他们勤奋地练习舞蹈。他们每餐只吃一片椰肉，只喝淡水，他们相信吃得少一些，表演时头脑更清醒。同时，每日凌晨他们进行一种祈祷仪式，被称为“Kauti”，他们日落即睡，凌晨三四点钟起床，表演 Kauti，这一仪式的目的是唤醒神，召唤神的力量保护所有舞者，他们认为在这个时间段里神最有力量。^②

如上，无论在吉尔伯特群岛还是巴纳巴岛，历史上的基里巴斯舞者为舞蹈付出了极大努力，他们不懈地追求完美，因而锻造了基里巴斯传统舞蹈之美。

三 基里巴斯传统舞蹈的意义

正如卡捷琳娜·玛蒂娜·特利瓦所言，在一个缺少资源去发展其他艺术如绘画、雕刻、摄影的国家里，身体就成为文化传承和创造的基本方式。^③ 无疑，对于基里巴斯人而言，舞蹈是一种生活方式，也是他们

① P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “ ‘ Ruoia ’ , A Gilbertese Dance ” , *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, pp. 65 – 69.

② Raobeia Ken Sigrah, Stacy M. King, *Te Rü Ni Banaba-The Backbone of Banaba*, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 2001, p. 86.

③ Katerina Martina Teaiwa, *Akekeia! “ Traditional Dance in Kiribati (Review) ”* , *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2004, p. 197.

的一种存在方式，他们清晰地知道舞蹈的意义。舞蹈是基里巴斯传统社会生活的中心，舞蹈蕴含着基里巴斯人关于社会、生活、精神的表达，具有多方面的意义。

传统舞蹈是基里巴斯历史的记忆。基里巴斯历史上没有文字，但基里巴斯人以身体来进行书写。在巴纳巴岛，矛舞是特·安卡家族作为巴纳巴岛唯一主人时期的舞蹈，是其家族远古历史的见证，这一舞蹈记录了特·安卡家族在古代遭到入侵以及战斗时的场景。舞者在种种复杂舞姿下互动，以模拟战争的全景。矛舞还保存了特·安卡人的古代方言。矛舞的名称“Te karanga”即来自特·安卡家族的古代方言。特·安卡家族的古代方言只有少量流传至今，与基里巴斯语一起使用，由于了解这几个古老语言意义的长者已经去世，矛舞就成为坚守文化遗产的重要方式。巴纳巴岛的短棍舞，记录的是第一批入侵者奥瑞亚瑞亚家族与特·安卡家族关于土地疆界争端的历史片段。基里巴斯人称他们的舞蹈为“我们的土地的故事”，舞蹈是祖先创造并流传下来的历史。

传统舞蹈是基里巴斯现实生活的艺术表现。基里巴斯传统舞蹈与海洋生活密切相关，Ruoia 舞的许多姿势正是驾驭一艘单人悬臂梁独木舟所需要的动作；Ruoia 舞音乐具有摇摆以及起伏的特点，这来自音乐创作的巫术仪式，在这一巫术仪式中，创作者需要漂浮在洋礁以外的汹涌波浪中寻找灵感。一些头部、眼睛、手臂的动作是模拟海鸟尤其是军舰鸟的动态。卡捷琳娜·玛蒂娜·特利瓦曾观察过现代基里巴斯男性在海边手钓时快速而优雅的抛线、收线动作，由此知道传统男性舞蹈经常是捕鱼故事和捕鱼技巧的再现。同样，舞蹈是基里巴斯人最高级的情感表达方式之一，表达岛屿生活中的快乐、悲伤以及友情、爱情。

对基里巴斯人而言，传统舞蹈具有神奇的力量。在历史上，基里巴斯人虔诚地崇拜祖先神以及自然神，据凯利·约翰逊－希尔的研究，基里巴斯人相信舞蹈是神灵带来的，人的躯体是神灵的媒介，舞者是神灵的化身。在舞蹈表演时，舞者会感觉到神的力量穿透身体，舞者尖叫、呐喊以释放神的力量。正如一位舞者所描述的：有时，当我放松下来，会感觉到我的身体有某种东西像风一样在轻轻地吹拂，并渗透进我的皮

肤，当此发生，我就知道自己被舞蹈精灵盘踞了，于是我站起来穿上舞蹈服装。因此，基里巴斯传统舞蹈具有奇异的力量，能够使舞者颤抖、尖叫、哭泣甚至眩晕。这种力量影响到所有社会成员，即便作为观众，也能为舞蹈的力量所感染，经常情不自禁地潸然泪下，甚至尖声叫喊，如一位基里巴斯人所描述的：当我仅仅是在观看时，恰似有某种力量在身体内越聚越多，而无力控制。基里巴斯人相信舞蹈具有神奇的力量。舞蹈不仅具有荡涤心灵和康复疾病的功能，能够解除躯体的和精神的病痛，而且能够令舞者通过舞蹈进行祈福，从而产生特殊的力量。^①

舞蹈是基里巴斯传统社会交流乃至融合的重要媒介。在古代的巴纳巴岛，当巴纳巴岛特·安卡家族的一位男子与新来的奥瑞亚瑞亚家族的女子缔结婚约、开启土著与新来者的融合时，新娘族人要求新郎学习他们的舞蹈以用于婚礼，新郎每天到新娘的村子学习舞蹈，晚上回到自己的村子休息。一个偶然的机会，在他去往新娘村庄的路上，停在一棵树下休息，和风中摇曳的树枝让他联想到正在学习的舞姿。于是，接下来的三天他没有到新娘的村子，而是在这棵树下，跟随着风中摇曳的枝条练习。因而，特·安卡家族的矛舞中有了摇摆的流动的舞姿，尤其是女性的表演。在吉尔伯特群岛，1999年后的数年间，当卡捷琳娜·玛蒂娜·特利瓦到吉尔伯特群岛的塔拉瓦岛和塔比特韦亚岛做文化人类学的调查时，虽然有吉尔伯特人的血统，但她并不会使用吉尔伯特语，于是舞蹈成为她与岛民交流的媒介，岛民因她擅长现代舞而欢迎她，她向岛民展示现代舞并教授他们，而岛民教她 Ruoia 舞，包括前面谈到的 Ruoia te buki 和 Ruoia te bino 舞，由此可想象古代吉尔伯特舞蹈的社会交往的媒介功能。

舞蹈体现了基里巴斯人民富有的创新精神。自20世纪早期开始，巴纳巴舞蹈有男女共同表演的项目，其中即包括矛舞。在矛舞中，女性以柔和优雅的摆臀以及复杂的手、头部动作，与男性舞者的力量感两相

① Johnson-Hill, Kelly, "Dance and Worship in the Pacific Islands: A Comparative Study with Implications for An Emerging Ecumenical Consciousness", *Journal of Theolog*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2004, pp. 362 - 367.

映照,使矛舞韵味更加浓郁。

基里巴斯人民将既顽强又浪漫的民族精神融入了舞蹈。1943年,一种产生于吉尔伯特群岛迈亚纳岛的 Ruoia 舞表现了这种精神。记录者 P. B. 拉克斯顿先生认为这段舞蹈创作于日本占领吉尔伯特群岛时期,体现了岛民的顽强精神。不过,从这段舞蹈主题曲的歌词可推断,舞蹈创作时期可延续到美军占领吉尔伯特群岛之时。1943年11月19~29日,美军胜利进行了塔拉瓦岛、马金岛、阿贝马马岛战役,解放了吉尔伯特群岛。这段舞蹈的主题曲歌词如下:

多么可怜! /希特勒其时认为他能够征服/看啊,实际上他不能
征服/他的豪言和梦想只是四散的宣传/啊,他们来了/啊,他们是
怎样来的呀/不慌不忙地/从容而笃定地来了:美国人/看啊,他是
怎样地前进,英国军队/和美国军队因为他们将要发起进攻/德国的
堡垒已没有什么可清扫/从苍穹之下没有什么剩下/真的没有/旗帜
飘扬/加入战斗/旗帜飘扬/加入战斗/我们将欢呼“嘿嘿好耶”!^①

这里引人注意的是,迈亚纳岛的作家忽视了实际占领吉尔伯特群岛的日军,而是将德国纳入歌词,嘲讽希特勒梦想的破碎,歌颂美、英军队的胜利进军。无论怎样,经历了被征服的痛苦,岛民在舞蹈中展示的依然是浪漫精神。

传统舞蹈是基里巴斯保持社会凝聚力和文化独特性的方式。舞蹈是一种教育方式,通过舞蹈,年青的一代能够了解并理解他们的历史与文化。通过舞蹈的学习、准备以及各种场合的表演,基里巴斯人产生了社会一体的感觉。基里巴斯人以舞蹈表达其文化认同感,无论在基里巴斯本土,还是在斐济的拉比岛,以及流散到所罗门群岛、新西兰、澳大利亚、英国的基里巴斯人,舞蹈都是他们赖以保持其历史和文化独特性的

① P. B. Laxton and Te Kautu Kamoriki, “ ‘Ruoia’, A Gilbertese Dance”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, p. 64.

主要载体。舞蹈是基里巴斯人关于物质世界与精神世界及其之间关系的情感与感觉的顶点，舞蹈中包含着基里巴斯人民的所有精神，是种族和文化独特性的重要标志。

Aesthetic Course and Significances of Kiribati Traditional Dance

Xu Meili

Abstract: Dancing has been the important expression of culture in Kiribati. Traditional dancing has reflected concentratively traditional aesthetic of the Kiribati people. Artists have striven hard for beauty of postures, movements, music and costumes. Dancers have learnt precise and complex steps since childhoods. They have been constantly perfecting choreography, and specially pleased Gods for all of beauty of dancing. Traditional dancing which has reflected concentratively Kiribati national spirit has had Rich Significance. The traditional dancing has carried historical memory and reproduced island real life, and it has been the media of human and gods just as the ways of human interaction. The traditional dancing reflected romantic tenacity, social cohesion and Unique culture.

Keywords: Kiribati; Traditional Dance; Formal Beauty

斐济走火仪式概述

——与希腊对比的视角

杨鹏飞 杨鸿濂*

摘要：远古时代人们便崇拜火的力量，他们通过与火相关的活动来表达对火的敬畏，这也是世界上很多民族都有走火习俗的原因。斐济的走火仪式过程复杂，是对未成年战士迈向成熟的终极考验。仪式的神秘也源自口口相传的班噶岛火神传说。对比希腊的走火仪式，二者虽在形式上有所不同，但精神上的含义是相通的。

关键词：斐济 希腊 走火 火神传说 班噶岛

“走火”是指赤脚走在滚烫的灰烬或石头上。世界各地的许多的民族和文化中都有走火的习俗，最早的文献可以追溯到公元前 1200 年的印度铁器时代。^① 它常被用作一种仪式，作为对个人力量和勇气的考验，或在宗教中作为对个人信仰的考验。^②

一 斐济走火仪式

在火上行走已经存在了几千年，从希腊到中国，世界各地的文化都

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① ABC Binns, Corey, “World’s Watch and Learn: Physics Professor Walks on Fire”.

② H2G2, Earth Edition, “Firewalking”.

用走火仪式来纪念重生、成长和信仰。斐济的传统文化表演中，走火仪式一直都作为最富观赏性而且震撼的重头戏来出现。走火仪式有着极其烦琐冗杂且规矩甚多的准备活动。

首先，仪式将在地面上挖出一个大的圆形坑，直径 12 ~ 15 英尺，深 3 ~ 4 英尺。这个坑里排列着直径 12 ~ 15 英寸的大块河石，在仪式开始前 6 ~ 8 个小时内，祭祀人员需要在这些石头上用木材燃起大火。

其次，关于祭司斐济有着严格的规定。在举行仪式时，祭司通常来自神话传说中图伊 - 纳 - 伊维卡利塔的直系后裔或亲属。在活动开始前的两周内，走火人会将自己与所有女性隔离开，与她们没有任何接触，而且他们不允许吃椰子以及椰子制品。如果不遵守禁忌，走火人在仪式中可能会被严重烧伤。

再次，过程较为漫长。时间快到的时候，部落的年轻武士会手持木杆，木杆的末端会绑上一圈或一根结实的绿色藤蔓。他们用藤蔓把燃烧的木头从石头上清除掉。当武士们举起缠着藤蔓的木杆时，会齐声高唱：“噢乌喽乌喽（O-Vulo-Vulo）。”一种名为瓦卡巴拉巴拉（WaqabalaBala）的长树蕨类植物会被放置到面向祭司方向的坑里，据说这种植物包含着神的灵魂。然后，人们会将一根直径约 1.5 英寸的大型藤蔓拖上石头，使之变平，为祭祀活动做好准备。

当石块达到要求时，会有低阶祭司或走火人跳到石头上，并采取一些试验来测试它们的坚固程度，当祭司满意时，需要将一捆树叶和一捆长沼泽草放在大坑的边上。

当一切就绪时，瓦卡巴拉巴拉的位置在祭司的指挥下被调整，并且指向走火人将要接近的方向。准备好火坑的村民们随即围住这个圆圈，只留下一个缺口，供走火人进入。

大祭司环顾四周，当他觉得时辰已到之时，他将大喊一声“乌图噢（Vuto-O）”，这是让走火人迅速从隐蔽处冲出的信号，然后排成一排，快步向坑边走去。

瓦卡巴拉巴拉很快就会被移走，走火人进入坑内，在坑周围白色的滚烫石头上轻快地走着。他们似乎没有受到热量的伤害。当观众安静下

来时，一声突兀的叫喊声会响起，一捆捆的草和树叶被扔到石头上，走火人蜷缩在坑中央，唱着与这个场合相关的歌谣。

走火人的每根脚踝附近都缠有一条干的蕨类叶子，叫作德拉乌－尼－巴拉巴拉（drau-ni-bala-bala），它意义重大，一块手帕扔在石头上会燃烧起来，但这条蕨类植物则不会轻易被点燃。这些蕨类被小心地取下并埋在石头下的烤炙室里，和四个特殊的篮子一并被称为瓦西里（vasili）。

最后，整个坑将被土覆盖，留存四天。四天之后，炉子被大祭司打开，烤好的蕨类根被取出，磨碎并与水混合，将斐济人的主食之一达洛（芋头）放置在液体中煮熟，供给大祭司食用。

这才完成了全部的走火仪式。^①

二 班噶岛的火神传说与走火仪式祭司的由来

那么为什么只有班噶岛的人能够成为祭司或走火人呢？这要从斐济一个最古老的传说说起。

很久以前，在斐济群岛最大岛屿维提岛（Viti Levu）的南部有一个班噶岛 [斐语发音为姆班噶（mbengga）]，岛屿中有一个隶属于萨瓦屋（Sawau）部落的村子叫作纳瓦凯塞（Navakeise）。在村子里有一个非常擅长讲述古代传说和故事的人叫作德雷德雷（Dredre），他经常为村子里的人讲故事，村子里的人为了感谢他给人们带来的欢乐，也常常带一些礼物送给德雷德雷。

有一次当人们问他想要什么礼物时，德雷德雷要求所有的观众都要把第二天他们打猎时见到的第一个东西送给自己。

有一名叫图伊－纳－伊维卡利塔（Tui-na-Ivialita）的战士在山间的小溪里抓鱼，他捕获的第一个猎物是一个像鳗鱼一样的东西。可是当

① “Fire Walking On The Island Of Beqa, Legend Of The Firewalkers Of Fiji”, http://www.tropicalfiji.com/about_fiji/culture/legends/.

图伊把它从泥里拔出来的时候，它变成了一个神灵。

图伊非常高兴，准备向讲故事的人德雷德雷献上他的猎物。然而神灵开始求饶，试图用礼物作为交换以求让图伊释放自己，可是图伊都拒绝了。神灵最后提出可以给予图伊控制火的能力，这让图伊有些心动。

为了让它证明神的天赋，人们挖了一个坑，坑里铺满了石头，人们在石头上用木材点燃了一场大火。当石头被烧得发白时，神灵跳上了石头并叫图伊和它一起走上来。图伊鼓足了勇气，也踩在了石头上，结果他惊奇地发现并没有受到热量的影响。神灵告诉图伊，他所掌握的力量可以让他被埋在炉子里四天而不受任何伤害。然后图伊却不愿去尝试，他表示能够走在烧热的石头上就已经心满意足了。直到今天，萨瓦屋部落的成员依然可以在烧热的石头上行走，而图伊-纳-伊维卡利塔的直系后裔仍然是走火仪式中最权威的表演者或是大祭司。

在斐济人口口相传的故事中，班噶岛上的萨瓦屋部落有着无与伦比的能力，在维提岛北部和西部地区的拉（Ra）省和巴（Ba）省地区的原始部落中，当地的人们尤其信奉班噶岛上的人能够有效地治疗烫伤，当人们被热火烫到后，最先想到的并不是先进的西式医疗手段，而是应由村里的巫师出面邀请一名班噶岛的人跋山涉水来到村里为他诊治。诊治的过程是极其隐秘的，据一些声称接受过治疗的人说，班噶岛人会用手触碰伤者的皮肤，然后将一些绿色的植物糊状混合物涂在伤口上。这些植物可以有效地抑制伤口发炎并且祛疤效果极佳，因此班噶岛人每次出诊也都收入不菲。

火神的传说给班噶岛人带来了无上的荣光和切实的利益。在 19 世纪 70 年代塞鲁·伊佩尼撒·达空鲍（Seru Epenisa Cakobau）称王之前，斐济部落林立、吞并战争频繁，位于维提岛北部的拉省拥有最彪悍的武士和最大的战马群，从而建立了较大的军事优势。但直至斐济王登基，拉省的部族都一直与班噶岛的部落保持着较为友好的关系。这不仅是因为班噶岛与维提岛以海为界、地理位置优越，而且决定性的原因是维提岛的部落大多信奉班噶岛供奉的火神并崇拜火神祭司的力量。在医疗条件落后的大环境下，各部族的战士也希望在烫伤或烧伤后得到火神祭司

的祝福与治疗。

在信息不对称的年代,火神的传说很有可能是班噶岛的部族酋长在发现了一种可以治疗烫伤的草药后,将其神化并借由云游诗人及传说口述者的途径释放的。这个成功的传奇故事不仅在部落混战时期成功地震慑了来自拉省的最强武士部落,因而保留了大块完整的领地与财产,而且在现代社会中为部落的后人留下了一条谋生之路。

现代斐济的支柱产业即是旅游业。“数据显示,斐济2016~2017财年中旅游业创造的财富总量约占国内生产总值的40%。”而且,在新一年的旅游宣传中,斐济也在不断地推出“南太平洋时尚之都”和“魅力传统文化”等全新概念,大力推介独特的土著文化游。^①

在这些传统文化表演中,走火表演一直是非常重要的环节,虽然为了配合远途游客的游览时间,现今的走火表演对比传统仪式已经大大缩减时间并且简略了大部分的步骤,但是这一独特的文化仪式依然吸引了大量的游客前往观赏并成了斐济文化游的招牌表演。

三 希腊的走火仪式

斐济的走火仪式在希腊某些地区的节日“火节”中同样存在。在希腊北部和保加利亚南部的一些村庄中,阿纳斯特纳里亚(保加利亚语 Нестинарство, 希腊语 Αναστένάρια)是传统的走火仪式。庆祝这一仪式的部落是在1911~1912年巴尔干战争和1923年希腊与土耳其人口交换之后从东色雷斯进入希腊的难民的后裔。^②

保加利亚和希腊的某些村庄每年都有一个举行独特的仪式的时期,从5月21日开始,到5月23日结束。仪式的中心人物是圣君士坦丁和圣海伦,但这个时期中所有重要的日子都与希腊东正教日历中的重要日子重合,并与各种基督教圣人有关。这说明该古老的仪式和节日受到了

① 曲翔宇、杨鸿濂:《小众旅游热点,斐济掘金机遇多》,《环球时报》2018年12月5日。

② Xygalatas, Dimitris, “Ethnography, Historiography, and the Making of History in the Tradition of the Anastenaria”, *History and Anthropology*, Vol. 22, 2011, pp. 57–74.

基督教的影响。这些村庄每年都要庆祝两个大节日，一个在1月，更为重要的一个是在5月，用以纪念君士坦丁和海伦。每个节日持续3天，包括各种游行、音乐和舞蹈以及动物祭祀。节日的高潮就是走火仪式，参加者手持君士坦丁和海伦的圣像，兴高采烈地跳上几个小时的舞，然后进入火堆，赤脚走在燃烧红色余烬上，不会受到火焰的伤害。^①

举行走火仪式的每个社区都有一个叫作科纳基（konaki）的特殊圣地，君士坦丁和海伦的圣像被放置在那里，还有圣人的“图腾”（semadia）以及祭品和附在圣像上的红色头巾。5月20日，在火节前夕，君士坦丁和海伦的圣像会被当地人请出来，在色雷斯琴和鼓的伴奏下与圣像共舞。一段时间后，他们相信自己可能会被圣君士坦丁“俘虏”，其表现形式就是进入一种恍惚状态。5月21日，圣人节的早晨，人们聚集在科纳基圣地，来到一口井前喝圣水，并献祭动物。关于被杀动物的特点有明确的规定，但各村规定略有不同。晚上，民众在一个空旷的地方点燃一堆火，在科纳基圣地跳一段时间的舞后，执行走火仪式的人阿纳斯塔内瑞德斯带着他们的圣像走向火场。阿纳斯塔内瑞德斯绕着火堆跳了一圈后，在圣徒移动火堆的时候，他便在滚烫的煤堆上跳起舞来。这种仪式也会在1月份的圣阿塔纳西斯节期间举行，但是只在室内进行火焰行走。

根据一些传说，这一习俗起源于中世纪，当时圣君士坦丁教堂在科斯蒂，即现在的保加利亚境内。有一次圣君士坦丁教堂起火，当地村民仿佛听到了圣君士坦丁的呼救声。村民们冒着火焰救出了圣像，神奇之处便是没有任何人受伤，仿佛受到了圣君士坦丁的保护。然而，大多数民族学家认为，走火仪式是古代酒神崇拜的遗迹。^②

传统上，举行这种仪式的权力是世袭的，只有阿纳斯塔内瑞德斯的子女才能继承，而且只有当阿纳斯塔内瑞德斯太老或病得不能继续举行这种仪式时才能继承。举行走火仪式的家族是神圣的，该家族所

① Danforth, Loring M., *Firewalking and Religious Healing: The Anastenaria of Greece and the American Firewalking Movement*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

② Kakouri, Katerina, *Dionysiaka* (Athens, 1965); Megas, George A., *Greek Calendar Customs*, 3rd ed. (Athens, 1982).

住的房子被称为 stolnina (столнина), 类似于一个小教堂, 里面陈列着几个圣人的圣像, 以及神圣的门和用于仪式的鼓, 当地人相信鼓手在敲鼓的时候可以治愈疾病。

今天这种走火仪式在希腊北部的 5 个村庄举行: 阿亚埃莱尼、兰加达斯、米里克、马夫罗莱夫克和克尔金。此外, 这个仪式仍然在斯特兰扎山区的 6 个保加利亚村庄巴尔加里、格拉马蒂科沃、斯里瓦罗沃、康多洛沃、科斯蒂和布罗迪罗沃举行。在 20 世纪和 21 世纪, 这种仪式在很大程度上被商业化了, 现在在保加利亚黑海沿岸的海滨胜地, 外国游客都可以参加这种仪式, 而这些人与最初的传统几乎没有什么关系。一些保加利亚人仍然在最早举行走火仪式的村庄里以更真实的形式举行仪式。希腊北部几个村庄的居民也保留了这种仪式, 这些村庄居民的先人曾与保加利亚人一起生活在斯特兰扎山脉的腹地, 但在巴尔干战争后搬到了希腊。

2009 年, 该仪式被列入联合国教科文组织非物质文化遗产名录和国家非物质文化遗产代表作名录《人间瑰宝——保加利亚》中, 收藏在当地历史博物馆。

无论是在斐济还是在希腊, 走火仪式如同马拉的双轮车一样, 虽然经历数千年, 但依然发挥着它最初的作用。同时, 走火仪式的观赏性和舞蹈相类似, 而且对于人类学、历史学以及神话学而言都有着重要的学术价值。在此我们应该庆幸斐济和希腊的走火仪式能够完整地保存并沿用至今, 这是一项值得深入研究探讨的世界性的非物质文化遗产。

On Fire Walking in Fiji

——*Compare with Greece*

Yang Pengfei, Yang Honglian

Abstract: People worshiped the power of fire in ancient times. They

expressed their awe of fire through activities related to fire. This is also the reason why many people in the world have a custom of fire walking. The complicated fire walking ceremony in Fiji is the ultimate test of the maturity of underage warriors. The mystery of the ritual also originated from the legend of the Bega Levu firewalkers, which was passed down from mouth to mouth. Compared with the Greek fire walking ceremony, although these two ceremonies are different in form, but the spiritual meaning is the same. Modern physicists have also scientifically explained the principles of the fire walking ceremony.

Keywords: Fiji; Greece; Fire Walking; Legend of the Firewalkers; Bega Levu

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Learning Year 12 Chemistry in Samoa: Barriers and Support

Faguele Suaalii *

Abstract: This paper reports on an exploration of the findings of a study, which investigated the teaching and learning nexus in secondary schools' chemistry classes in Samoa. In particular, the project explores barriers and support factors that affect achievements in Year 12 chemistry. The exploration utilised classroom observations, archival records, work samples and semi-structured interviews, in order to investigate both students and teachers' perceptions of barriers and successes to the students' achievements. The aim of the project is to stimulate educators and policy makers to become aware of the relatively large number of factors, which may contribute to students' achievement during Year 12 chemistry in Samoa secondary school classrooms.

The report also discusses how the Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) 2016/17 – 2019/20, in relation to education, is focused on improving the quality of life for all Samoans, thus ensuring that sustainable and societal progress is reflected in classroom interactions and achievements at secondary school level.

The examination of the data suggests that barriers and support range from teaching and learning expectations, motivating factors and classroom practice

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to teaching and learning styles.

Keywords: Year 12; Chemistry; Samoa; Barriers and Support

Introduction

Having spent a number of years teaching secondary school chemistry in Samoa, I realised that many Year 12 chemistry students found learning chemistry problematic and they struggled with applying chemical principles to everyday situations. Some students failed to recognise any relationship between the chemistry taught in class and their surroundings and therefore, they did not perceive any value or relevance in studying chemistry —other than to pass exams. In Samoa, students' achievement level in chemistry is a concern. In addition, there has been a decrease in the number of students opting for science or chemistry at higher levels. As a result, the following questions can be asked: what is going on in the classroom? Why, after so many years of teaching the same curriculum, students' learning of chemistry is still problematic? These are two of the questions that I wish to answer whilst working on this research project.

This paper reports an exploration of the findings of my research investigation during my Ph. D. study. The investigation was conducted in three government co-ed secondary schools in Samoa: one located in a rural area and two located in the urban regions of Upolu, which is the most populated island of Samoa. There is one case study in each of the three schools; this being the schools' chemistry classroom. In each case, five chemistry students and one chemistry teacher were invited to participate. The central aim of my Ph. D. investigation was to understand the teaching and learning processes found in Year 12 chemistry classrooms, in Samoa. The primary focus was to explore the nature of factors that contribute to achievements — including both barriers and support. In particular, the teaching and learning of one of the units in the organic chemistry strand, hydrocarbons, was investigated.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section offers a brief outline of the background to my Ph. D. research investigation. It discusses a brief description of how the Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) 2016/17 – 2019/20, in relation to education, is focused on improving the quality of life for all Samoans, thus ensuring that sustainable and societal progress is reflected in classroom interactions and achievements at secondary school levels. Subsequently, there is a brief description of the methods used for the data collection. The following section begins with an outline of the three themes, which are supported by the relevant literature. The final section is a summary of this presentation and several future directions for this project are suggested.

The Research

Background to the study

Education is central to the future well-being of Samoa. It teaches young people the virtue of reason and it plays an important role in maintaining and developing the cultural fabric of society. Education develops in students the skills and attitudes needed to succeed in an ever-changing world. Today, that role is expanding since education will not only continue to shape the nation's cultural future; it is also central to the nation's economic and social well-being.

Internationally, over a time span of more than 30 years, students have studied basic chemistry as part of their science curricular^①. However, despite the regular teaching and re-teaching of these concepts and the use of projects and external assistance, research on students in New Zealand and Samoa has

① Taber, K. S., "An Analogy for Discussing Progression in Learning Chemistry", *School Science Review*, 76 (276), 1995, pp. 91 – 95. Taber, K. S., "Exploring the Language (s) of Chemistry Education", *Journal of Chemistry, Education Research and Practice*, 16, 193, 2015.

shown that more than fifty percent of students, in their final year (Year 13) at high school, maintained misconceptions^①, which led to a constant “low level of achievement”^②. An explanation for this phenomenon would not be simple — and it would be difficult to come to any conclusions — unless educators are able to gain an in-depth understanding of the nature of these classroom^③, including the teachers and the students’ experiences.

A literature review shows that there has been a real concern about the conceptual understanding of chemistry in secondary school students^④. The findings from these researchers show that more authentic and meaningful learning takes place, when the learning is contextual and made more relevant to the students’ own life^⑤. A study by Bhattacharya and Richards (2000) suggests that teachers need to become reflective thinkers and compliant with various effective teaching and learning tools, in order to engage students within collaborative and interactive learning environments. These strategies can improve the quality of students’ learning, thus making their learning contextual, which will then result in an improvement in their academic achievement. However, the teaching and learning of chemistry in classrooms today appears to focus mainly on helping students to pass exams.

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- ① Suaalii, F., Misconceptions in Chemistry: A Comparative Study of Samoa and New Zealand High Schools to Identify their Different Origins and Approaches to Eliminate and Correct Them (Unpublished Med thesis Massey University Palemerston North 2007). Suaalii, F., Supports and Barriers to Achievement in Secondary School Chemistry: Exploring Teaching and Learning of Year 12 Chemistry in Samoa (Ph. D. thesis, Massey University Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2013).
 - ② Government of Samoa, *Education For All: Mid-Decade Assessment Report, Samoa 2007*, 2007.
 - ③ St. George, A., Bourke, R. “Understanding Learning to Inform Teaching”, in A. St. George, S. Brown & J. O'Neill (Eds.), *Facing the Big Questions in Teaching: Purpose, Power and Learning*, Victoria, Australia.; CENGAGE Learning Australia Pty Limited, 2008, pp. 123 – 133.
 - ④ Suaalii, F., Supports and Barriers to Achievement in Secondary School Chemistry: Exploring Teaching and Learning of Year 12 Chemistry in Samoa (Ph. D. thesis, Massey University Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2013).
 - ⑤ Suaalii, F., Supports and Barriers to Achievement in Secondary School Chemistry: Exploring Teaching and Learning of Year 12 Chemistry in Samoa (Ph. D. thesis, Massey University Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2013).

Theoretical framework and plans of the Ministry of Education Sports and Culture (MESC)

The Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) 2016/17 – 2019/20, in relation to education, is an integral part of the government's overall economic strategy, with its focus on “improving the quality of life for all Samoans and boosting productivity for sustainable development”^①. Thus, the Samoan government has acknowledged the vital role of education in achieving its vision^②. New school improvement programmes have been developed to reinforce the four goals of Samoa education, which encourage (i) the development of comprehensive and enriching curricula; (ii) the development of active, interactive and creative pedagogies; (iii) the development of impartial evaluation and assessment methods; and (iv) support for individuals and society, through a humane education system^③.

The four goals were, in turn, addressed through four key principles: (i) equity, which requires the fair treatment of all individuals, in the provision of educational opportunities; (ii) relevancy, which is defined through a system which is meaningful, recognisable, applicable and useful; (iii) efficiency, which is demonstrated through management practices that ensure optimum use of resources, efficient services delivery, effective communication and co-ordinated decision-making; and (iv) quality^④. Quality refers to the demonstration of high

① Ministry of Finance Economic Policy and Planning Division. , *Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2008 – 2012: Accelerating Sustainable Development and Broadening Opportunities for All*, Apia; Government of Samoa, 2016.

② Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006 – 2015*, 2006.

③ Dr. Taufe'ulungaki, A. M. , Nako, A. , *Government of Samoa Education Sector Evaluation Study/PRIDE Project*, Apia; Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture, 2005. Western Samoa, *Education Policies 1995 – 2005*, 1995.

④ Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006 – 2015*, 2006. Ministry of Finance Economic Policy and Planning Division, *Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2008 – 2012: Ensuring Sustainable Economic and Social Progress*, Apia; Government of Samoa, 2008.

standards of academic achievement, with results coming from a complex interplay of professional and technical factors and social and cultural practices^①. Students' achievement refers to the level of intellectual growth which a student has attained whilst being involved in the learning process.

The review of the accomplishments of the first 10 years of educational policies and strategic plans (1995–2005), by the Pacific Regional Initiative for the Delivery of Basic Education (PRIDE), identified many deficiencies in the area of educational quality^②. These included a relatively high student “dropout”^③ and “repeaters” in Year 8^④. There was also a high demand for comprehensive teacher development^⑤ and the implementation of a quality improvement programme^⑥. Students' achievement in science subjects and mathematics has continued to be a concern for a number of years^⑦, at both primary and secondary school levels. In 2007, the GOS urged MESC to “find the cause (s) of students' low achievement levels”^⑧.

Methods used in the study

The data collection techniques included archival records and work

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- ① Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006–2015*, 2006. Thaman, K. H., Ako and Faiako: Cultural Values, Educational Ideas and Teachers' Role Perception in Tonga (Unpublished Manuscript, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 1988). Thaman, K. H., “Towards Culturally Inclusive Teacher Education with Specific Reference to Oceania”, *International Education Journal*, 2 (5), 2001.
 - ② Government of Samoa, *Educational For All. Assessment 2000: Samoa Country Report*, 2000.
 - ③ Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006–2015*, 2006.
 - ④ Government of Samoa, *Educational For All. Assessment 2000: Samoa Country Report*, 2000.
 - ⑤ McMurray, C., *Samoa, A Situational Analysis of Children, Women and Youth*, Suva, Fiji, 2006.
 - ⑥ Government of Samoa, *Western Samoa Education Policies, 1995*. Government of Samoa, *Educational For All. Assessment 2000: Samoa Country Report*, 2000. Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006–2015*, 2006.
 - ⑦ Government of Samoa, *Educational For All. Assessment 2000: Samoa Country Report*, 2000. Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture: Strategic Policies and Plan 2006–2015*, 2006.
 - ⑧ Government of Samoa, *Education For All: Mid-Decade Assessment Report, Samoa 2007*.

samples from student participants, classroom observations and semi-structured interviews, for all participants. Fifteen Year 12 chemistry students and three chemistry teachers participated in this study. The sequence of data collection in Table 1 below indicates that the first three methods were overlapping; this ensured the completion of data collection before the semi-structured interviews were conducted. This also ensured that the information gained from the first three methods was collected and further explored in the semi-structured interviews, which were flexible in nature.

Table 1 Sequence and Duration of Data Collection

<i>Method of data collection</i>	<i>Sequence and duration of events (week)</i>								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Collecting archival records									
Classroom observation									
Collecting work samples									
Semi-structured interviews									

Themes and the Literature

Themes

The examination of the data suggests that barriers and support range from (i) teaching and learning expectations, (ii) motivating factors and classroom practice, to (iii) teaching and learning styles. These are discussed in detail below.

Theme 1: Teaching and learning expectations

The present study identifies that some of the student participants were not realising their potential because their teachers' expectations were low and thus, that led to difficulties in understanding scientific concepts. The students

were unable to find any connection between scientific concepts and making sense of what they were being taught in the classroom. The teachers' expectations of their students' achievement were often based on beliefs about the students' ability. For instance, teachers felt "insecure" about students who had scored very low in previous unit tests and they believed that they would not be able to cope with the school certificate examination at the end of the year. After a series of classroom observations, these students appeared to remain quiet during discussions and only became active when copying notes from the board. Passive and rote learning was evident amongst these students in these classes, despite the fact that the teachers continued to provide explanations and relevant procedures, to help them answer examination questions. Some of the student participants in this study, however, were very confident and they felt that the teaching of chemistry was fair, appropriate and challenging, as they prepared for their school certificate examination. During class discussions, these particular students participated and posed questions and they were often given opportunities to respond.

What the literature says about teaching and learning expectations

Teacher expectations are seen as a significant determinant of students' achievement^①. In addition, Koballa and Glyn confirmed that teachers' expectations can influence students' performance in science and other areas^②. The significance between teacher expectations and student

① Crawford, B. A. , "Learning to Teach Science as Inquiry in the Rough and Tumble of Practice", *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 44 (4), 2007, pp. 613 – 642. McKinley, E. , "Postcolonialism, Indigenous Students, and Science Education", in Abell, S. K. , Lederman, N. G. (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Science Education*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 2007, pp. 199 – 226.

② Koballa, T. R. , Glynn, S. M. , "Attitudinal and Motivational Constructs in Science Learning", in Abell, S. A. , Lederman, N. G. (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Science Education*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 2007, pp. 75 – 102.

achievement is viewed as both a reason and a solution to the achievement gap^①. Teacher expectations reflect teacher beliefs and together this influences what the teacher attempts to elicit from the students — and what the students expect of themselves^②.

Science teachers' expectations of students (and the strategies they use that are based on these expectations) play an important role in increasing or reducing students' motivation to learn. Researchers have found that teachers, who have high expectations of students, give cues and prompts that communicate to them their belief that the students can perform well^③. However, teachers who have high expectations of students are less likely to accept poor answers from them^④. Frequently, the students, who are believed to be high-ability learners, receive more positive non-verbal feedback from teachers, such as smiling and eye contact.

Good and Brophy suggested that teachers with low expectations of students are more likely to provide them with inconsistent feedback, sometimes praising inadequate answers, sometimes criticising them and sometime ignoring them^⑤. In many cases, those students who are believed to be low-ability learners are

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- ① Darling-Hammond, L., "Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence", *Education Policy Analysis Archives*, 8 (1), 2000. Gay, G., *Culturally Responsive Teaching: Theory, Research, and Practice*, New York: Teachers College Press, 2000.
 - ② Brophy, J., *Dispelling the Myth: Teaching Educational Practices, Series 1*, Washington, D. C.: International Bureau of Education, 2000. Gay, G., *Culturally Responsive Teaching: Theory, Research, and Practice*, New York: Teachers College Press, 2000.
 - ③ Good, T., Brophy, J., *Looking in Classrooms* (9th ed.), Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2003. Rob, C. J., "Spontaneous Inquiry Questions in High School Chemistry Classrooms: Perceptions of a Group of Motivated Learners", *International Journal of Science Education*, 25, 2003, pp. 13 - 33. Rubie-Davies, C. M., "Teacher Expectations and Student Self-perceptions: Exploring Relationships", *Psychological School*, 43, 2006, pp. 537 - 552.
 - ④ Koballa, T. R., Glynn, S. M. "Attitudinal and Motivational Constructs in Science Learning", in S. A. Abell & N. G. Lederman (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Science Education*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 2007, pp. 75 - 102.
 - ⑤ Good, T., & Brophy, J. *Looking in Classrooms* (9th ed.), Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2003.

asked fewer and less challenging questions: they also receive less feedback and they have less time to respond and less praise. Across a set of studies, Seiler, Tobin and Sokolic^① and Tobin, Seiler and Walls^② outlined how normal practices of schooling, such as tracking, teaching to the test, rote learning, drill-and-practice activities and curricula (geared towards minimal achievement) led to a culture of low expectations in science for students. Yet the same students, who were exposed to these low expectations, helped to reproduce the culture of low expectations by engaging in multiple forms of resistance, including resistance to high expectations of their learning from their teacher and a lack of attendance in class, even when the science instruction was being led by a competent, experienced and caring teacher^③.

Students are sensitive to teachers' beliefs about them. In cultures where low achievement is attributed to low ability (and ability is believed to be unalterable), low-ability students often come to believe that their performance will not change, regardless of their level of effort^④. In cultures where the students' level of work and effort is considered to be directly related to their learning, high expectations for all students lead to higher achievement, through more work and effort by students of all abilities^⑤. This however, requires science teachers to be more effective and to use strategies to set

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- ① Seiler, G., Tobin, K., Sokolic, J., "Design, Technology and Science: Sites for Learning, Resistance and Social Reproduction in Urban Schools", *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 38, 2001, pp. 746 – 768. Seiler, G., Tobin, K., Sokolic, J., "Reply: Reconstituting Resistance in Urban Science Education", *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 40, 2003, pp. 101 – 104.
 - ② Tobin, K., Seiler, G., Walls, E., "Reproduction of Social Class in Teaching and Learning Science in Urban High Schools", *Research in Science Education*, 29, 1999, pp. 171 – 187.
 - ③ Griffard, P., Wandersee, J., "Challenges to Meaningful Learning in African-American females at An Urban Science High School", *International Journal of Science Education*, 21, 1999, pp. 611 – 632.
 - ④ Cruickshank, D. R., Jenkins, D. B., Metcalf, K. K., *The Act of Teaching* (4th ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006.
 - ⑤ Carin, A. A., Bass, J. E., Contant, T. L., *Teaching Science as Inquiry*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Merrill Prentice Hall, 2005.

and maintain high expectations. Staver discussed some of these strategies:

- monitoring and analysing students' work and taking corrective individual and group action as needed;
- helping students believe in their ability to learn effectively and raising their awareness of positive outcomes as a result;
- helping students to view themselves as capable learners;
- building learners' confidence by breaking difficult tasks into smaller steps that can be viewed as more manageable and achievable;
- providing assistance but not doing the tasks for the students;
- giving learners a reasonable level of control over their learning;
- helping learners become aware that their own efforts, strategies and persistence, are important to their successful learning;
- helping learners to experience the satisfaction of successful learning^①.

Theme 2: Motivating factors and classroom practice

Some students seem naturally enthusiastic about learning, but many need (or expect) their instructors to inspire, challenge, and stimulate them: “Effective learning in the classroom depends on the teacher's ability... to maintain the interest that brought students to the course in the first place”^②. Whatever level of motivation students bring to the classroom, will be transformed — for better or worse — by what happens in that classroom.

① Staver, J. R., *Teaching Science: Educational Practices Series* (Vol. 17), Geneva, Switzerland: International Academy of Education, 2007.

② Erickson, S. C., *The Lecture*, Ann Arbor: Center for Research on Teaching and Learning, University of Michigan, 1978.

Motivation is one of the most important impulsive power sources, which gives some guidance to the behaviour of students in school; and it determines behaviours, strengths, and stability in learning. Although Samoan students behaved in a manner that was culturally respectful within the classroom, there was no indication that learning was associated with such behaviour. In this study, it was determined that this impulsive power source was deficient in all three cases. The teacher gives instructions for almost everything the students have to do in class. For instance, when the students completed their copying of notes, the teacher would then ask them to work on an activity/task. This was often followed by more instructions from the teachers on what they could do. Student participants stated that it is best to wait for instructions, because they often get scolded by the teacher if they do things on their own. Although I did not see students being scolded during the investigation, the teacher constantly gave instruction after instruction, which appeared to be a tradition in these classrooms.

Unfortunately, there is no single magical formula for motivating students. Many factors affect a given student's motivation to work and to learn^①including interest in the subject matter; a perception of its usefulness; a general desire to achieve; self-confidence and self-esteem; and patience and persistence. In addition, of course, not all students are motivated by the same values, needs, desires, or wants. Some students will be motivated by the approval of others and some by overcoming challenges.

What the literature says about motivating factors and classroom practice

Teachers do make a difference to the motivation of students in relation to

① Sass, E. J., "Motivation in the College Classroom: What Students Tell Us", *Teaching of Psychology*, 16 (2), 1989, pp. 86 – 88.

learning. Teachers can make school life miserable for their students or alternatively, they can make it appealing, by filling their classroom with excitement and hope. In the latter situation, students will be interested in their learning and search for even more knowledge, under the guidance of enthusiastic teachers^①. Such teachers care about what they teach and they communicate this to their students, so that the students understand that the knowledge they are gaining is important for further studies and job applications. These students are motivated to learn, since they keep in close touch with their teachers, in relation to topics discussed in the classroom.

Studies perceive that science competence is related to students' motivation to learn and their future aspirations; and ultimately their achievement in science subjects. For instance, Lau and Roeser found that, although cognitive ability was the strongest predictor of high school students' performance in science achievement tests, students perceived that science competence was a significant predictor of engagement, achievement and future aspirations^②. Specifically, students' perceived that science competence uniquely predicted students' test and classroom engagement and achievement, as measured by science tests and classroom grades and students' anticipated pursuit of science-related college majors and careers.

Given that students perceived science competence as being linked with motivation, achievement and future academic and career choices, it is important that science educators develop a more complete understanding of related beliefs and perceptions. For instance, most children begin school with a positive attitude: they are enthusiastic about learning and participating in

① Wlodkowski, R. J. , Jaynes, J. H. , *Eager to Learn: Helping Children Become Motivated and Love Learning*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990.

② Lau, S. , Roeser, R. W. , “Cognitive Abilities and Motivational Processes in High School Students' Situational Engagement and Achievement in Science”, *Educational Assessment*, 8, 2002.

classroom activities. They are optimistic about their abilities and they anticipate success and view their expending efforts and practice as the key to overcoming difficulties^①. These beliefs are integral to successful careers and they are associated with subsequent motivation, concurrent and future achievement and decisions to continue learning particular subjects^②.

Peer-groups are those close peers who may influence the learning motivation amongst students. A student, who is close with a peer group who like to study, will eventually join in the discussion group which has been formed. On the other hand, a student, who is close with a peer group who often “skip” classes, will eventually follow that peer group and begin to skip classes. Students feel “cool and smart” by hanging out with their peer group, rather than following the advice of their elders, because peers within a close age range tend to have a closed mind set in their thinking and their point of view comes from the same perspective.

Theme 3: Teaching and learning styles

This study has identified that students’ learning styles and preferences are not being recognised by their teachers. This was based on the fact that all the lessons observed were merely being taught according to the teacher’s preference. In almost every observed lesson, the teacher began the chemistry lesson by standing in front of the class and giving explanations and demonstrations using diagrams or models of scientific concepts, whilst the students sat and listened. Sometimes the chemistry class began with students copying notes into their note books before a discussion. When asked about this classroom practice, the student participants

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- ① Freedman-Doan, C. , Wigfield, A. , Eccles, J. S. , Blumenfeld, P. , Arberton, A. , Harold, R. , “What am I Best at? Grade and Gender Differences in Children’s Beliefs about Ability Improvement”, *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, 21, 2000, pp. 379 – 402.
- ② Marsh, H. W. , Craven, R. G. , “Reciprocal Effects of Self-concept and Performance From A Multidimensional Perspective: Beyond Seductive Pleasure and Unidimensional Perspectives”, *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 1, 2006, pp. 133 – 163.

claimed that this was the way they were taught in school and they are used to it. The most important thing for them is to have the notes written in their books, to help them with examinations and test preparations.

A discussion with the teacher participants, relating to their current teaching approaches and their understanding of their students' learning and achievements, immediately resulted in them stating their belief in the importance of a student-centred paradigm to learning. However, limited time to complete the syllabus before examinations became a great barrier to its implementation. In the case of these teachers, it is clear that a student-centred approach promotes active learning but unfortunately their classroom practice revealed a different approach. Such an approach reflected a system that favoured teacher-centred, 'talk and chalk' instructions with students, who were situated as passive recipients of the knowledge.

What the literature says about teaching and learning styles

Research findings have shown that the academic achievement of students differs significantly, in regards to their learning styles. Samoan students, in particular, also have different learning styles and their approaches to learning are often a reflection of their family's influence. For example, Anae's study of Samoan students in New Zealand identified that they were individualistic in nature and that Samoan students preferred to learn as individuals and therefore, they chose not to partake in group tasks and activities^①. Anae noted that some Samoan families practice the individualistic culture of New Zealand and she believed that the nature of this New Zealand culture could have influenced these students. She also noted that some students believed their church to be irrelevant, in relation to their educational development. One important point arises

① Anae, M., *Fofo i Vaoese: Identity Journey of New Zealand-born Samoans* (Ph. D. diss, University of Auckland, 1998).

from this study: that family is the most significant factor in many Samoan students' lives. Educators need to understand their students' family culture, in order to identify appropriate approaches for these students.

Students' learning style preferences refer to the ways in which they respond to learning stimuli and to their characteristic ways of acquiring and using information^①. Learning styles recognise not only that individuals learn in different ways, but also that individual characteristics (such as personality) influence learning^②. This recognition is in line with constructivist notions of learning^③, which recognise that factors, such as learning styles and prior knowledge may (for example) influence judgements on the importance of information presented and it may also influence the interpretation given to that information^④. Furthermore, constructivists believe "that meaningful learning is a cognitive process in which individuals make sense of the world in relation to the knowledge which they already have constructed, and this sense-making process involves active negotiation and consensus building"^⑤. It is argued that students' learning styles differ^⑥. In addition, it is sometimes claimed that

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- ① Sloan, T., Daabe, C.J., Giesen, J., "Mathematics Anxiety and Learning Styles: What is the Relationship in Elementary School Teachers?" *School Science and Mathematics*, 102, 2002, pp.84-90.
 - ② Dunn, R., Dunn, K., *Teaching Students Through Their Individual Learning Styles: A Practical Approach*, Virginia, U.S.A: Reston Publishing, 1991.
 - ③ Bodner, G.M., "Constructivism: A Theory of Knowledge", *Journal of Chemical Education*, 63, 1986, pp.873-878.
 - ④ Bailey, P.D., Garrat, J., "Chemical Education: Theory and Practice", *University Chemistry Education*, 6, 2002, pp.39-57. Kelly, G.J., Sezen, A., "Activity, Discourse, & Meaning Some Directions for Science Education", in W.-M. Roth (ed.), *Re/Structuring Science Education* (Vol.2), Springer Netherlands, 2010, pp.39-52.
 - ⑤ Fraser, B.J., "Classroom Environment Instruments: Development, Validity and Applications", *Learning Environments Research*, 1 (1), 1998, pp.7-34.
 - ⑥ Entwistle, N., "A Model for the Teaching-learning Process", in T.E. Richardson, M.W. Eysenck D.W. Piper (eds.), *Student Learning: Research in Education and Cognitive Psychology*, England: Open University Press, 1987, pp.13-28. Entwistle, N., *Promoting Deep Learning Through Teaching and Assessment: Conceptual Frameworks and Educational Contexts* (Paper Represented at the TLRP Conference, Leicester, November 2000). Richardson, T.E., "Reliability and Replicability of the Approaches to Studying (转下页注)

knowledge of learning styles and the use of educational resources^①, which are relevant to learning styles, will lead to efficient learning^② and an increase in the motivation to learn^③.

Irrespective of a student's learning style, the teacher has a significant influence on the student's learning experience^④. It is a fact that teachers are most helpful when they help their students to learn in a way that suits the student's style preference^⑤. However, does this suggest that adapting a teaching style to the learning style of a student will result in improved academic achievement in chemistry or science? A large amount of researches have been focused on the effect of matching and mismatching teaching and learning styles^⑥. Different approaches have been suggested including matching instructional methods^⑦, media and assessment to learner preferences and tendencies; mismatching styles in order for the learner to develop a broader

(接上页注⑥) Questionnaire”, *Studies in Higher Education*, 15, 1990, pp. 155 – 168.

- ① Kelly, G. J., Sezen, A., “Activity, Discourse, & Meaning Some Directions for Science Education”, in W.-M. Roth (ed.), *Re/Structuring Science Education* (Vol. 2), Springer Netherlands, 2010, pp. 39 – 52.
- ② Gadzella, B. M., Stephens, R., Baloglu, M., “Prediction of Educational Psychology Course Grades by Age and Learning Styles Scores”, *College Student Journal*, 36, 2002, pp. 62 – 69.
- ③ Moore, L. L., Grabsch, D. K., Rotter, C., “Using Achievement Motivation Theory to Explain Student Participation in A Residential Leadership Learning Community”, *Journal of Leadership Education*, 9 (2), 2010, pp. 22 – 34. Nolen, S. B., “Learning Environment, Motivation, and Achievement in High School Science”, *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 40 (4), 2003, pp. 347 – 368. Stipek, D., *Motivation to Learn: From Theory to Practice*, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1998.
- ④ Ministry of Education Sports and Culture, *National Curriculum Policy Framework*, 2006.
- ⑤ Allen, R. H., *Impact Teaching: Ideas and Strategies for Teachers to Maximize Student Learning*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002. Dunn, R., Dunn, K., *Teaching Students Through Their Individual Learning Styles: A Practical Approach*, Virginia, U. S. A: Reston Publishing, 1991.
- ⑥ Mugler, F., Landbeck, R., “Learning in the South Pacific and Phenomenography Across Cultures”, *Higher Education Research & Development*, 16 (2), 1997, pp. 227 – 239. Uzuntiryaki, E., “Learning Styles and High School Students' Chemistry Achievement”, *Science Education International*, 18 (1), 2007, pp. 25 – 37.
- ⑦ Suaalii, F., Bhattacharya, M., “Conceptual Model of Learning to Improve Understanding of High School Chemistry”, *Journal of Interactive, Research and Learning*, 2007.

approach to learning^①; providing the initial contact with the material in the learner's preferred mode and then moving to broader exposure with subsequent material^②; or teaching to all styles^③.

There is still a general lack of creativity in teaching approaches, despite a significant number of professional development programmes, which have been conducted over the years. In addition, the Samoan Curriculum recognises that, for students to succeed, curriculum experiences must relate to student interests, needs and learning styles, in order to engage students in their learning^④. More group activities are needed, which allow students to personally experience scientific ideas within a wide variety of contexts. Students need to be encouraged to share ideas openly with one another. In this way, students will engage in a variety of strategies and learning styles. However, most teachers still dominate the teaching and learning process and (as a result) the students' various learning styles are not well catered for within education in general, or science classrooms in particular^⑤. This finding is consistent with other research on effective teaching, which suggests that effective teachers adjust their teaching to fit the needs of different students and the demands of different instructional goals, topics and methods^⑥.

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- ① Sadler-Smith, E. , Riding, R. , “Cognitive Style and Instructional Preferences”, *Instructional Science*, 27, 1999, pp. 355 – 371.
 - ② Reinert, H. , “One Picture is Worth A Thousand Words? Not necessarily!” *The Modern Language Journal*, 60, 1976, pp. 160 – 168.
 - ③ Felder, M. R. , “It Goes Without Saying”, *Chemical Engineering Education*, 25 (3), 1991, pp. 132 – 133. Felder, M. R. , Brent, R. , “How to Improve Teaching Quality”, *Quality Management Journal*, 6 (2), 1999, pp. 9 – 21.
 - ④ Ministry of Education Sports and Culture, *National Curriculum Policy Framework*, 2006.
 - ⑤ Government of Samoa, *Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture; Strategic Policies and Plan 2006 – 2015*, 2006.
 - ⑥ Darling-Hammond, L. , *Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence*, 1999. [http: //www. politicalscience. uncc. edu/godwink/PPOL8687/WK11March% 2029% 20Teachers/ Darling-Hammond% 20Review% 20essay% 20on% 20teacher% 20quality% 20and% 20outcomes. pdf](http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/godwink/PPOL8687/WK11March%2029%20Teachers/Darling-Hammond%20Review%20essay%20on%20teacher%20quality%20and%20outcomes.pdf) (Accessed on 18 November 2018).

Summary

This study has provided some useful information on the teaching and learning of chemistry in Samoa secondary schools. It provides the foundations for some of the factors (particularly within the classroom) that affect students' learning of chemistry in Samoa. This paper demonstrates that above and beyond the differences in student characteristics, students' achievements in chemistry and science were positively linked with their perceptions of challenges; and the support of their teachers.

Teachers must embrace the view that effective teaching means constantly being aware of (and attending to) their students' struggles to learn chemistry and they need to continually adjust their teaching strategies and techniques, in order to help their students work through any difficulties. In doing so, teachers should set high learning expectations and focus on core scientific ideas. In addition they should aim for a deep, integrated understanding of scientific inquiry and the core body of scientific knowledge. In order to help students reach their teachers' aims and expectations, the teachers must understand how learners actively construct new knowledge, in addition to an understanding of the complexity of the learning process, the importance of the students' interests and the students' potential anxieties and conflicts within science concepts.

Direction of research

Although barriers and supports were identified in this study, there is still a need to look into various factors which cause these barriers across the various schools settings as well as the different subjects in Samoa secondary schools. The Government of Samoa has put so much emphasis and funds on the

improvement of education in Samoa, yet, there is always a concern of low achievements and high school drop-out. Thus, this exploratory study involving three case study classrooms in Samoa can inform about the nature of support and barriers to students' achievements.

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历史

Research on
Pacific Island
Countries

小议“南岛语族”之起源

迟小飞*

摘要：19 世纪以来，针对“南岛语族”的起源问题，众多中外学者分别从语言学、考古学、民族学等角度提出了多种不同的起源地及扩散模式的假说。南岛语族的起源与扩散问题在语言学、考古学等相关领域一直是个具有争议性的重大理论问题。本文梳理了中外关于南岛语族起源与扩散问题的不同假说，列举了中外学者中具有代表性的观点，并在此基础上从跨学科的角度，综合语言学、历史学、考古学、人类学等进行跨学科研究，提出了对南岛语族起源与扩散问题的新思考，以期得出比较接近历史真实的结论。

关键词：南岛语族 语言学 中国南方地区

15 世纪开始的大航海时代，欧洲的航海家们远渡重洋，不断开辟“新航路”和发现“新大陆”。在每一处新到的岛屿上，西方航海家们几乎都发现了土著们居住过的痕迹。这些土著在语言和文化上表现出超乎想象的统一性，有着相似的风俗习惯。^① 这种种迹象，引起了为找寻

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① 范志泉、邓晓华、王传超：《语言与基因：论南岛语族的起源与扩散》，《学术月刊》2018 年第 10 期。

香料群岛、南方大陆而进入太平洋的西方探险家的好奇。16世纪,来自西方的探险家们发现太平洋诸岛地区不同的族群对鲨鱼、乌贼等动物的称呼如出一辙,由此认为南岛地区的语言有相似之处。^①随着接触的日益频繁,西方学者对南岛地区语言的认识不断深入。1706年,荷兰人H. 莱兰特发现南岛地区各种语言间存在亲属关系;1836年,德国学者W. F. 洪堡特首次用“马来—波利尼西亚语”来命名这个地区的语言;1899年,德国学者W. 施密特创造了“南岛”一词,并将南岛地区的语言称为“南岛语”。^②由此,西方学术界便将这个有着共同海洋文化和关系纽带的群体称为南岛语族。

所谓“南岛”(Austronesia),是由两个希腊文字的字根austro-与-nesia所组合而成,前者为南风之意,后者意指岛,后来日本人将“Austronesia”翻译成“南岛”,近代国人翻译日文时引进了这个词语。“南岛语族”是一个民族学概念,是指现今居住于东起复活节岛、西到马达加斯加等海岛、南至西南太平洋三大群岛、北达我国台湾地区、中经东南亚的具有民族语言亲缘关系和相似文化内涵的土著民族文化体系,主要包括马来人(一般包括中国台湾高山族)、密克罗尼西亚人、美拉尼西亚人、波利尼西亚人等几大族群。根据《民族语》世界语言资料库的统计,南岛语族包括1262种语言,使用人口约2.7亿。南岛语族是目前世界上分布区域最广,也是唯一一种主要分布在海岛上的族群。西方学界一般以语言学分类法为主要依据,将南岛语族分为东、西两大区。东部大洋洲族群包括美拉尼西亚、密克罗尼西亚、波利尼西亚三区;西部赫斯佩拉尼西亚族群包括中国台湾地区、菲律宾、印度尼西亚、马来西亚等地。^③

南岛语分为4个语族:(1)印度尼西亚语族分布在中国台湾(高山族语言)、菲律宾(他加禄语、比萨杨语等)、中南半岛(占语、马来语等)、南洋群岛(印尼语、爪哇语等)、马达加斯加(马达加斯加

① 王有为:《南岛语族:根在何处?》,《百科知识》2011年第13期。

② 邓晓华、高天俊:《演化语言学的理论、方法与实践》,《山西大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)2014年第2期。

③ 徐丹:《研究语言的新视角:语言和基因的平行演变》,《当代语言学》2015年第2期。

语);(2)密克罗尼西亚语族分布在菲律宾以东、赤道以北的马里亚纳群岛、关岛、加罗林群岛、帕劳、马绍尔群岛、瑙鲁、吉尔伯特群岛等地;(3)美拉尼西亚语族分布在印尼以东、赤道以南的新几内亚岛、俾斯麦群岛、所罗门群岛、圣克鲁斯群岛、新赫布里底群岛以及新喀里多尼亚、斐济等地;(4)波利尼西亚语族分布在上述三个语族以东的广大区域,包括赤道以北、国际日期变更线右侧的中途岛和夏威夷,赤道以南、国际日期变更线两侧的非尼克斯群岛、托克劳、萨摩亚、法属波利尼西亚、皮特凯恩岛、复活节岛以及汤加和新西兰等地,共有100多种语言和方言。关于南岛语系和其他语系的同源关系,目前有4个不同假设:(1)传统观点认为,南岛语系和其他语系没有同源关系;(2)德国传教士W.施密特于1904年提出,南岛语系和南亚语系同源;(3)美国学者Dahl于1970年指出,南岛语系和印欧语系同源;(4)法国学者沙加尔于1990年提出,南岛语系和汉藏语系同源。^①

自南岛语族共同体确认以来,最引人注目也备受争议的焦点之一,莫过于南岛语族的起源与扩散问题。关于南岛语族的起源,目前中外学界普遍运用遗传学(基因研究)、语言学、考古学、文化人类学等跨学科相结合的方法进行综合性研究。迄今为止国际公认的一点是,基因的稳定性最高也最可靠,语言次之,文化又次之。^②有关南岛语族的起源与扩散问题,起初便是来自语言学实践的相关探讨。但是由于语言学的对象局限于当代南岛语族,忽视了古、今南岛语族居住地的变迁,以及语言学者们囿于各自理论、研究方法的不同以及所掌握材料,在该问题的研究方面始终没有达成共识。

一 “南岛语族”的文化来源

长期以来,在国内学术界长期得到认同的理论是,语言在台湾发展

① 吴春明:《“南岛语族”起源研究述评》,《广西民族研究》2004年第2期。

② 范志泉、邓晓华、王传超:《语言与基因:论南岛语族的起源与扩散》,《学术月刊》2018年第10期。

后奠定了日后南岛语族的基础,并于约4000年前随人口外移而扩散。^①张光直在《中国东南海岸考古与南岛语族起源问题》一文中指出:“简单的说,台湾的南岛语族说明台湾是整个南岛语族最早起源的地区的一部分;向上追溯四、五千年所得的大坌坑文化很可能是原南岛语族的代表或一部分的代表;隔着台湾海峡的富国墩文化如果可以进一步的证明是大坌坑文化的一部分,那么原南岛语族的老家便推上了大陆的东南海岸;照目前的材料看来,这批材料的地理范围集中在闽江口向南到韩江口的福建和广东东端的海岸。”^②他将南岛语族最早的源头指向台湾西海岸的大坌坑文化和福建沿海的富国墩类型。

也有学者将南岛语民族的起源锁定在中国福建。东山博物馆馆长陈立群通过对东山大帽山贝丘遗址出土的大量石器、陶制品等文物进行初步分析,指出这些石器、陶器等文物在制作方法、生产工艺等方面和台湾、澎湖地区的考古发现十分相似。再则,东山岛自古使用的竹筏是最早最好的航海器,与太平洋上南岛语族的竹筏有一定的渊源关系。^③因此推断南岛语民族起源于福建。

林惠祥在《马来人与中国东南方人同源说》《南洋马来族与华南古民族的关系》等文中指出,华南大陆的百越民族就是居留在大陆上的古代马来人,即所谓的“原马来人”,并从体质特征、文化习俗、考古遗存等学术角度比较全面地论述了华南大陆为马来人的起源地。^④凌纯声从体质、语言和文化诸方面对马来人和中国南方民族进行了比较后也认为,“南洋土著”均来自中国,他们的祖先就是中国史籍中提到的百越民族。^⑤许友年指出:“不论是我国的东南沿海

① 邓晓华:《南方汉语中的古南岛语成分》,《民族语文》1994年第3期。

② 张光直:《中国东南海岸考古与南岛语族起源问题》,四川大学博物馆、中国古代铜鼓研究学会编《南方民族考古》第一辑,成都:四川大学出版社,1987年,第10页。

③ 陈立群:《福建东山岛旧石器时代文化》,《汕头大学学报》(人文社会科学版)2006年第5期。

④ 林惠祥:《人类学论著》,福州:福建人民出版社,1981年。

⑤ 凌纯声:《东南亚古文化研究发凡》,台湾《新生报》副刊“民族学研究专刊”第3期,1950年。

或者是西南地区，恰好都是古代百越活动的地区。据古籍记载，直到秦汉时为止，百越就是分布在我国东南沿海的浙江、江西、福建、广东、广西，经西南的贵州、云南诸省直达中南半岛的一个大的族系。百濮则是我西南的古老部落群，其分布地区往往与分布在西南的百越系统的部落相交错。”“马来人种来源于我国古代的越濮民族。”^①何平教授认为，南岛语民族的发源地应当就在中国，具体来说就在中国包括西南地区在内的整个南方地区。^②总之，近年来国内外越来越多的研究成果表明，这个民族群体与古代中国南方的民族有着密切的渊源关系，南岛语民族先民的主体很可能是从中国南方地区迁徙过去的。

传统理论上，南岛语系的原乡就是中国台湾。^③尽管这是根据考古学、语言学而得出的认识，但通过现在繁复的基因资讯可以确认的是，太平洋岛民的线粒体 DNA 在很早以前的东南亚岛屿就已经存在。与此同时，考古学家对植物和人类遗骸的最新研究表明，台湾新石器时代的文化和大陆存在紧密联系，也为南岛语族源自古代华南大陆提供了证据。^④中国东南及环太平洋地区史前考古国际学术研讨会上公布的最新研究成果指出，南岛语系也可能起源于其他地区，台湾并不是南岛语系向南扩散的唯一出口。利用各种机会和条件，南岛语系同样可以经过福建和两广沿海地区扩散。台湾考古学家臧振华认为，南岛语系的起源和扩散应该涵盖福建以南到北部湾沿海地区，即南岛语系可能通过华南到中南半岛，再扩散至太平洋诸岛屿，^⑤这为“南岛语系多元路径扩散论”提供了更多证据。

① 许友年：《马来民歌同中国民歌的比较》，《外国语言与文学》1982年第1期。

② 何平：《中国西南与东南亚跨境民族的形成及其族群认同》，《广西民族研究》2009年第3期。

③ 何大安、杨秀芳：《南岛语与台湾南岛语》，《台湾南岛语言丛书导论》，台北：远流出版事业股份有限公司，2000年。

④ 吴春明：《中国东南土著民族历史与文化的考古学观察》，厦门：厦门大学出版社，1999年。

⑤ 臧振华：《再论南岛语族的起源与扩散问题》，《南岛研究杂志》（*Journal of Austronesian Studies*）2012年第1期。

关于我国南方古越族及其先民与南太平洋群岛居民之间在文化传统上存在着的渊源关系，历来都为学界所关注。目前围绕我国南沙群岛、中沙群岛、西沙群岛引起的国际性争端不断，研究南岛语族的起源不光可以解答国际上困惑已久的学术问题，而且对于阐述三沙群岛自古以来是我国的神圣领土具有十分重要的历史意义与现实意义。

二 语言学视野

19 世纪末以来，国外学者就南岛语族的起源问题有着多种不同的观点和看法。比较早期的说法，包括该语言起源于密克罗尼西亚、中国长江之南、中南半岛、西新几内亚等不同观点。20 世纪 40 年代，国际学术界多认为其源头是在菲律宾群岛，后来又普遍认为起源于台湾岛，至 20 世纪前半期，一些学者分别从不同角度将南岛语人群的起源与扩散研究和中国大陆东南部地区联系起来。自 1970 年起，历史语言学研究已确定中国台湾世居民众的语言为南岛语族最古老的语言分支，这一结论表明中国台湾是南岛语族最早的发源地之一，并推测与台湾相邻的大陆东南沿海也应该是南岛语族的重要发源地。^① 语言学研究的这一重大进展推动了考古学界对南岛语族起源的研究，西方考古界关于东南亚乃至太平洋南岛民族与中国大陆东南沿海之间的关系，先后有两种代表性观点。20 世纪 70 年代，美国考古学家威廉·G. 索尔海姆（William G. Solheim II）提出了“东南亚文化中心论”，认为东南亚岛屿（Island Southeast Asia）是南岛语族的老家，中国沿海乃至日本一带的南岛人都是从南方扩散而来。^② 随着研究的深入，索尔海姆的观点逐渐成为少数。到 1990 年前后，澳大利亚国立大学的彼得·贝尔伍德（Peter Bellwood）教授提出了南岛语族“出台湾说”（out of Taiwan），认为原南岛语族是在新石器时代起源于中国大陆东南沿海，后迁徙到中国台

① 李壬癸：《珍惜台湾南岛语言》，台北：前卫出版社，2010 年。

② Cavalli-Sforza L. L.：《追踪亚当与夏娃——从演化历史看基因、民族和语言的关系》，吴一丰、郑谷苑、杨晓珮等译，台北：远流出版事业股份有限公司，2003 年。

湾,由中国台湾经菲律宾北部进入东南亚群岛,然后又扩散到太平洋,中国台湾是南岛语族的老家。^① 贝尔伍德的这个理论符合大多数学者的认识,直到今天仍然是国际学术界的主流观点。也有一些学者把南岛语族的发源地锁定在中国云南。例如,温斯泰德认为,从语言根据来说,马来族的故乡可以在占婆、交趾支那和柬埔寨探索,而现在从文化证据来说,则可以把它的位置放在中国云南的西北方。^② 随着各方面研究的不断深入开展,目前又有很多学者以考古证据为依托提出其发源地应该位于以福建沿海为中心的中国东南沿海一带。通过大量的对比研究,考古学家发现,无论是在语言、体形、基因还是出土文物上,“南岛语族”群体都和当今的福建人有着惊人的相似。由此,最新研究认为,“以福建沿海为中心的中国东南沿海一带”才是南岛语族的最早源头,也是“南岛语族”先民即将走向茫茫海洋之前,在亚欧大陆上的最后一片栖息地。同时,也再次说明了海峡两岸文化自古有着同根同源、一脉相承的深厚渊源。^③

由此可见,南岛语族先民的迁徙是持续的、动态的。学者们综合了语言学、人类学、考古学等多个学科的资料和证据,初步勾画了一幅南岛语族的扩散图。目前,大多学者认为南岛民族的先民是分两批迁往东南亚地区的。虽然学界对南岛语族的起源与扩散至今仍有不同的看法,但目前南岛语族的发源地在中国的南方地区这一观点得到了中外大多数学者的认同。虽然关于南岛语族先民的迁徙还没有定论,但我们大致可以勾勒出这样一幅图景:南岛语族的先民从中国南方地区出发,分批沿着不同的路线迁徙到东南亚地区;他们来到东南亚后,在各个地区定居下来,与当地的居民混合,在自身的发展与外来因素的影响下,形成了我们今天见到的南岛语族的主体。

① Peter Bellwood, “The Prehistory of Island Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Research”, *Journal of World Prehistory*, 1987.

② [英] 理查德·温斯泰德:《马来亚史》,姚梓良译,北京:商务印书馆,1974年。

③ 李国庆:《福建沿海考古与南岛语族起源探秘》,《大众考古》2014年第3期。

三 特色研究

（一）树皮布文化

树皮布文化是南岛语族的文化特征之一。树皮布是一种由拍打技术制作而成的布料。树皮布属于无纺织布体系，与经纬结构的纺织布体系组成了传统服饰的两大体系。由于树皮布由植物纤维组成，史前时期的树皮布实物很难保存下来，研究史前树皮布文化，对研究南岛语族起源问题具有积极的意义。

澳大利亚国立大学教授洪晓纯研究发现，南岛语族地区至今仍流行树皮布文化，而对树皮布原材料之一构树的DNA鉴定结果显示，华南及台湾均为构树遗传多样性最高的地区，说明南岛语族的起源地也包括广大的华南地区。她认为，从新石器文化演变的角度来看，当时的文化扩散一定是存在多元路径的。^①

研究史前时期的树皮布文化，可以通过民族学调查现今遗存下来的树皮布文化来了解史前树皮布的制造工艺，同时通过考古学来研究保存下来的用于制造树皮布的石拍，以此推测树皮布文化的传播线路。研究表明，史前树皮布石拍最早出现在环珠江口一带，树皮布文化可能发源于此；关于树皮布文化的传播路径，可能存在东、西两条线路：东线为中国环珠江口地区—中国台湾地区—菲律宾—太平洋岛屿，西线为环珠江口—中南半岛—太平洋岛屿。南岛语族族源地也可能在环珠江口一带，史前南岛语族的迁徙可能存在两条线路：东线为中国环珠江口地区—中国台湾地区—菲律宾—太平洋岛屿，西线为环珠江口—中南半岛—太平洋岛屿。南岛语族的分布范围与树皮布文化的分布范围几乎一致。文化的传播需要人作为载体，树皮布文化的传播路径很可能就是南

^① 张弛、洪晓纯：《华南和西南地区农业出现的时间及相关问题》，《南方文物》2009年第3期。

岛语族的迁徙路径。

从考古学角度分析,根据世界树皮布技术的扩散过程,呈现南中国—中南半岛—菲律宾—中美洲的传播路径,并与人类学上南岛语族的传播极为相似。树皮布技术是南岛语民族文化要素之一,中国环珠江口地区距今约 7000 年前树皮布制作石拍的大量出土发现,也将为未来南岛语言祖先来源的探索、研究开拓广阔前景。

(二) 独木舟寻根

2010 年法属波利尼西亚独木舟协会发起和组织了“寻根”活动,按照传统方式驾驶仿古独木舟,借助星象、季风和洋流,从南太平洋上的法属波利尼西亚大溪地出发,途经 10 个国家和地区,历时近 4 个月,经过 1.6 万海里的艰难航行,最终抵达目的地——中国福州,展开了一次不同寻常的“寻根之旅”。这次特殊的“寻根之旅”,正是模仿和沿着南岛语族先民当年从中国东南沿海迁徙至太平洋诸岛屿的方式和路线,反向航行,回到起源地福建来“寻根”并开展文化交流。独木舟成功的漂徙,也进一步证明了通过独木舟这一海上交通工具,南岛语族先民完全可以具备从福建迁徙到南太平洋各岛的必要条件。

这次“寻根之旅”航程万里,路途艰难,极富探索精神,是一次让世人仰慕的海上探险,既有求证南岛语系先民迁徙繁衍的考古意义,又有促进环太平洋各国人民交流合作的现实意义。而将世界的目光聚焦在福建这个南岛语族的发源地,对福建也有着非同凡响的意义。

(三) 中美考古

福建省博物院考古队队长、研究员林公务,考古队副研究员范雪春等专家,与美国夏威夷大学教授白瑞·罗莱、那肯拉·斯弟尔、鲍尔·卡若斯,美国哈佛大学人类学系焦天龙博士,夏威夷大学人类学系等联合组织的考古队,于 2003 年进驻东山岛陈城镇澳角渔村,就“航海术·新石器时代台湾海峡的交流与南岛语族分布”这一课题,对距台

湾海峡最近的福建东山岛大帽山新石器时代贝丘遗址，进行了进一步的发掘考证。经中美两国考古学者两年多来的联合考察和研究证实，南太平洋、印度洋的“南岛语族”曾在新石器时期到达福建省，并形成了福建当地的土著居民。这一重大发现证明了在新石器时代以前，南岛人在福建也有分布。考察队形成了比较一致的观点：从东山发掘的文物和台湾澎湖地区考古发现的文物完全一样；以往有的学者主张“南岛语族”最早起源于菲律宾的说法不确切；“南岛语族”的最早起源地应是中国大陆福建东南沿海一带，再向中国台湾、菲律宾和大洋洲等地传播。台湾已查找到“南岛语族分布”的确切证据，而东山与台湾不仅地域接近，而且发现刚出土的大量文物与台湾、澎湖的文物十分相似，年代也比较早，可以得出台湾的土著活动范围涉及东山岛的结论。这对“南岛语族”是否分布于福建东南沿海一带以及闽台史前关系的渊源，有着重要的研究价值，为其研究提供了非常丰富的依据。

四 最新发展

中国首个国际性南岛语族考古研究机构——国际南岛语族考古基地于2017年11月7日在福建省平潭综合实验区挂牌成立。国际南岛语族考古研究基地由中国社会科学院考古研究所、福建博物院以及平潭综合实验区联合共建，位于平潭综合实验区平原镇上攀村，集文物资料整理、修复、标本保管、科研、教育、展览、公共文化普及等功能于一体。“国际南岛语族研究中心”也在此基础上一并成立。

国际南岛语族考古基地包括四大功能区：科研区、展示区、遗址保护区和生活服务区。该基地具有七项功能：闽台地区乃至我国东南地区史前文化遗址考古调查、发掘、研究基地；“国际南岛语族起源与扩散”课题研究基地；国际南岛语族研究机构和专家开展学术研讨交流的平台；集平潭地区史前遗址出土文物标本保管、整理、修

复、展示于一体的综合性研究基地；考古博物馆专业人员培训实习基地；开展公众考古以及历史文化教育的基地；平潭人文旅游重要景点。

考古研究表明，平潭与马祖这两个地方在距今 6000 多年前就开始来往、互动，平潭跟马祖可以串联在一起，合力发展海上文化旅游活动。距今 7000 多年的壳丘头遗址是平潭乃至我国史前海洋文明的重大考古发现。目前国际学术界普遍认为以福建沿海为中心的我国沿海区域是南岛语族的起源地，而平潭正好位于这个起源地的核心区。国际南岛语族考古研究基地依托平潭壳丘头遗址聚落群而建，将通过开展考古工作，搭建一个国际南岛语族研究专家学术交流、研讨、合作的平台，打造一个集文物保护、科研教学、人文旅游观光等为一体的综合性基地。该基地将发展成为南岛语族学术的焦点、中心，带动学术界研究热潮。近年来，中国社科院考古研究所与福建博物院文物考古研究所在平潭开展了大量系统的考古调查、勘探，新发现一大批史前遗址，这些遗址不仅填补了平潭史前文化发展脉络的一些缺环，对于研究福建史前文化、闽台关系、南岛语族起源等课题都有重大意义。

国际南岛语族考古基地的建设，有利于加强“南岛语族”及我国海洋文化理论研究，扩大中国在“南岛语族”沿线国家和地区中的影响力，使其成为联结海峡两岸的文化纽带和建设“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”本土文化资源的有力措施，彰显我国海洋文明的辉煌历史。

结 论

根据人类非洲起源的路线和证据，不难发现，南岛语系是许多语系的祖先之一（比较语言学的音变鉴定），在印度尼西亚爪哇岛发掘的智人远远早于在南亚发掘的智人。已故语言学家邢公畹认为南岛语系起源于汉藏语系这一观点显然不成立，反而是南岛语系对汉藏语系的藏语产

生了深刻的影响,^① 证据便是在藏语中有马来语同源词的音变,是在马来语词根上的叠加和变形,但在马来语中却无藏语词根的叠加和变形。这就道明了南岛语系通过影响南亚语系来影响汉藏语系与壮侗语系。南岛各族的语言与中亚属于印欧语系的语言有异,与东亚、东南亚的其他语言也截然不同,其中仅波利尼西亚语和日语的部分词汇从发音学的角度是相近的。

语言是社会的活化石,有许多历史谜团主要靠研究上古语言来逐步解决。南岛语言属黏着型语言,主要构词和构形手段是词根添上附加成分和词根的重叠或部分重叠。常用词大多为双音节,音节构造较简单。大多数词根既能作名词,也能作动词;人名、普通名词、方位名词分别用不同的冠词;代词第一人称有“我们”和“咱们”的区别;数词有十进位的,还有五进位甚至四进位的;动词有式、时、体、态的范畴。词序往往随谓语的性质而变动,有的语言动词出现在主语之后,有的语言动词出现在句首。^② 笼统地将南岛人归为一种起源是错误的,南岛人只是语言比较学上的划分,而不是人种的划分。从库克船长开始,许多学者试着来解释这个族群,他们首先勾画出了南岛语族宽广的分布范围:从非洲东岸的马达加斯加岛,越过半个地球,到南美洲西面的复活节岛;从北半球的台湾岛和夏威夷群岛,跨过赤道,到南半球的新西兰岛。然后,学者们开始孜孜不倦地为这个族群寻找故乡,西新几内亚、中南半岛、印尼附近岛屿……中外学者们给出了一个又一个答案,到了今天,越来越多的学者倾向于这样一个论断:南岛语族起源于中国大陆东南地区,南岛语族的祖先向太平洋地区的扩散是哥伦布发现新大陆之前人类历史上最伟大的海上殖民。南岛语族起源于中国东南沿海,后经台湾岛向太平洋传播。近年来的考古学与人类学的研究表明:福建是“南岛语族”的重要发源地。

① 邢公畹:《关于汉语南岛语的发生学关系问题——L. 沙加尔〈汉语南岛语同源论〉述评补证》,《民族语文》1991年第3期。

② 孙宏开、江荻:《汉藏语言系属分类之争及其源流》,《当代语言学》1999年第2期。

On the Origin of “Austronesian Language Family”

Chi Xiaofei

Abstract: Since the 19th century, as for the origin of the “Austronesian language family”, many Chinese and foreign scholars have proposed a variety of different hypothesis of origins and diffusion models from the perspectives of linguistics, archaeology and ethnology. The origin and spread of the Austronesian language family has been a major controversial theoretical issue in linguistics, archaeology and other related fields. This paper combs different Chinese and foreign hypotheses about the origin and spread of the Austronesian language family, lists the representative viewpoints of Chinese and foreign scholars, and from an interdisciplinary perspective combines linguistics, history, archaeology, anthropology to conduct interdisciplinary research and proposes new thinking on the origin and spread of the Austronesian language family, and look forward to drawing conclusions closer to the historical reality.

Keywords: Austronesia Language Family; Linguistics; Southern China

A Forgotten Chinese Army

——*Chinese Soldiers POWs of the Japanese in New Britain Island*

Mingxian Su *

Abstract: During the Pacific War, a group of Chinese soldiers POWs were secretly sent to New Britain Island as forced labours. The remnant of over 700 these Chinese soldiers was liberated by Australian forces after surrender of Japanese army in August 1945. Both Australian and Chinese governments leaned it was a “forgotten Chinese army”, the repatriation of these POWs to their home was on the agenda. However, they experienced extreme difficulties in two years before came back to their homeland.

Keywords: Chinese Soldiers POWs; Japanese Ill-treatment; Liberation; Repatriation

After the Japanese was defeated and announced to surrender to Allies on 15 August 1945, the Australians tried to get detailed information about their over 1000 lost servicemen who were captured in early 1942 after the Japanese had attacked and occupied Rabaul of New Britain Island, the then capital city of Australian Mandated Territory New Guinea. However, on 4 September at

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the first face-to-face meeting with the Japanese regarding the scheduled formal surrender two days late, they were told that the Japanese didn't hold large numbers of Australian POWs, apart from 28 European prisoners of war and 8000 Asians. The Australians were very disappointed for such a result, because Europeans were unexpected as eighteen of them were British gunners, seven American, one Australian, one New Zealander and one Dutchman, and so were the large numbers of Asians, including 1397 Chinese^①. At this time, the Australians were still not sure the identities of these Chinese prisoners of war. Six days after, Australian forces reoccupied Rabaul. They finally realised that the group of 748 Chinese prisoners of war was a "lost army" of China, and others were Cantonese laborers^②.

Such a discovery raised questions: who were these Chinese servicemen and where were they from? With the assistance of Tim Mack, Chinese interpreter between the Australian forces and Chinese troops, and Rev James Ferguson of The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), a former Australian missionary in China, the Australians learnt that they were the remnants of double that number (1504) originally before transported to Rabaul in late 1942, and were used as forced laborers to serve the Japanese in New Britain and surrounding islands. Actually, they were originally combined by two portions of prisoners of war: 1000 of them were taken from Nanking (Nanjing) camp, the other 504 soldiers were from Zhejiang province.

These 1000 prisoners of war from Nanking were composed by different Chinese troops according to places and periods when they were captured by the Japanese. (1) Soldiers from the "Lost Battalion" (四行孤军营) of the crack 88th Division who defended four bank's warehouse in Shanghai in November 1937 seem the most significant. Originally, 57 of these POWs were brought to Rabaul, but only

① Hank Nelson, "The Return to Rabaul 1945", *The Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1995, p. 132.

② "Chinese 'Lost Army' Found", *The Daily News* (Perth), September 18, 1945, p. 7. Men of Lost Army at Rabaul, *News* (Adelaide), September 20, 1945, p. 8.

36 of them survived when the Australians found them in September 1945. Since Shanghai was fallen into the Japanese hand in the fall of 1937, they were taken as prisoners of war. In other words, these men liberated in Rabaul had been interned nearly eight years^①. (2) Soldiers from the so-called Loyal Army for National Salvation (忠义救国军) under command of General Dai Li (戴笠). This special troop had plenty of affiliated guerilla forces fighting in Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, including suburbs surrounding Shanghai, particularly conducting sabotages to the Japanese. Most of them were captured in 1941 and 1942 during village sweeping activities launched by the Japanese forces. The original figures of this group brought to Rabaul was unknown, but over 100 of them survived. (3) Men from 1st war zone in North China who were soldiers of 9th, 14th, 15th and 27th Armies, the main body of the nationalist forces in Shanxi and Henan provinces under command of General Wei Lihuang (卫立煌). They were captured after fierce fighting to the Japanese during Zhongtiao Mountains Campaign in May 1941. They were interned in Nanking camp of prisoners of war before shipping to New Britain Island in late 1942. The figure of their survivors was similar to those originally from Loyal Army for National Salvation. (4) A small group was composed of soldiers from New 4th Army under command of the Chinese Communist Party. Considering its theatres of war mostly covering the above three provinces similar to the Loyal Army of National Salvation, it is not surprised that some of soldiers from New 4th Army were captured by the Japanese during different battles. Eight of them survived in Rabaul. (5) Soldiers of new 30th Division affiliated to 88th Army. This division participated in early stage of battles of Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign launched by the Japanese in May 1942. The captured soldiers were soon transformed to Nanking prisoners of war

① Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 52. "Chinese Soldiers Prisoners for Eight Years", *Daily Advertiser* (Wagga Wagga), September 20, 1945, p. 2.

camp. Around 50 of them survived in Rabaul finally. (6) Others were mostly guerilla forces and militia units affiliated to the above mentioned Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provincial governments and headquarters of 3rd and 5th war zones. Most of them were captured during the Japanese anti-guerilla sweep in 1942^①.

Other portion of 504 Chinese prisoners of war came from Zhejiang province, all of them were soldiers of 86th Army who fought the Japanese in Quzhou in late May and early June 1942 during Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign. They were captured after defending Quzhou which was under siege of the Japanese and had been attacked over 4 days. They were interned somewhere in Zhejiang before transported to Shanghai in late December in the same year, from Wusong port, departing two days late than their Nanking fellows, they were shipped to Rabaul. Since concentrated on Shanghai, this Zhejiang group had been headed by Lt Col Woo Yien (吴揆). Around 331 of them were liberated by the Australian forces in Rabaul in September 1945^②.

At the beginning of the face-to-face meeting between the Australians and the Japanese, the later advised that 8000 Asiatic prisoners of war in Rabaul area as special service corps of the Japanese. According to this, when the Australian forces liberated the remnants of 1504 Chinese servicemen prisoners, their status whether regarded as forced laborers or prisoners of war became a question, it required a classification as soon as possible. Fortunately, just one week after, on 18 September, DPW&I (Directorate of Prisoners of War and Internees) of Army headquarters confirmed that these Chinese servicemen were classified as recovered prisoners of war^③. In fact, the Australian forces in Rabaul seemed to understand that these Chinese troops were their Allied comrades. They had reasons to do so as the Australian Imperial Force sent a

① Transcripts of evidence-Court No 114-Accused Ayizawa Harumoto, Shooting of Chinese at Rabaul, AWM54, 1010/3/15.

② Treatment of Chinese Prisoners of War-statements by Lt Col Woo Yien of Chinese Army-Major Chen Kwok Leong and Chinese Civilians, 1946, AWM54, 1010/4/153.

③ Repatriation of Chinese from Rabaul, NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

contingent named “Tulip Force” to China in late 1941 and early 1942, on mission to provide technical aid and training to Chinese guerrillas in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces operating against the Japanese^①. In other words, as Allied soldiers, they once fought together shoulder by shoulder by facing the common enemy. The liberated Chinese soldiers seemed also sharing the same feeling. On 17 September, when an Australian party approached a camp containing about 70 Chinese soldiers, they stood outside the internment camp to welcome their Allies, holding a long banner inscribed “the road to victory was a success”, “welcome victory for friendly Australian Imperial forces!”^② The Australians were touched as they noticed that these Chinese soldiers cut up shirts and made themselves special hats and regimental insignia so that they would not be mistaken for Japanese. They also made Chinese national flag hung on the camp gate to welcome their Allied comrades to identify where they were from. The Australians had a strong impression that these Chinese soldiers were proud and defiant, never yielded to the Japanese. They stoically awaited the day of their release^③. Indeed, the Australians learnt that these Chinese prisoners of war had been treated by the Japanese worse than other Asiatic in New Britain during the past two and a half of years. Half of them died as a result of Japanese maltreatment. Some died from ill-treatment, and others took their own lives. The death rate of Chinese POWs in New Britain and surrounding islands was higher as Japanese atrocities, which included mass murder, shooting, slaughter by swords and bayonets, buries alive, etc.^④ Their fate could be compared with 600 English gunners who were captured in Singapore and were also taken to Ballalae Island in 1942. All of

① Australian Cadre in China, NAA: A816 52/302/118.

② “Chinese Troops Among Japs on Gazelle Peninsula”, *Canberra Times*, September 19, 1945, p. 1.

③ “Chinese Troops Found on New Britain”, *Northern Star* (Lismore), September 19, 1945, p. 1.

④ AWM54, 1010/3/15; Trial of War Criminals-WO Matsumoto Toratura; S/Maj Inagaki Masaku-charged with torturing Chinese at Rabaul, 1943, Transcripts of Evidence, 1945, AWM54, 1010/6/37.

them died either by ill-treatment or killing, apart from 28 of them were left in Rabaul because of sickness during their transferring from Singapore to Ballalae Island^①.

When handing over details of all POWs to the Australians, the Japanese claimed that the captured Chinese soldiers were listed as members of a Special Service Corps or Company to serve the Japanese imperial army and navy in New Britain. The difference between prisoners and service corps was important because it changed legal status. The purpose is to claim these Chinese POWs in the service corps was subject to Japanese military law, no matter how they were treated by the Japanese, if prisoners were supposed to be treated according to international convention^②. More sinister plot of this claim was to change the legal status of these Chinese soldiers from prisoners into collaborators of the Japanese. Such a claim was vociferously opposed by these Chinese soldiers; even during Rabaul war criminal trial in 1946 they clearly stated that the Chinese forces were not known as a special service company^③. Obviously, this Japanese plot seemed unsuccessful, the Australians also ignored it because they knew the fact that large number of Allied prisoners of war were taken by the Japanese to Thailand, Hainan Island, Taiwan and Japan during the Pacific War as the forced laborers to meet Japanese military demands. Japanese war crimes and atrocities to Allied POWs were notorious. The Chinese soldiers were not different from the fate of Allied POWs.

With the confirmation of these unexpected Chinese soldiers as Allied comrades, the Australian forces in New Britain soon provided food supplies and medical treatment to their Chinese fellows to make them rapid recovery

① War Crimes-Ballalae (Ballalai) Island-Massacre of 400 British PW, NAA; MP742/1, 336/1/1460. Also see; Ballalae Island case-Investigations into the fate of 300 Europeans, Interrogations of Senior Japanese Officers with a view to ascertaining the unit and its responsibility for the custody of Europeans, AWM54, 1010/9/65.

② Rabaul-Report on Civilians and Prisoners of War, AWM127, 13.

③ AWM54, 1010/3/15; and AWM54, 1010/4/153.

from starvation and suffered tropical diseases and malnutrition^①. On 26 September, these 748 Chinese soldiers were finally concentrated on their new camps on shores of Blanche Bay and reorganised into two temporary battalions: one was those from Nanking, and others from Zhejiang, the commanding officer of the whole recovered Chinese POWs was Lt Col Woo Yien. It seemed that this was a temporary arrangement before they were repatriated to China. To show their loyalty to homeland and celebrate victory over Japan, the recovered Chinese soldiers since then took only two week undergoing intensive drill daily, in anticipation of a parade on October 10, China's National Day ceremony on their camp, which was attended by Major General Kenneth William Eather, GOC of 11th Australian Division, whose troops reoccupied Rabaul and liberated the Chinese.

On September 18, 1945, the Australians formally informed Chinese Legation with this surprise finding of Chinese troops in New Britain, expecting the Chinese government evacuated them home soon. However, response from Chinese authorities to this discovery was much slower. In surprising such a lost army appeared in Australia's mandated territory, on 9 October, 1945, Ministry of War required Chinese Legation in Australia to investigate these recovered POWs' identities and serviced units etc, as Chinese Army headquarters actually didn't have any information about the fate of their defeated troops in above mentioned battles and campaigns^②. Obviously the Australians were not satisfactory to Chinese Legation as so far it didn't give advice regarding evacuation of them home over one month after providing information of these Chinese POWs. Australian demobilization actually began on 1 October according to the War Cabinet's decision earlier. Even during liberating Allied POWs in New Britain, the Australian Army already required advices to evacuate the recovered POWs by

① "Liberated Chinese Recovering Near Rabaul", *Kalgoorlie Miner* (WA), October 9, 1945, p. 2.

② Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 2.

their nations. Accordingly, all of their rescue efforts of food supplies and medical treatment to POWs were temporary actions. The first stage of demobilization might affect Australian 11th Division. They expected all POWs were repatriated back to their home countries before this Division was withdrawn to Australia.

At the same time, the recovered Chinese POWs seemed that they could not just wait and eagerly expected to be repatriated to China, particularly when they saw that Indian, Indonesian and Malayan POWs were communicating with their home country authorities and preparing for repatriation, but they didn't have any instructions from Chinese Legation in Canberra. Perhaps based on either strong demands of Chinese soldiers or encouragement of Australian troops, Lt Col Woo Yien was arranged by Australian Army to fly from Rabaul to Sydney on 19 October, with purpose of reporting to both Chinese Legation and Australian Army headquarters about situation of recovered Chinese POWs and seeking advices for their early repatriation. With assistance of DPW&I, Woo Yien travelled to Canberra and met with a Chinese Legation representative to discuss every important matter relating to Chinese troops in Rabaul. The result of this meeting was a long cable to Chungking (Chongqing). Both Chinese Legation and POWs in Rabaul then awaited advices what steps have been taken to repatriate these soldiers to China. The Chinese Minister to Australian did not have authority to discuss repatriation matter with the Australian Government before receiving directions from Chungking^①. It seems that details of Chinese POWs reached to Ministry of War and Army headquarters. Woo Yien and his fellows expected to return China soon.

As one of Big Five in Allies, China was supposed to be able to provide transportation to evacuate her fellows back home, because property of the Japanese Imperial Navy's China Fleet was theoretically taken by Chinese

① Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, pp. 4-5. NAA; NAA; A6059, 23/441/28.

Government in September after Japanese surrender. Ironically, these ships were either worn out or small volume of tonnage which were unable to voyage in the ocean. More importantly, all ships of Chinese Navy were destroyed or sunk by the Japanese during the war. In other words, Chinese Government was unable to provide any her own ships to evacuate her fellows at that time^①. Ministry of War finally advised Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 November to request British Pacific Fleet to provide shipping for movement of Chinese soldiers to China. Captain Wang Chikuang (王致光), naval attaché of Chinese Legation, actually discussed with Australian Army regarding the repatriation of Chinese POWs in early November, but the Australians stated no available shipping as Australian servicemen were also waiting for large number of ships to repatriate them home urgently according to the plan of demobilisation. The suggestion to seek help of British Pacific Fleet was originally from the Australians.

British Pacific Fleet rejected the above request on 8 December on the pretext of New Britain being under control of General MacArthur. In whole month of December, British authorities in India and Malay and Government of Netherlands East Indies were busy to move Indians, Indonesians and Malaysians, including servicemen and civilians or forced laborers, from New Britain to deferent destinations of above lands. But in the same time, there was no any signal for repatriating Chinese home. Morale among these personnel was already low. Conflicts, even riots, were run among different groups of soldiers, between servicemen and civilians by political differences and depressions, etc.^② With the fear of the whole Chinese troops losing control in such a bad situation, Lt Col Woo Yien reported to both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War by a cable on Christmas eve and indicated that all of these service personnel and civilians

① Guo Liang, "The Glorious Evidence: Postwar Chinese Navy Took over Japanese Surrendered and Compensated Warships", *Modern Weaponry*, Vol. 7, 2013.

② "Near Civil War in Rabaul", *News*, Nov. 12, 1945, p. 4.

desired to be repatriated as soon as possible.^① In response to this appeal, in early January 1946, Ministry of War turned to General Headquarters for the Allied Powers in Tokyo for assistance according to British Pacific Fleet's suggestion. The hope was broken up on 1 February, Tokyo replied: "New Britain is mandate of Australia. Military control is exercised by Australian military forces. Repatriation of Chinese from New Britain is a matter to be arranged between Chinese Government and Australian Government. No action is being taken here."^② It meant that Chinese Legation had to deal with Australian authorities again for repatriation of Chinese from Rabaul, including recovered prisoners of war and civilian laborers.

Dr. K. C. Cheng (郑康祺), Chinese Minister to Australia, then negotiated with Australia's Department of External Affairs (DEA). After several meetings and discussions, the Australians admitted in principle to provide a vessel to carry on this repatriation in late March. It indicated that the Australians had obviously realised repatriation was an inevitable responsibility for Australian Government, as Australian Army also recommended that representation be made to repatriate Chinese service and civilian persons soonest especially some Chinese have been POWs for nine years, Army pushed DEA to take urgent action for this matter^③. However, DEA still had an off chance that the Americans could help. During this time, UNRRA (The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) was involved in this matter as the Chinese Government had approached UNRRA with the view of effecting early repatriation of civilians. On 14 March, UNRRA cabled Australian government and stated that it was able to assist repatriation of both Chinese service personnel and

① Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, pp. 16 – 17.

② Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 24.

③ NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

civilians as all necessary arrangements ready for completion by UNRRA and AFWESPAC (U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific). It was necessary for Australian Government to formally request transportation assistance from AFPAC (Australian Liaison Section Army Forces Pacific) through Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP). In the coming months, the Australians informed Chinese Legation accordingly and both Chinese and Australian representatives in Tokyo worked together to lobby SCAP. However, on 17 June, they received a disappointing reply:

“It is regretted that General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, is not in position to be of direct assistance in this matter as the question of the assignment of shipping for this purpose in one which lies without its purview to determine. If neither China nor Australia processes the necessary shipping and if it is desired to obtain shipping from the United States, the problem might be taken up with United State Government through diplomatic channels.”^①

All hopes were destroyed. Now it was again a matter between Australian and Chinese governments. Army regarded evacuation of Chinese troops on highest level. The worse situation of Chinese in Rabaul further pushed the Australians to locate a ship for them. On 5 May, Lt Col Woo Yien cabled Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting that 5% of soldiers had depression which was nearly out of control. He urged to provide vessel for transporting these service personnel back to China. Major Lee Waisin (李惟恂), from Loyal Army for National Salvation, in letters written in early 1946 also reported to his superior General Guo Luzhou (郭履洲) about lower morale and fierce conflict among servicemen, and requested to rapidly evacuate them. Lt Zhu Yun (朱云) of the “Lost Battalion” also wrote letters in May to General Sun Yuanliang (孙元良), his former Division Commander,

① Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 43.

described the difficulties of him and his fellows surviving for nearly nine years as captives, and cried for earlier repatriation. All of these formed a force to push Chinese Legation further negotiating with Australian authorities to relocate an available vessel. More importantly, Yoizuki Affair occurred in Rabaul in March 1946. The affair was related to a so-called “Japanese ‘hell ship’”, which was described as a grave responsibility upon the Federal Labor Government for the sending of an overcrowded Japanese destroyer with prisoners of war and internees from Sydney to Japan, was made in early March by the Anti-Labor Press under very suspicious and degrading circumstances. The matter calmed down two weeks after, as the Japanese hospital ship Hikawa Maru sailed on 14 March for Taiwan from Rabaul with 350 Formosan men, women and children taken off the overcrowded Japanese destroyer Yoizuki at General MacArthur’s request.^① The affair might have caused some troubles for Federal Labor Government, but both Chinese service personnel and civilians in Rabaul were badly upset by the reality of its processing. At the same time, the Australian government just agreed to provide transportation to ship Chinese back to China, however, while these Chinese men saw ships arrived in Rabaul, not embarking them but taking Japanese, Formosans and even Koreans home. Also, General MacArthur rejected to provide any vessel to ship these Allied prisoners of war to China, but enabled to send hospital ship to the same place-Rabaul, repatriating only 350 Formosans home. Chinese personnel and civilians seemed to be completely ignored. A strongly unfair feeling simmered among all Chinese, as they seemed to be the forgotten men of Rabaul. According to Australian press, all the Indonesian, Malay, and Indian prisoners of war liberated at Rabaul by the Australians had gone home and the Japs were getting away at the rate of 20000 a month, but the Chinese were still there. As a comment on such a repatriation delay by Mr James Ferguson, Senior YMCA officer and chaplain and interpreter to the Chinese forces in Rabaul in May 1946, “The keen

① “Report on Yoizuki”, *The Advertiser*, March 14, 1946, p. 4.

disappointment of the Chinese has been largely overcome by their inexhaustible patience, but their great anxiety is due to the very few replies received in answer to the hundreds of letters sent to China during the past seven months. Letters that have arrived here have brought such sad and discouraged news that the survivors of this tragic force are more anxious than ever to return home.”^① This was another force to drive the Australians to concentrate on solving this matter. To cope with the situation of Chinese army and civilian personnel anxious return home, the Australian Army acted more initiatively than DEA officials in May, during which the action had been already taken by a branch to obtain shipping for the return of these personnel, they preferred repatriation from Rabaul be effected as early as is possible and at least before 30 June 1946^②.

In early July, through a close communication with Shipping Control Board, Army obtained information that there would be a ship coming to Rabaul, then sailing to Hong Kong. The Australians in early August had confirmed that the ship named “Reynella” should leave Sydney for Rabaul probably two weeks after, apart from loading approx 6000 tons UNRRA cargo it could also take approx 1200 Chinese to Hong Kong. Dr K. C. Cheng immediately reported to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with this good news on 10 August^③. It seemed that all Chinese service personnel even plus half of civilians should return home soon.

During negotiating and searching shipment, Chinese authorities had put service personnel as first priority of repatriation. Currently at Rabaul, latest figures of the Chinese were 762 servicemen (Lt Col 1, Maj 3, Capt 11, Lts 54, and other ranks 293) and 816 civilians. The desirable scenario of repatriation was to embark all of these 1600 Chinese on one single ship to

① “Japs Gone Home but Chinese Must Wait”, *The Mail* (Adelaide), April 6, 1946, p. 6.

② NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

③ Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 53.

China, either Hong Kong or other destinations of mainland. However, according to current capacity of Reynella for approx 1200 people, an issue raised: whether service personnel or civilians were first priority of repatriation? Army and DEA discussed several times by consulting opinions from local military district. Finally, by the end of August, the recommendation from 8th Military District which was committed to garrison the territory of New Guinea was accepted by Army: first priority for repatriation gave to civilians. This recommendation was based on the following reasons. Firstly, these civilians were a constant source of trouble in Rabaul on account of indiscipline and tendency to commit civil offence from petty thefts to robbery with violence. Secondly, their behaviour and indiscipline had necessitated segregation and confinement to camp in an isolated area under guard. Furthermore, although service personnel contained differing factions, and in many cases their officers appeared to be weak, they were well disciplined and cooperative, due to strict disciplinary control by Lt Col Woo Yien, senior Chinese officer in the area. According to this, arrangements were made for 1114 personnel to be embarked on Reynella, 814 civilians and 300 service personnel (2 Majors, 5 Captains, 27 Lieutenants, and 266 other ranks) separately. Army also agreed to supply a guard of 30 AMF (Australian Military Forces) personnel for voyage from Rabaul to China as requested by Master of Reynella. Previously, Army would consider Chinese service personnel was made responsible for discipline among the civilians and themselves during the voyage, but the civilians would require an AMF ship's guard irrespective of whether Chinese service personnel were embarked or otherwise. Therefore, unless all Chinese civilians were moved in one shipment, the necessity of a further guard for a second shipment would arise. Army's decision seemed to be desired to avoid further burden for the Australians.

On 29 August, Governor of Hong Kong rejected Chinese service personnel's disembarkation in Hong Kong as they would give rise to serious difficulties there, particularly in regard to the service personnel unless direct transshipment to the

interior has been arranged. Two weeks later, Army decided the route of Reynella changed, it would proceed to Shanghai^①. In fact, Dr K. C. Cheng already reached an agreement with Master of Reynella in late August during his inspection to this ship in Sydney, after negotiation between two parties, in which Reynella would sail to Shanghai, as most of Chinese service personnel originally came from northern and eastern China. More importantly, even the voyage from Hong Kong to Shanghai would take extra days, Reynella promised remaining passage fares no change with kindness^②.

On 15 September, after learnt Army's plan for repatriation of Chinese civilians as first priority, Dr K. C. Cheng sent telegram to Minister for External Affairs to urge continuing to carry on original plan for repatriation of Chinese service personnel as first priority, because all of previous arrangements were made for this purpose accordingly. It seemed that the Australians accepted this advice, as Army even indicated on 30 September Reynella accommodation available for all Chinese personnel and civilians. Army's change of repatriation plan was based on a worse situation occurred in Chinese civilian camp in Rabaul, particularly camp captain Lo and his brother were murdered on 8 September between gang conflicts. The authorities had great concern of local circumstance warrant if these civilians who were regarded as trouble source still remained in Rabaul^③. However, in the coming month, after further inspection of Reynella and consultation on shipping safety certificate to confirming its personnel carrying capacity limit 1236, Army finally realized that embarking all Chinese in Reynella was impossible. Especially, none of Australian authorities wanted this repatriation leading to another incident like Yoizuki Affair which broke out in early this year at the same place. To minimize the effect of this trouble source to local

① NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

② Pei-ping Hsieh (ed.), *Repatriated Overseas Chinese after World War II: A Documentary Collection Vol. II: Australia, Soviet, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia*, Taipei: Academia Historica, 2007, p. 63.

③ Repatriation of Chinese from the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, NAA: A518, MX112/1.

community and security, both military and local civil authorities would like to repatriate these Chinese civilians as soon as possible. By late October, Army and DEA then turned to their previous plan to put all civilians in the first repatriation ship. Considering the reality of Chinese civilians and concerns of the Australians, particularly considerable local Chinese population in Rabaul, Chinese Legation in Canberra finally in November had to agree with the plan of civilian priority for repatriation with 1141 Chinese personnel were confirmed to be embarked on the ship. As all Chinese civilians were Cantonese, disembarking them in Hong Kong would be more convenient to access to Canton (Guangzhou) and less costing. Both Chinese and Australian authorities, with assistance of UNRRA, finally reached an agreement with Hong Kong to allow Reynella disembark these civilians there, then take all embarked Chinese service personnel to Shanghai^①.

Previously, Reynella scheduled to depart from Sydney to Rabaul in late August. However, this schedule was delayed by wharfies strike for about four weeks. It left Sydney in early October. After stopping at Port Moresby of Papua and Lae of New Guinea separately, it arrived in Rabaul on 1 November. The vessel was again delayed until mid-December as frequently rescheduling its departure date several times, either uploading extra 2050 tons UNRRA cargo as requested or solving a unpredicted engine trouble of the ship which took about three weeks for repairs, even a tragic incident caused a Chinese soldier shot and killed by allied forces during disturbance at Rabaul on 23 November^②. On 21 December 1946, Reynella finally sailed to Hong Kong then transferred to Shanghai with 1141 Chinese embarked on the ship, including 802 civilians and 339 service personnel. The ship entered port of Hong Kong on 2 January 1947, and arrived at Shanghai 7 days later.

The figure of service personnel in the first repatriation was slightly

① NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

② Enquiry re Incident at Rabaul-Death of Chinese Soldier and Wounding of Another, NAA: MP7421, 85/1/941.

different from original arrangement. They were composed of 11 officers (Capt 1 and Lts 10) and 328 other ranks. Their destinations were: Zhejiang 70, Henan 31, Sichuan 23, Hebei 6, Gansu 3, Guizhou 2, Shanxi 10, Fujian 31, Anhui 10, Jiangxi 36, Jiangsu 12, Shuntian (Beijing) 2, Shandong 9, Guangdong 8, Hubei 25, Hunan 56, and Guangxi 5. According to an approval from Directorate of Shipping made in late October, Lt Col Woo Yien left Rabaul just before Reynella sailed to China. After departure of Reynella, about 420 Chinese service personnel remained in Rabaul waiting for next run of repatriation.

Early in November 1946 when the plan of civilian priority repatriation was confirmed, Chinese Minister had realized the morale of the remained service personnel would be lower once Reynella left but they had to wait. On 27 November, he immediately set up a meeting with Senator W. P. Ashley, Minister of State for Supply and Shipping, urging him in his way to expedite the allocation of shipping to transport the remaining Chinese service personnel from Rabaul to Shanghai. In fact, Australian Government shared Dr. Cheng's feeling, and also wanted to send these Chinese service personnel back China soon. Senator Ashley had a positive reply to Chinese Minister's request, expressing that his department would maintain a collaborative relationship with Department of the Army to ensure an adequate programming of the tonnage available for the various needs to be served by shipping north of Australia, and he then gave instructions to Director of Shipping to examine every possibility of meeting the need of Chinese repatriation and watch closely for every opportunity to bring use of vessels which might come into position. In other words, the sooner the better, because the Australians needed not only to supply rations but also to provide medical treatment and pocket money to the Chinese during their remaining period although the Chinese Government would pay the debts that the Australians made for; more importantly Australian demobilization would end in July next year and 8th Military District would also be abolished, discipline and control of these Chinese service personnel, including public community security, would become a heavy

burden for local civil and military authorities.

Before Reynella sailed to Shanghai, Directorate of Shipping, conjunction with Army, already made contacts with a number of shipping companies intending to relocate a vessel shipping north of Australia, particularly to Japan or Hong Kong. Even in March 1947 when noted that Reynella after returned from China should call Rabaul soon to load general cargo, Army intended to make this vessel available for repatriation of Chinese personnel. However, Reynella was not available for this purpose as it was scheduled to sail to other ports of Australia. Therefore, allocation of other suitable vessels was being pursued. All of these efforts were unsuccessful until early May. Army allocated the vessel "River Norman" which was undergoing repairs in Sydney, the estimated completion of its repairs was in early June. According its schedule, River Norman would load general cargo from Sydney for discharge at Melbourne; after completion of this task, it would load cargo for discharge at Hong Kong. It made the vessel be able to proceed to Rabaul taking on board the remaining Chinese personnel awaiting repatriation, and was expected to sail from Rabaul in early August^①. The reason for departing in this time was based on the fact that River Norman was a cargo ship. The vessel contained capacity for the carriage of 450 persons in the after 'tween decks'. On completion of loading cargo at Melbourne, the tween decks would be thoroughly cleaned up and covered with heavy steel craft on which pallets etc would be laid. It also had not sufficient gallery accommodation for the maintenance of these passengers would be necessary to place on board a big cooker and erect or supply latrines and dining tables. Erection of above equipments required a certain times for completion.

Dr. Cheng's premonition to these remaining Chinese personnel came to truth. Soon after the departure of Reynella, remaining Chinese troops lost control, as Maj Chen Kokleung (陈国樑), Commanding Officer of these soldiers, was important cope with the situation, because he held no

^① NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

delegation Chinese Central Government to command. These service personnel were divided into factions-communist and nationalist, frequently fighting was occurring among them, for some times they had been causing trouble within and outside their camp^①. Also, some friction occurred between Chinese and Australian soldiers in Rabaul, because few interpreters with the Army were poor and misunderstandings were often liable to occur. From Australians' point of view, particularly from H. C. Newman, Assistant Secretary of Defence Division of Department of the Treasury, the Chinese Government was showing little anxiety of their welfare and repatriation^②. Under constant pressure from the Chinese Legation on account of the rise of a serious incident occurring, Army suggested to Chinese Military Attaché to issue written authority appointing Maj Chen Kokleung as Commander all Chinese personnel in Rabaul to restore order in March. After Lt P. C. Lin's inspection to general condition and feelings of recovered Chinese soldiers in Rabaul in April who was posted by Chinese Military Attaché, Army accepted Lt Lin's suggestion to solve the misunderstanding between Chinese and Australians arisen from incommunicability of language. Accordingly, at least one conference was held each week between Lt Park (Australian Army Liaison Officer) and Maj Chen, and two interpreters were employed in each conference, one acting as interpreter, the other as censor. Any complaint and petition other Chinese officers wish to make must first be reported to Maj Chen, who in turn discussed with Lt Park. In this way, mutual understanding was established and the friction was dissolved. In addition, the Australians also increased the quantity of meat and vegetable in their meals to Chinese soldiers, reissued them a complete outfit of summer uniforms, replaced or repaired the leaking canvas tents, and provided small amount of pay to both officers and other ranks^③. In doing so, the situation of restless among recovered Chinese

① Members of the Chinese Army Forces-Rabaul Area, NAA: A549, 88/600/7.

② NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

③ Payment to Chinese Army, NAA: MP742/1, 247/1/1534.

soldiers was under control. Most importantly, River Norman was relocated in May, the Chinese personnel were concentrating preparation for repatriation to China soon.

To ensure all Chinese personnel could be embarked on ship, Army also sent Capt Ralph Newton McCann as a medical officer and Sgt N. W. Tampling as a medical orderly to perform duties to the patients during voyage, for which Army arrange to create a sick bay on River Norman to accommodate nine Chinese personnel suffering from TB. As embarked Chinese personnel were mostly recovered soldiers, no guard was necessary for this repatriation. Also, to fully acquaint with the details of matters relating to Chinese personnel since their recovery from the Japanese, Army appointed Maj A. G. Turner to accompany the vessel as safe conduct officer.

The original arrangement of agreement reached by Chinese Government with the Australian Government was that Chinese personnel would be repatriated to Shanghai. With considerable reluctance with the reason of River Norman unable to sail to Shanghai and as a concession to the Commonwealth Government the Chinese Government had to agree to the repatriation to Canton. Unless the difficulties were absolutely insuperable the Chinese Government was most anxious that repatriation should be to Canton. However, this destination was finally rejected in mid-July. Firstly, the U. K. Food Control, whom the Australians persuaded to give answers the cargo of flour for Hong Kong which was the basic loading of the voyage, had strongly objected for the deviation. Secondly, River Norman could not enter the port of Canton, as her draft would be too great and it was a bar port with a limited depth of water and therefore could only lie outside the entrance and disembark personnel on to barges or other small craft. Thirdly, there might be complications either with the Chinese maritime authorities or later the Hong Kong Government through any special regulations under which the vessel could coke by calling off Canton. As a result, Hong Kong was the destination of repatriation. Similar to the repatriation last year, Hong Kong Government rejected Chinese soldiers to disembark on the land, stating that it should not

be asked to undertake the responsibility for the reception and transfer of so large a party of Chinese soldiers. Although such a move might go through without difficulty, there was the possibility of complications and the possibility that the soldiers might have to be retained in Hong Kong for some days. To avoid the above difficulties, alternatively, in the end of July just before River Norman sailing from Rabaul, Chinese Legation urged to arrange for a suitable small vessel to transfer Chinese soldiers from River Norman direct to Canton^①. There were no answer from Hong Kong authorities even when River Norman departed from Rabaul on 2 August. Finally, on 4 August during the voyage of River Norman, Governor of Hong Kong reluctantly agreed disembarkation of Chinese troops on the land with conditions. According to his requests, firstly the vessel must provide ample notice of exact time of arrival, secondly troops were unarmed when disembarked, and thirdly Chinese Government must be responsible for making arrangements with local authorities and supervising transshipment. From which Governor of Hong Kong agreed Chinese troops repatriated Hong Kong land proceeding Canton by train^②.

Finally, River Norman with embarkation of 418 Chinese personnel (including 49 officers and 377 other ranks, plus 2 civilians) arrived at Victoria Harbour of Hong Kong. They immediately moved to Kowloon train station to transfer to Canton at the same day.^③ Their destinations were as follows: Jiangsu 176, Zhejiang 56, Anhui 33, Jiangxi 19, Hunan 25, Hubei 9, Fujian 7, Guizhou 4, Sichuan 24, Guangdong 6, Guangxi 6, Shangdong 14, Henan 23, Hebei 9, Shaanxi 3, Shanxi 2, and Gansu 1.^④

As prisoners of war, the Chinese troops were in the hands of the

① Inquiries into Japanese Atrocities and Repatriation of Chinese from Rabaul, NAA: A571, 1945/3780.

② NAA: A518, MX112-1.

③ Territory of Papua New Guinea-Relations with China-Chinese in Territory, NAA: A1838, 309/2/1.

④ NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

Japanese for a considerable period before shipped to New Britain as forced laborers in late 1942, they had been in Rabaul nearly two years since their liberation in September 1945. After the disembarkation of them in Hong Kong on 12 August 1947, it indicated that their repatriation had been completed through the efforts of both the Chinese and Australian Governments. During the period of their recovery in Rabaul and repatriation, the Australians took care of both Chinese service personnel and civilians with rationing, clothing, medical treatment and other facilities as the Chinese government would meet these costs. In the first four weeks of liberating the recovered Chinese prisoners of war, the Australian Army contributed to meet all costs. The Chinese Government paid the Australian Army's debit with £ 9848. 4. 1, to cover costs of rationing Chinese soldiers in the period between 7 October 1945 and 15 March 1946. The rest cost with amount of £ 62401. 0. 9 generated since then till the last repatriation of Chinese personnel in August 1947 owing by China was finally recovered by the Australian Government in 1961^①.

① NAA: A6059, 23/441/28.

征稿启事

《太平洋岛国研究》是由聊城大学主办，教育部国别和区域研究中心（备案）、山东省首批重点新型智库建设试点单位太平洋岛国研究中心承办的学术集刊，于2017年春创办，由社会科学文献出版社出版发行。本集刊旨在探讨太平洋岛国历史与现实诸问题，以期促进中国太平洋岛国研究的发展，推动国际学术交流。本集刊重点研究太平洋岛国历史文化、政情政制、对外关系、经贸旅游以及区域一体化，注重创新、探讨、切磋和争鸣，设有多个栏目，欢迎国内外学者不吝赐稿。

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